Writing Malaysia and the Moro Identity: An Analysis of the Moro National Liberation Front's Foreign Policy.

• Author: Mahinay, Krizza Janica
• Position: ARTICLE - Report

Introduction

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), under the leadership of Nur Misuari, started the contemporary Moro rebellion in the 1970s. In its fight against the Philippine state, the group's early supporter was an external actor, namely, Malaysia. As the Philippine sources reported, Malaysia supplied the Moro fighters with weapons and ammunition to fight the Philippine army. (1) There was also evidence that Moro fighters were trained by the Malaysians in Pulau Pangkor and Sabah. (2) In addition, Malaysia became the initial conduit for internationalizing the plight of the Moro people and the struggle of the MNLF. In 1972, Tunku Abdul Rahman, then Malaysian Prime Minister and Secretary-General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), raised the Moro case to the OIC members and convinced them to support it. (3) Likewise, Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein, another Prime Minister of Malaysia, called for the same appeal during the Islamic Summit Conference in Pakistan in 1974. He stated, "We seek to give our Muslim brothers a rightful place in a peaceful world." (4) In the same way, the Moros saw the Malaysians as their natural allies, a perception based on their common ethnic ties. (5) Their shared religion served as another factor in establishing close relations. (6) Accordingly, their bond served the MNLF in their battle against the Philippine state since it provided international support and legitimacy to the group.

However, the relations between Malaysia and the MNLF started changing in 2001. The MNLF began describing Malaysia as an accomplice of the Philippine state in colonizing and oppressing the Moro people. Particularly, Misuari accused Malaysia of illegally occupying Sabah, which he now claimed to be part of the Moro homeland. (7) Moreover, he condemned Malaysia for participating in the conception of a peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the MNLF's main rival group. According to Misuari, the agreement formulated by the Philippine and Malaysian governments aimed at creating instability among the Moro people. (8) Considering this situation, how can this shift in the MNLF's discourse on Malaysia be explained? What are the implications of the MNLF's new discourse on Malaysia within the Philippines?

There are several explanations for the change in the MNLF's discourse. One of them is revenge and according to this explanation, the MNLF retaliated against Malaysia for capturing its leader, Nur Misuari, in 2001. During this incident, the Philippine government accused Misuari of inciting another rebellion and ordered his arrest. (9) For this reason, Misuari was said to have fled to Malaysia in the hope of obtaining political asylum or safe passage to the Middle East. (10) Nevertheless, Misuari was arrested by the Malaysian police upon his arrival. He was detained for more than a month and was later deported to the Philippines where he was imprisoned for several years. (11) This incident led Misuari to form a grudge against Malaysia. (12) Another explanation states that the MNLF's discourse on Malaysia demonstrates their opposition on Kuala Lumpur's support of the MILF. (13) Analysts posit that Malaysia's assistance to the MILF pushed the MNLF aside from the peace negotiations. For this reason, the MNLF is trying to discredit Malaysia to prevent the fulfillment of the peace negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine government.

Either of these explanations could be possible reasons for the change in the MNLF's discourse on Malaysia. Nevertheless, there are gaps in these answers. For instance, the first explanation does not consider the criticisms made by the MNLF against the former leaders of Malaysia. Specifically, the MNLF is claiming that Kuala Lumpur had been conniving with Manila against the Moro people since the 1970s. Considering the MNLF's relation with Malaysia in the early years of its struggle, this accusation is unreasonable and implausible. In light of this new claim, the 'revenge explanation' is not enough to explain the shift in the MNLF's discourse. On the other hand, the second explanation fails to consider the transformation of the relation between the MNLF and the MILF. That is, the MNLF did not disapprove of the peace negotiation between the MILF and the Philippine government before 2001. In fact, the MNLF interceded for both parties, which led to the temporary cessation of hostilities between the MILF fighters and the Philippine army. Misuari even hoped for the success of the peace talks between the MILF and the Philippine state, which were assisted by the Malaysian government. (14) Hence, the two explanations do not provide a complete understanding of the MNLF's new discourse on Malaysia.

