Why and How Did Iran's Reformist Movement Perish? Understanding the Implications of U.S. Sanctions Policy.

• Author: Heiran-Nia, Javad
• Position: ARTICLE

Introduction

Historically, social movements and local protests have often arisen from those of middle- or working-class backgrounds who have demonstrated the courage and skill to organize others at great personal sacrifice and peril. (1) These reformist movements and organizations, spearheaded by a new middle class, have embraced the rhetoric and instruments of social justice and human rights--both domestically and from an international standpoint--not just as empowering tools but also as vehicles for building social solidarity across the globe. The spread of the middle class across the world has been equated with evolving norms and values. In recent years, however, democratic systems of governance appear to have been in a state of atrophy. Iran's middle classes have felt threatened by the lingering economic hardship caused by the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, negative consequences of global free trade, and the ongoing U.S. sanctions. This trend has generated contradictory results, making some members of the middle classes more motivated to participate in the political process to rectify wrongs, and others resigned to a pessimistic view with little or no desire to challenge or even hold the government accountable.

Iran's once vibrant and thriving reformist movement closely associated with the middle class, which has always been known for demanding a democratic remedy, has hit a dead end. With all the levers of power now in control of conservative forces, many members of the middle class appear skeptical about their current and future role in promoting democratic values. Having entered a corridor of uncertainty and economic insecurity, they appear more and more discouraged about the availability of a democratic alternative. This can be explained in part by the way in which the Islamic Republic has utterly failed to cultivate meaningful links with some members of the middle class, leading to challenging times of unprecedented government mistrust.

Equally detrimental have been renewed U.S. economic sanctions on oil exports and other sectors of the economy that followed President Trump's decision to leave the nuclear deal, known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These sanctions led to the severe devaluation of the Iranian currency, skyrocketing inflation, and the shrinking of the middle class, leaving basic commodities inaccessible to ordinary Iranians. (2) These crushing sanctions, by contrast, have empowered the revolutionary guards whose advocacy of the so-called "resistance economy" has prevailed. (3)

To better fathom the growing sense of disillusionment with participation in a political process that is increasingly bereft of democratic legitimacy, we turn our attention to the mismanagement of the economy and endemic corruption, but more specifically, we examine the impacts of the harsh sanctions that have crippled Iran's economy. Although all this has resulted in a great deal of economic insecurity for the vast majority of Iranians, this is not to say that there is no reason for optimism or hope. While the campaign for political reform has faded away its message is particularly germane as the country's middle class struggles to make ends meet.

In this essay we attempt to unlock the socio-economic and political dynamics of this trajectory in a country whose middle class once thrived as the engine of social change and moderation. In the sections that follow, we examine the emergence of Iran's middle class and its role in promoting democratic values in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Our focus then shifts to the impact of sanctions on the country's GDP, the standard of living, the poverty rate, and the gradual erosion of the modern middle class. After demonstrating that the future of the middle class looks uncertain at best, we conclude that the persistence of authoritarianism, when combined with religious populism, will bear serious and long-term consequences for the country's middle class. The reformist movement, which has relied heavily on the support of the middle class, appears increasingly lackadaisical and spiritless in the wake of the ongoing democratic rollback in Iran.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Middle Class

The modernizing programs and development projects initiated by the Pahlavi dynasty were supposed to produce an urban middle class supportive of the regime. The dynasty's neo-patrimonial structure of power, however, never allowed the emergence of a new middle class capable of providing a solid base of support for the regime. On the contrary, the growth of middle class members expanded the ranks of the opposition. With the advent of the Islamic Republic, several factors combined to transform the country's class structure. These included, among other things, the rise in education levels, the growth in urban population size, the expansion of bureaucracy, soaring income levels, and changing lifestyle and consumption patterns. Evolving lifestyles affected housing, how to spend leisure time, financial planning and saving, and the pursuit of modern domestic technology, including washing machines and color Television. The new middle class after the revolution was the product of several key factors, including, but not limited to, urban population, literacy rate, the state of higher education, the expansion of government bureaucracy, and lifestyle.

Urban Population

The growing urbanization since the 1979 Iranian Revolution has generated both attitudinal and behavioral changes characteristic of a new middle class. In Iran, according to the 1986 census, for the first time, the urbanization coefficient was, at 54.3 percent, higher than the ruralization coefficient. The urban population of the country in 1976 was approximately 16 million. By 2006, it had exceeded 48 million (68.46 percent). (4)

In the last census, conducted in 2016, Iran's total population was 79,877,472, of which 59,146,847 lived in urban areas, and 20,730,625 resided in rural areas. (5) According to this data, a section of the population is continuously commuting for work, from urban to rural areas and vice versa. (6) In addition to urban attractions (greater prosperity, economic, educational, communication, and political resources), development plans such as communications have accelerated this process. The table below shows the growth of the urban population in relation to the rural population in the years following the Iranian Revolution. During the 1980s, as shown in Table 1, the country's urban population trends began to show rapid growth.

Literacy Rate

The growth in the literacy rate, which began in the mid-Pahlavi period (1960s), continued at a much faster pace in the post-revolutionary period than before. The literacy rate increased from 27 percent in 1953 to 84.61 percent in 2006. By 2016, that rate had increased to 88 percent. (8) These changes created a new middle class with different capabilities and expectations that staked new claims on the government. Acutely aware of state-society relations, this class showed a greater proclivity to participate in the political process and exercise greater influence on governance. (9) The surge in the female literacy rate also provided significant social capital for the reformist movement that defied the archaic views about the subordinate role of women in politics. In Iran, approximately half the population is female and women make up a progressively larger share of its university graduates. (10)

In 2017, according to Hossein Tavakkoli, an official with the Sanjesh Organization that is in charge of holding the university entrance exam, out of 378,706 participants who were admitted to the universities nationwide, some 213,884 (57 percent) were females, and 164,822 (43 percent) were males. (11) The narrowing gender gap in education in Iran is well documented and has been studied from different dimensions. (12) The literacy rate difference between men and women, according to Shapour Mohammadzadeh, head of the Literacy Movement Organization in Iran, has declined from 26 percent before the 1979 Revolution to 2.8 percent in August 2020. (13) The literacy rate among Iranian women, Mohammadzadeh added, stood at 28 percent prior to 1979. By early 2020, nearly 90 percent of women could read and write. (14)

This increase in female literacy presents both great advantages and potential risks for the Islamic Republic. On the positive side, more and more educated females have entered the labor force, giving a significant boost to the country's service sector, including banking and finance, hospitality, hotels, education, insurance, health, social work, computer services, communications, electricity, gas and water supply. This sector, however, has been one of the sectors hardest hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in the loss of jobs for women. (15)

Notwithstanding these turbulent times and the global economic crisis, women have continued to fight against unjust laws and restrictions. (16) Their movement in Iran has steadily grown into a skillful and inspiring feminist model for those seeking equal rights and gender justice. (17) Islamist and secular women alike have begun to reject their confinement to the home and have managed to participate in the public sphere through their socio-economic activities. In doing so, they have contributed vigorously to the development of civil society access for women in Iran. Some Islamist women have even argued that "the ideals of the revolution cannot be attained unless women are present in the public sphere." (18)

The State of Higher Education

In the early days of the revolution, higher education stagnated due to the closure of universities, but with the reopening of universities and the establishment of two private and non-profit higher education centers (Islamic Azad University and Imam Sadegh University) in 1982, the number of student enrollments at colleges and universities dramatically increased...