Turkish-German Challenges in the Light of German Federal Elections.

• Author: Yeneroglu, Mustafa
• Position: COMMENTARY - Essay

Turkey and Germany: A Distinctive Relationship

There are few, if any, examples of two countries, without common state borders, that possess such an intense relationship as that of Turkey and Germany Nowadays, the relationship of the two states while closely intertwined, and however paradoxically, seems to be as bad as it has ever been. Thus, it would not be exaggerating to discuss the historic low that currently plagues the Turkish-German partnership and the issues still to overcome. It is true that the mutual statements made in the wake of the German elections tend towards the cautiously optimistic. However, the widening gap in recent years has rekindled old pessimistic convictions about the future of the EU and Turkey's role, thereby strengthening the fundamental bilateral disagreement.

Over and above historical ties, through the lenses of Realpolitik, strong cooperation between the two nations becomes inevitable. There is no other country outside of Turkey where such a huge Turkish population is settled. Half of the three million people of Turkish descent in Germany possess German nationality. (1) Moreover, Germany constitutes Turkey's leading trade partner.

In 2016, the bilateral trade volume between Turkey and Germany grew by 4 percent, reaching a new all-time high of 37.3 billion Euros. In the same year, the value of Turkish exports to Germany was about 15.4 billion Euros (total export in 2016: 129 billion Euros), marking a growth by 6.4 percent compared to the year before. German imports, meanwhile, were worth around 21.9 billion Euros (total import in 2016: 179.5 billion Euros). (2) At the same time, Turkey became the fifth largest trading partner of the European Union. (3) The bilateral trade volume between Turkey and the EU amounted to 131 billion Euros in 2016 (total export from Turkey to the EU: 61 billion Euros; total import from the EU to Turkey: 70 billion Euros). (4) In addition, it is predicted that the modernization and extension of the Customs Union would bring substantial benefits for both partners and thereby enhance Turkey's economic performance by 2 percent. According to the European Commission, such an extension would mean that Turkey could export additional goods amounting to 5 billion Euros to the Union. (5) In the first six months of 2017, foreign direct investments in Turkey comprised around 4.2 billion Euros, with investments from EU member countries which grew by 61 percent compared to 2017, making up more than half of the foreign direct investment. (6)

There are numerous areas that promise considerable prospects for development. The consumer sector and the market for luxury goods offer good chances for prolific cooperation. The expansion of the railway system and the development of the energy sector will transform Turkey into a significant growth market that will be certainly of special interest to German investors and energy companies. Turkey is expected to almost double its demand for energy by 2023. Due to its geostrategic role, Turkey strives to become an energy hub,' thereby functioning as a bridge connecting Europe, the Middle East and Africa. (7) Currently, there are around 6,800 German companies or Turkish companies with German equity participation operating in diverse sectors across Turkey. (8) On the other hand, Germany is home to nearly 96,000 businesses that are owned by people of Turkish descent, employing around 500,000 individuals. These businesses generate a total annual turnover of more than 50 billion Euros. (9) Similarly, tourism is another industry that illustrates the interconnectedness of the two countries; despite contemporary clashes, around 3.9 million Germans visited Turkey in 2016. (10)

As highlighted above, the economic features of this special relationship are enriched by geopolitical challenges that have to be taken up together as NATO partners. Undeniably, Turkeys geographical location attributes to it an exceptional role as a Eurasian bridge to the Near and Middle East, but also to Asia and Africa. (11) The international community faces extraordinary challenges, particularly in the Middle East, that pose a threat to global peace and stability of nations worldwide. (12) Ever since Europe's refugee crisis in 2015, stability in the Middle East has become crucial for the European Union and Germany in particular. (13) As a consequence of the war in Syria, Germany and Turkey have turned into the most important countries of their respective regions in terms of accommodating refugees. However, these waves of migration have also triggered the mobility of terrorists from the Middle East, thus necessitating closer Turkish-European cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Not so long ago, on the January 22, 2016, the first bilateral Turkish-German intergovernmental consultations took place in Berlin, where both countries committed themselves to a closer partnership in the field of counter-terrorism, EU membership, irregular migration, visa liberalization and burden-sharing with regard to refugees. (14)

