Understanding Tehran's Long Game in the Levant/Tahran'in Levant'taki Uzun Soluklu Oyununu Anlamak.

• Author: Vakil, Sanam
• Position: Report

Introduction

Iran's increasing influence and interference in the Levant, seen through its support for Lebanese Hezbollah, Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria and Palestinian groups such as Hamas, has been both an opportunity and a challenge for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The increase in Iranian ties to state and non-state actors has posed reputational costs for Tehran, but has also provided strategic depth and deterrence capabilities for the Islamic Republic. The result of which on the one hand has entrenched Tehran's reach and leverage in the Levant and on the other hand sparked calls from the international community, particularly the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel to limit the Islamic Republic's malign influence on the region. (1) The Trump Administration in the U.S., in concert with regional allies, seeks to reverse Iran's relevance and multifaceted influence. (2) Understanding Iran's diversified foreign relations strategy in the context of regional change can better explain Tehran's motivations as well as the challenges ahead.

While Iran has had longstanding ties to the Levant, these connections have ebbed and expanded and been heavily influenced by regional events as well as changes in Iran's domestic political landscape and priorities. The evolution of Iranian linkages to the Levant can be categorized as multifaceted, diversified and strategic. Relations range from historical, political, economic, religious, and cultural linkages that have increased in scope and scale since the 1979 Iranian Revolution as a means to expand and extend Iranian influence beyond its borders. Specifically, Iran's relations with Syria and with the Lebanese group Hezbollah have been the nexus linking Tehran, Damascus and Beirut. Moral, financial and military support for Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have played an important role too, as has the presence and use of militia and proxy groups sponsored by Tehran in the aforementioned countries. (3) Although these relationships have not always been strong or consistent, this axis has proven resilient to the pressures of time, regional events and international opposition. Common goals of security, regime stability and relevance as well as anti-Israeli and anti-American animus have united these actors and maintained Tehran's reach into the Levant.

Regional events have also provided Tehran with opportunities to increase its foothold. From 2001 to 2009, Tehran gained much traction throughout the region by taking advantage of frustration on the Arab street over the pervasive nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the U.S. policy towards the Middle East following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks that resulted in the 2001 Afghan war and 2003 invasion of Iraq. Tehran benefitted from the removal of two erstwhile enemies--Saddam Hussein and the Taliban--in its neighboring states of Iraq and Afghanistan. In both countries, in order to counter the U.S. presence, Tehran implemented a deftly implemented diversified strategy, supporting state and non-state actors. (4) During this period, Iranian support for Hezbollah proved decisive in the 2006 Lebanon War, (5) where Hezbollah was able to hold off Israeli attacks. Popular support for Hezbollah and Iran soared on the streets of the Middle East and Tehran was buoyed by its successful regional approach.

The tide turned against Iran after its domestic crackdown following the 2009 Green Movement protests. Another shift for Tehran was the conclusion of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or Iran nuclear agreement signed between Iran and the countries known as the P5+1 (the 5 members of the UN Security Council plus Germany). (6) The transactional agreement resulted in Iranian compromises to its nuclear energy program in exchange for sanctions relief, but was perceived by regional actors as an opportunity for greater Iranian empowerment at the expense of Saudi Arabia, Israel and other Persian Gulf countries. (7) The outbreak of the 2011 Arab Spring protests was another critical turning point. With violence impacting Iran's longtime Syrian ally, Iran chose to stand by Assad --a decisive strategic calculation that would have wider sectarian consequences.

These shifts both challenged and increased Iran's sense of security and provided the Islamic Republic with unique circumstances to increase its regional footprint. The consequences of Iranian involvement in Syria however have spilled over, unleashing wider sectarian and regional challenges. As the conflict has waged on, Iran's justification for its activities in Syria has shifted, taking on existential dimensions for Tehran. Seven years after the outbreak of the conflict, it remains to be seen if Iran's investment and support for the Assad regime will pay off.

This paper will present a strategic view of Tehran's engagement in the Levant as well as a historical one. Taken together, Tehran's strategy, threat perceptions, history in the Levant and current standing on the ground are key to deciphering its current and future engagement in the wider Levantine theatre.