These gaps, however, can be addressed by considering the issue through an examination of power dynamics. This approach posits that different actors including dissident groups are continually challenging each other's policy and identity, which is also called the battle of discourse. (15) This means that actors are in a constant struggle to affix meaning about themselves as the center or the 'self' (16) By successfully creating a center which others can recognize or identify with, (17) the actors are able to establish their hegemonic position, which also means the maintenance of their existence. Particularly, for dissident groups, engaging in a battle of discourse means the production or legitimization of their power, which also entails countering the existing hegemonic power. (18) In subverting the current hegemon, the dissident group must construct it as the 'other.' This means that the dissident group produces itself as the inside, rational and civilized, while it constructs the 'other' as irrational and anarchic. (19) Although the 'other' affirms the existence of the 'self,' it also threatens the 'self.' (20) Thus, this provides the justification for the 'self' to continually rebuke the 'other' to secure and maintain its existence. (21) This preservation of the 'self' and the rejection of the 'other' are made more legitimate and compelling through the practice of foreign policy. By engaging in foreign policy, the dissident group performs the second exclusion. (22) In other words, the dissident group uses an external actor like a foreign state as its reference point in subverting the main state which tries to suppress its existence. By using an external actor, the dissident group exposes the policies of the main enemy state as mere fabrication and subsequently depicts it as an illegitimate representative of the group's people. Through this, the dissident group creates a closed community and emphasizes the boundary of its constructed community as separate from that of the enemy state. This corresponds to the construction of the boundary between the 'inside/self' and the 'outside/other.' (23) The creation of this boundary strengthens the dissident group's position and power over their constituents. (24)

This paper posits that the shift in the discourse of the MNLF on Malaysia reflects the battle of position in the Philippines. Originally, the MNLF was the only Moro representative recognized by the OIC and the Philippine state. (25) The OIC's acknowledgment of the MNLF legitimized its position as the principal source of the Moro people's identity and the justification of their cause. However, the MNLF was gradually displaced by the MILF through the instigation of the Philippine government starting from 2001. Within this process, the MILF became the known representative of the Moro people, while the MNLF was excluded from the peace negotiations. This transformation in the power relations between the MNLF, MILF, and the Philippine government incited the MNLF to produce counter-narratives to maintain its power and existence. Accordingly, the MNLF used Malaysia as its reference point to regain its role as the central actor in the Moro's struggle against the Philippines. Therefore, this paper argues that the MNLF depicted Malaysia as un-Islamic, a colonizer, and a conspirator in order to delegitimize the MILF and to prevent the MILF-Philippine agreement from being fulfilled.

Within its depictions, the MNLF portrayed the MILF as a pawn of both the Malaysian and the Philippine state. As a puppet of the two governments, the MILF was constructed as an illegitimate representative of the Moro people which, as such, must not be supported by the Moros. Meanwhile, the MILF-Philippine peace negotiations, which were facilitated by Malaysia, are described as a mere pretense to hide the parties' real goals. That is, the two governments would offer a peace agreement as a means to keep the Moros under their control and obstruct them from regaining Sabah. By relating to Malaysia in this way, the MNLF can reassert itself as the legitimate representative of the Moro people and renew its struggle against the Philippine state.

The following parts of this paper explore how the MNLF used Malaysia as its reference point in re-legitimizing itself as the authentic Moro representative. This includes retracing the early relationship between MNLF and Malaysia, demonstrating the changes in the power dynamics within the Philippines starting from 2001, and finally explaining how the new MNLF's depictions of Malaysia discredits the MILF and the Philippine government.

MNLF-Malaysia's Early Relationship

The MNLF leaders and members established their first connection with the Malaysian government shortly after news erupted about the murder of young Muslim men in Corregidor Island. The incident was called the Jabidah Massacre. According to Jibin Arula, who was allegedly the only survivor of the massacre, he and his colleagues were trained by the Philippine army for a secret mission called Operation Merdeka. The mission involved the infiltration of Sabah to reclaim the land for the Philippines. However, the men mutinied against their army superiors and were...