Why the Neutrality of Azerbaijan Is Important for the European Union.

• Author: Abilov, Shamkhal
• Position: COMMENTARY

Not only is it far from clear who is to be made resilient against what where there is no more or less benign government but, where countries are only just coming out of war, their first priority is national survival and their demand is for security guarantees. Would sovereignty and equality not be a better leitmotiv for EU strategy in the neighborhood? Sven Biscop (1) Introduction

The EU and Azerbaijan have been working on a new treaty framework since 2017. A new treaty would replace the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that entered into the force in 1999. How comprehensive and ambitious the new treaty is, is not yet clear. Many believe it is going to be like the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed between the EU and Armenia in 2017, which is not as ambitious as the Eastern Partnership Program (EaP). On the official website of the EU, negotiations with Azerbaijan are categorized as an upgraded version of the PCA. (2) Armenia's CEPA is also in the same category (3) Yet, we should also acknowledge the fact that Azerbaijan is not a member of the Eurasian Economic Union of Russia, which prevented Armenia from signing the EaP's Association Agreement/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area AA/DCFTA. This fact enables us to assume that, compared to Armenia, there are at least technically more options for Azerbaijan and the EU to cooperate. Although there are relatively more options for collaboration, the fundamental factor that must be acknowledged by the EU and Azerbaijan is the new treaty should avoid altering Azerbaijans neutrality which is currently a determinant factor in assuring the fragile security stability and balance of power in the entire South Caucasus region.

Azerbaijan's Geographical Location: Curse, Blessing, or Just a Piece of Land?

Geographically Azerbaijan may be considered to occupy an unfavorable or favorable position, depending on the geopolitical context. It is a landlocked country, relying on neighboring Georgia for access to European energy markets. At the same time, Azerbaijan is the only country in the world that shares a border with Iran and Russia. The hardest time for Azerbaijan begins when relations between the EU and Russia, or the West and Iran, hit bottom. Traditionally, Azerbaijan has pursued a so-called balanced foreign policy course, yet tension between Azerbaijans neighbors and the West puts the country into a difficult situation and endangers its course. The sad news is that the West/EU does not get along well with Azerbaijans neighbors most of the time, particularly with Iran and Russia. Put differently, Azerbaijans balanced course is under constant threat without a security guarantee.

According to former U.S. National Security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Azerbaijan is not just a piece of land in the middle of nowhere, but one of the most important geopolitical pivots of the Eurasian continent. (4) Thus, occasionally, the country uses its location as a bargaining instrument to trade off and to gain recognition and influence. Azerbaijan "presents itself as a 'defensive shield' for the Caspian Sea: it opens or blocks the access to many significant extra-regional actors, oil-and gas-thirsty" (5) Recently, Azerbaijan has attempted to activate the Caspian Sea's transport potential as well via multi-billion port and railway projects. (6) The fact is, in addition to Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia around the Caspian Sea contemplate the same position for themselves. Differently from Azerbaijan, however, they tend to block access to foreign actors most of the time, not open it.

A Complex Geopolitical Context

Since independence, Azerbaijan has pursued policies aimed at opening the Caspian Sea to international investments, particularly in the energy sector. To do so, Azerbaijan had to get rid of the actors obscuring realization of this goal. Thus, in the very first years of its independence, Azerbaijan forced Russian army units to leave its territories, suspended its participation in Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS) gatherings, and began to negotiate the deal of the century -oil contracts with Western oil companies. (7) Eventually, the country lost Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding seven regions due to Russia's backing of Armenia. The Khojaly massacre -one of the bloodiest events in Azerbaijan history-happened in this context on February 26, 1992, where more than 600 people were brutally killed and tortured, and hundreds wounded, while Azerbaijani incumbents were negotiating oil deals in London. (8)

The fact that the Russia of the 1990s is not the Russia of the 2000s and 2010s also should be considered. It was much weaker then, having been economically and financially destabilized and thrown into political chaos due to the unexpected break-up of the USSR. Nonetheless, it did not allow radical undesired shifts in the South Caucasus periphery without its consent. Lesson learned: without a security guarantee, making sharp moves might have undesired consequences for a small state. Russia was, is, and will be an important factor in the South Caucasus region--one whose interests and concerns should be taken into account. Eventually, at the end of 1993, Azerbaijan returned to CIS and offered a share to a Russian oil company in energy contracts signed in 1994. (9)

Azerbaijan's Neutrality or So-Called Balanced Policy

The same complex geopolitical context has persisted in the region since 1994. After Russia's revival in the mid-2000s, its security threat has been felt in the region more often than usual. Thus, in 2010, Azerbaijan had to re-evaluate its policies toward the economic and security structures of the Euro-Atlantic space. Whereas, in the National Security Concept adopted in 2007, Azerbaijan had envisaged "integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic political, security, economic and other institutions as the strategic goal of the Republic of Azerbaijan," (10) in its military doctrine adopted in 2010, Azerbaijan's integration with Euro-Atlantic structures was not listed as a strategic goal. Artile 29 of the same doctrine prohibits deployment of any foreign military bases on the soil of Azerbaijan. (11) The same principle applies to Azerbaijan's sector of the Caspian Sea. According to Article 3.6 of the recent convention signed among the Caspian littoral states in 2018, the "presence in the Caspian Sea of armed forces not belonging to the Parties" is prohibited. (12) And in 2011, Azerbaijan became a member of the Non-Alignment Movement. (13)

Today, differently from Armenia and Georgia, Azerbaijan does not envision allying with NATO or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Rather, Azerbaijan makes episodic decisions based on its interests without crossing redlines. From time to time, Azerbaijan allies with the European Union, for instance, when it comes not to recognize the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and Sevastopol, and it supports different NATO operations. Although Azerbaijan has contributed to NATO-led operations in Afghanistan since 2002, and has cooperated with NATO in the framework of Partnership for Peace since 1994 and the Partnership Interoperability Initiative since 2014, Azerbaijans membership in NATO has never been on the agenda of either officials in Baku or Brussels. (14)

Besides, Azerbaijan has $5 billion worth of arms deals with Russia. (15) Even though in the local media Azerbaijan's membership in the CSTO is occasionally discussed, few believe in its plausibility due to two significant facts. First, Azerbaijan does not believe in Russia's good faith, considering its past experiences and Russia's current aggressive policies in the region. Second, Azerbaijan's number one enemy, Armenia, is in CSTO; Armenia will use its veto right to prevent Azerbaijan...