Historical Backdrop

Iran has had deep historical ties to the Levant. These ties have ebbed and flowed through the cycles of history as empires have risen and receded. Important to note is the durability and evolutionary nature of these relations. During the Achaemenid and Phoenician times from 539 to 332 BC, trade and political interests brought Iranian influence to the Mediterranean. The Phoenician coastal city-states of Tyre, Sidon, Byblos and Arvad were launching grounds for Persian-Hellenic battles. Indeed, the Phoenicians, capitalizing early on their skill as traders, benefited from the vastness of the Persian Empire. (8) Under the Safavid Shahs, Shia clergy from the mountains of Jabil Amil immigrated to Persia taking part in a Safavid conversionary mission that gradually brought Shia Islam to Iran. This mutually beneficial relationship was marked by the assistance and, more importantly, the legitimization that the Shiite religious leaders granted to the Safavid dynasty. Indeed, a quid pro quo of sorts developed between the clergy and the crown: The Lebanese clerics legitimized Safavid dynastic rule in exchange for clerical influence over conversion and education. (9)

Beyond the clerical migration that laid the foundation for this relationship was the constant student moves to the region. Iranian students began to attend the alluring Protestant and Jesuit colleges that had opened in the Levant; "Going to study in Beirut was for a young Iranian a way to get a modern Western education without leaving the Muslim world." (10) Many of the Iranian elite from the Hoveyda brothers to Shapour Bakhtiar (11) studied in Beirut. The city was a multicultural, pluralistic landscape that opened avenues to both the East and West. Over the years, Beirut provided refuge to many of Iran's political and religious activists. The Bahai community found sanctuary among Lebanon's Cedars, as did many opponents of the Pahlavi Mohammad Reza Shah. (12)

While Mohammad Reza Pahlavi pursued a foreign policy based on realpolitik, Iran's Shia connections also played a part in his international relations. The shah maintained contact with prominent Shia such as Musa al Sadr, as well as the Maronite community of Lebanon, which also quietly encouraged Shia empowerment in Iran. Similar to Iran's use of Hezbollah today, the reliance on Maronite Christian leaders (13) for its own purposes reveals the importance of pragmatic, strategic interests. These ties were limited, however, by the tide of Arab nationalism that swept over the country. (14)

Needless to say, the Shah's support of the Shia cleric Musa al-Sadr represents the quintessential link between the two countries. (15) Musa Sadr, while born in Qom, traced his lineage back to the Jabil Amili clerics who migrated to Iran during the Safavid era. Sadr eagerly returned to the land of his ancestors as an Iranian clerical envoy in 1959. (16) While Sadr and oppositionists (17) were struggling to advance their own interests amidst the wider regional political struggles in Palestine, Lebanon and Iran, Sadr directed his effort towards Shia empowerment in 1974, founding Amal or hope to assist the Movement of the Disinherited. (18) The groups' military wing was formed during the Lebanese Civil War and lives on today as one of the two Shia political parties in Lebanon. Indeed, the inter-Shia squabbles between Sadr, the Shah and Khomeini reveal much about the tension and ideological disunity that existed within the pre-1979 revolutionary movement. (19)

Iranian revolutionaries sought refuge in Lebanon inspired by Palestinian and Shia activism during this time. From Mostafa Chamran, who worked intimately with Sadr through the revolution, to Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, who assisted in the creation of Hezbollah, the Iranian dissidents used the linkages between the two societies to plant an Iranian foothold in the hills of Jabil Amil. (20) It was through these bonds that Iran gained further entree into Lebanon in the aftermath of its 1979 Islamic revolution.

Understanding Iran's Strategic Worldview since 1979

Important to this narrative is Iran's regional foreign policy that has been driven by its history, post-revolutionary ideology of independence, and by domestic political considerations. These themes form the backbone of Iran's strategy in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic's primary impulses consist of regime preservation and the restoration of Iran's regional relevance. While the former is drawn from Iran's post revolutionary history, the latter has been a continuous trend in Iranian policy since the days of the Pahlavi monarchy, predating the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Issues of regime security however are most poignantly rooted in the national memory of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War where Iran's neighbors, the United States and many European countries...