Turks Vote in Favor of Continuing the Erdogan Era.

• Author: Bezci, Bunyamin

The 2023 elections were particularly significant for Turkish citizens since they took place on the centennial of the Republic's proclamation. Having formed Europe's last modern state in 1923, they decided how they were going to usher in the next century. The Turks focused on modernization in the nineteenth century and saw the twentieth century as the century of democratization. The next century, in turn, will ostensibly be the century of technology. The neoliberal system financialized the real economy to promote growth and increase consumption, which gives the impression that welfare has spread. In truth, however, the 'Century of Turkiye' will remain elusive in the absence of increased technological output.

Upon coming to power in 2002, Erdogan created a local version of neoliberal politics. He sought to eliminate the military tutelage regime, which had executed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in a traumatizing manner, by deriving power from civil society and the markets, which had been growing stronger since Turgut Ozal's time. At the same time, the Turkish leader attempted to jump-start the economy, which had hit rock bottom in the 2001 economic crisis. In the initial years of the new millennium (which were actually the final moments of the twentieth century), his government promoted social unity through Kurdish and Alevi initiatives as well as tried to integrate Turkiye into the global system through accession talks with the European Union.

Taking Stock of Turkish Elections in the Last Two Decades

Having survived the 2007 coup attempt (also known as the e-memorandum) with the help of popular elections, Erdogan encountered a new political rival, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, in the 2010 constitutional referendum and the 2011 general elections. The main opposition leader had replaced his predecessor in 2010 following a scandal. He oversaw a nearly 5-point increase in the CHP's popular support in his first election, as the AK Party's number of parliamentarians decreased despite that movement's electoral success. By 2015, Kilicdaroglu had come to terms with the impossibility of defeating the AK Party single-handedly and disregarded the slide of some CHP voters to the HDP to help an additional political party be represented at the Turkish Parliament.

At the same time, the AK Party terminated the reconciliation process in April 2015 as lethal riots erupted over the ISIS invasion of Kobani on October 6-8, 2014, and the PKK refused to lay down its arms at the recommendation of Turkish leftists. Another development that led to the derailment of talks was the attempt by the PKK--which seized control of a vast area with U.S. support in the guise of combating ISIS--to take advantage of the power vacuum in northern Syria to create a Kurdish statelet. Due to the frustration of nationalist and conservative voters, the AK Party experienced a significant drop in its popular support (approximately 10 percent) in the June 2015 elections. That decline was arguably due to negotiations with Kurdish nationalists since the AK Party lost most votes to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), a Turkish nationalist movement that controlled the least number of parliamentary seats at the time. Moreover, some disagreements over strategy between the party's true leader, Erdogan, and Ahmet Davutoglu, his replacement and an inexperienced leader despite not being a inexperieced politician, played some role in that outcome. Although Prime Minister Davutoglu insisted on forming a grand coalition with the CHP after the June 2015 elections, President Erdogan refused to agree to the terms of the main opposition party, which collaborated with HDP, and forced a repeat election. The PKK dug trenches and took over residential areas in Turkiye's South East during the summer of 2015. Terrorist elements were defeated and peace was restored in these areas thanks to a coordinated operation of the Turkish security services known as the "Trench Operations." Furthermore, President Erdogans resistance to separatism helped the AK Party win back voters who had supported MHP in the previous election, as well as Kurdish conservatives. Ultimately, the movement regained the parliamentary majority necessary to form another single-party government. It is possible to argue that MHP and HDP were the main losers in the November 2015 elections. The CHP, in turn, allowed its supporters to split up and keep all four parties in the Turkish Parliament. Yet it failed to stop the AK Party from coming to power single-handedly. It is important to underscore that CHP's main goal was to increase the number of political parties represented in Parliament to stop the AK Party from forming another single-party government--unless, of course, it could increase its share of the popular vote to come to power itself.

Having survived the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, which the Fetullah Terrorist Organization's (FETO) military and civilian components triggered thanks to the people's resistance, Erdogan immediately amended the Constitution to adopt the presidential system of government. The April 2017 constitutional referendum passed, and Erdogan was elected president for the first time under the new system of government in June 2018. As the CHP's popular support declined, the Good Party (IP) entered Parliament as a new Turkish nationalist movement.

The 2018 elections ushered in electoral alliances since the new system enabled them in Turkish politics.

Whereas the AK Party and MHP (which had become closer in the wake of the constitutional referendum) formed the People's Alliance, the IP (which broke off from MHP) joined the CHP-led Nation Alliance together with the Islamist Felicity Party (SP). In this sense, the Parliament featured two Turkish nationalist parties and a Kurdish nationalist party, as well as mainstream conservative-democratic and social-democratic parties. The presidential system, which became operational in 2018, functioned seamlessly due to the People's Alliance's parliamentary majority and ability to cooperate without difficulty. Meanwhile, the opposition took steps to expand the Nation Alliance.

Advantages and Disadvantages on the Campaign Trail

At the start of the 2023 election cycle, the opposition had significant advantages. Primarily, opposition parties began to form the Table of Six ahead of the 2019 municipal elections, which had a positive impact on the election results. That preliminary bloc consisted of the CHP, the IP, and the SP. At the same time, Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoglu, on the verge of breaking off from the AK Party, quietly supported the opposition as the HDP endorsed the emerging bloc more openly. Consequently, opposition candidates won mayoral races in metropolitan areas like Istanbul and Ankara, where the ruling party had been in charge for a long time.

The opposition's second advantage, which was linked to its achievements in the municipal elections, was those opposition voters who became confident that they were on the verge of winning. After all, they had seen that they could win elections by joining forces, which really encouraged them ahead of the 2023 elections.

Thirdly, the opposition expected the COVID-19 pandemic to drag Turkiye's already troubled economy into a hysterical crisis. It is possible to argue that the decline in the income and living standards of wage earners helped the opposition gain momentum. Furthermore, the opposition believed that the AK Party government, which already had trouble addressing pressing problems, could not recover from the devastating February 6 earthquakes that affected a massive area in the country's southern provinces and claimed the lives of approximately 50 thousand people.

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