Turkish-German Relations since 2005

From Turkey's point of view, Turkish-German cooperation between 1999 and 2005 during the Schroder/Fischer era is regarded as a golden age of Turkey-Europe relations, specifically due to the reliable EU membership perspective that was conveyed. Consequently, the power asymmetry between Turkey and Germany has balanced out and developed into a symmetric relationship over the years. However, with Chancellor Angela Merkel's victory and the formation of a new government in 2005, an asymmetric Turkish-German relationship emerged once again. (15) Along with this, Turkey encountered Germany's reluctance to proactively support Turkey's EU accession and instead, the nation was merely regarded as a buffer zone between the East and the West. (16) As a consequence thereof, the accession negotiations halted before they even started properly. The election of Sarkozy as the French President, the blocking of several significant EU-Turkey negotiation chapters, the failure of the constitutional referenda in the Netherlands and France, the Euro crisis, the Syrian crisis and along with it the refugee crisis, the Russian crisis, Brexit and last but not least the recent advance of right wing populism in Europe have all contributed to certain consequences for bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany.

These crises have undoubtedly increased the fears and criticisms in segments of the European population regarding the enlargement of the European Union. As a result, one can observe that calls for the strengthening of European nation-states became louder and nationalism as well as populism gained ground. (17) As to the relationship with Turkey, it becomes apparent that Angela Merkel's concept of 'privileged partnership' has demotivated the Turkish government and consequently decelerated the political and legal reforms supposed to lead to Turkey's implementation of the EU acquis. (18) Step by step, public opinion in Turkey has realized that the country is transferring sovereign rights and is being externally evaluated by undergoing a lengthy process of adaptation without a realistic prospect to have a say, one day, in the decision-making bodies of the European Union. Accordingly, EU accession talks have come to a de facto halt.

With the emergence of the refugee crisis in 2015, which has prompted existential consequences for the future of the Schengen area, Chancellor Merkel has rediscovered the 'partial' importance of Turkey vis-a-vis the security of the European continent. Merkel's personal endeavors have encouraged the Union to stress the significance of Turkey as a strategic partner and on top of that, EU leaders began making a considerable effort to revive the accession negotiations.

On March 18, 2016, following the EU-Turkey Action Plan activated in November 2015, the European Union and Turkey agreed to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. It was decided that all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of March 20, 2016 would be returned to Turkey. Pursuant to the 1:1 scheme, for every Syrian refugee being returned to Turkey from Greece, another Syrian individual would be resettled to the EU. Moreover, the EU assured an immediate disbursement of 3 billion Euros for the support of refugees settled in Turkey. A further 3 billion was to be paid for concrete refugee projects until the end of 2018. In addition, pledges to re-energize the EU accession process were made, as well as visa liberation negotiations designed to reach the goal of lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens by the end of June 2016. (19) Since the entry into force of the so-called EU-Turkey Deal, the number of refugees passing from Turkey to Greece has dropped around 97 percent and amounts now to approximately 75 refugees a day. (20) During this period, 1,989 refugees were returned to Turkey from the Greek side, 11,333 Syrian refugees residing in Turkey were resettled within the EU. (21) Turkeys hope that by November 2016 up to 72,000 refugees from Turkey would be resettled in the EU, (22) as well as the promise to resettle around 250,000 refugees yearly amongst member states, (23) vanished pretty quickly The EU also did not fulfill its financial obligations under the deal; from the envisaged 3 billion Euros for 2016-2017, 55 projects worth about 1.78 billion Euros were signed and only around 908 million Euros disbursed so far. (24) As Turkey has assumed enormous humanitarian responsibility compared to her economic power, this development has increased frustration about EU reliability in Turkey. Nowadays, in some Turkish cities there are more refugees living than residents and governmental costs for support of refugees added up to $30 billion, (25) hence it becomes increasingly absurd that the wealthy European Union only procures a fraction of the expenses and in doing so permanently sets up new obstacles.

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