Understanding Israels Foreign Policy from the Perspective of Identity and Security.

AuthorSalameh, Mohammed Torki Bani
PositionARTICLE

Introduction

Ever since its establishment in 1948, Israel has faced external conditions identified by almost continuous enmity. Relative to its adversaries, Israel is considered a tiny state with limited recourse in terms of population and landmass. Moreover, Israel shares borders with hostile states that refuse to recognize its existence and non-state actors that create security challenges for its continuity. Shimon Peres, former President of Israel, described the security threats facing Israel by arguing that "we need to protect ourselves from knives, tanks, and rockets." (1) Such discourse reveals how Israeli policymakers identify different threats: "knives" refer to non-state armed actors (including Hamas, Fateh, and Hezbollah); "tanks" signify the danger that Israel faces from neighboring states, such as Syria; and "rockets" indicate the danger coming from regional actors, particularly Iran.

Despite Israel being a small nation, it has been able to project itself as a vital player in world politics. Both Israel's position in the international arena and its severe national security make it a matter of wide interest for observers and strategic studies scholars. Unlike other political entities, Israel has a unique aspect with regard to hostility, menace, and geostrategic challenges. Both Poland and France were conquered by Nazi Germany in World War II but sustained as enduring national entities, and the majority of the population persisted in the war relatively well. Jewish community on the other hand, has faced not just politicide but also genocide and the annihilation of its people.

Given the Arab hostility toward Israel during the first decades of its establishment, it was unlikely for Israel to control the external environment at the diplomatic and military levels. Although, since 1948, Israel has won every major war it fought with Arab armies, the nature of post-conflict peace is highly complicated for Israel to determine.

Despite the fact that many regional actors have signed a peace agreement with Israel, the danger that Israel faces from Iran and its proxies in the region has been considered Israel's top security issue. The strategic environment for Israel changed massively after accepting the Sadat initiative of 1977, providing a greater prospect for peace than in the past.

Thus far, Iran has been perceived as Israel's most dangerous regional rival. Tehran's continuous aspiration and will for a military nuclear capacity poses a critical threat to Israel should it cross the nuclear threshold. In addition, if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, other regional actors will do the same. Any serious attempt to understand Israel's foreign policy requires exploring the geopolitical condition of the region. Iran provides Hezbollah, a Lebanese proxy, with a massive arsenal of rockets that has proven to be hectic for the Israelis to deal with. Moreover, the Iranians have a growing influence in Syria, creating a dangerous Syrian-Lebanese alliance (part of what is known as the Shiite Crescent) encompassing territory from Iran to the Mediterranean. On the southern border, Israel faces security threats from the elected government of Gazawhich controls Gaza.

So far, the political analysis of Israel's foreign policy is projected on two theories: realism and constructivism. Throughout the years, Israel's foreign policy practices have fallen under both approaches, albeit not equally. The failure to study foreign policy from a social science approach and connect the dots between at least two theories can produce results that fall short on essential components in each theory, especially if we consider one and disregard the other. The case of Israel specifically is an interesting one, given the long-standing conflict that it has been facing. This article attempts to answer the following major questions: To what extent does identity matter with regard to the formulation of the Israeli foreign policy? And would the fusion of realism and constructivism theories result in a better understanding of Israel's policy and decision-making process, more precisely, its foreign policy?

Realist Constructivism

In a world where dangerous phenomena abound, understanding why a state pursues a particular foreign policy helps governments decide whether that state poses a threat or not. When a state is appropriately aware of actors in the international system that intends to inflict harm on it, this state has an opportunity to use its resources to protect itself from such threats. Nevertheless, when states miscalculate and take inaccurate measures, they run the risk of being exposed to danger or turning a benign actor into an adversary. As a result, states need to recognize what constitutes a threat.

Delving into International Relations (IR) theory for enlightenment, realists argue that states' actions result from pursuing imperative national interests, mainly power maximization. (2) The dilemma in realism's argument assumes a constant view of the notion of "national interests." While realism acknowledges the role of ideology, the theoretical approach ignores the way that ideological factors impact how states identify power and delineate their interests. Constructivism, which has been regarded as a rival of realism, may enhance realists' understanding of IR. Constructivists insist that ideas and culture are vital in constituting states' behavior. Thus, constructivism can supplement realism's insights through social and nonmaterial lenses. The integration of both theoretical approaches can explain the social factors' function in formulating foreign policy. Thus, a clearer image of intent and behavior can be seen.

In this part, we try to examine the debate between prominent theoretical approaches in IR: realism and constructivism. Usually, IR scholars focus on a specific theoretical approach in analyzing states' behavior in world politics. Conversely, this article seeks to integrate realism and constructivism to understand Israel's foreign policy dynamics. Some theorists of IR explicitly agree that both realism and constructivism are incompatible approaches. However, the bulk of this article reveals the opposite--realism and constructivism are indeed compatible. By exploring Barkin's realist constructivism, this article seeks to debunk the myth of realism and constructivism's incompatibility. Applying realist constructivism could prove valuable in IR theory, including helping indicate the connection between the study of power in international politics and the study of IR as a social construction. The second part delves deeply into Barkin's realist constructivist approach to IR.

In the realist thought, humans are concerned with their well-being in their competitive relations with one another. Thus, it is not unnatural for humans to be preoccupied with achieving a dominant position in life and reject being subjugated by others. Being malignant and pessimistic is not exclusive to humans' interactions but rather a vital aspect of IR. Classical realists agree that the acquisition, possession, and usage of power are central aspects of international politics. As a result, IR is regarded as "power politics," a realm of conflict, rivalry, and war between or among states who seek to realize their national interests and survival. For realists, IR is synonymous with power politics. (3)

Nevertheless, an array of differences among realists revolve around an important question: Why do states need power? According to Morgenthau, the desire for power is deeply rooted in human nature. Humans are, by nature, political animals--they demand control and enjoy their gains. As far as Morgenthau is concerned, IR is all about power struggle. (4) In the same vein, John Mearsheimer argues that power is considered the main currency of international politics. The consideration of economic and military relations among states is a central feature of realist thought. States seek to maintain the balance of power in their favor and attempt to avoid situations that endanger their positions in the international system. (5) Nevertheless, neo-realists assert that human nature has little to do with why states seek power. Instead, the anarchic structure of the international system forces states to pursue power. Given the international system's anarchic nature and the absence of a higher authority, states act at their best to ensure their survival. Neo-realists perceive states similarly; whether a state is democratic or authoritarian is an overlooked factor in their analysis. As Mearsheimer argues, "neo-realists treat states as if they were black boxes." (6) Neo-realists grapple with another pressing question: how much power is enough? For Kenneth Waltz, gaining too much control in world politics is an unwise decision. Waltz argues that the international system will punish states seeking power maximization and hegemony. (7)

On the other hand, Mearsheimer concludes that each state must pursue a power maximization strategy and, if the conditions allow, seek hegemony. The debate here lies beyond domination; it emphasizes the role of power in ensuring one's survival in an anarchic system. As Mearsheimer adds, "for classical realists, power is an end in itself; for neo-realists, power is a means to an end, and the ultimate end is survival." (8)

According to Waltz, a scientific theory of IR must help predict how states would behave. Furthermore, Waltz adds that a good IR theory must focus on the structure of the system, its interacting units, and its fluctuations. For classical realists, leaders' actions and decisions are central to their theory. For Morgenthau, states' leaders have a natural lust for power. (9) Meanwhile, neo-realists tend to take the distribution of power as an integral unit of analysis. According to Waltz, understanding the structure's influence on foreign policy is an indispensable factor in international politics; neorealism efforts to "abstract from every...

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