Turkish Foreign Policy in the Face of Regional and Global Challenges.

• Author: Inat, Kemal

Introduction

Turkiye's foreign policy faced major challenges in the second half of the AK Party's two decades in power. Despite being a NATO ally and European Union (EU) candidate country, Ankara experienced serious problems with its Western allies in the 2010s. Having spent the 2000s trying to persuade domestic institutions that it had a legitimate right to govern Turkiye by virtue of having won democratic elections, the AK Party was compelled to try and force Western governments to accept that Turkiye had the right to adopt and implement its foreign policy independently throughout the following decade. After all, the 'internal guardianship' regime was frustrated with the government's democratization attempts to normalize civilian-military relations just as the 'external guardianship' regime opposed Turkiye's attempts to shape its foreign policy independently and in line with its population's expectations.

Upon coming to power, the AK Party government faced the negative consequences of the U.S.' illegal invasion of Iraq. Throughout the 2000s, when Turkiye prioritized the expansion of its economic and military capacity, it sought to offset its disagreements with the U.S. over the Iraq War by working more closely with the European Union. However, the rise of Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy (who publicly opposed Turkiye's EU membership) to power in Germany and France took a toll on Ankara's relations with Brussels, encouraging the Turkish government to seek closer cooperation with Middle Eastern nations in pursuit of a more diverse foreign policy. During this period, the country strengthened its ties with Iran, Iraq, and Syria yet experienced tensions with Israel over that state's attacks on Gaza. Later, Israel's assault on the Mavi Marmara caused a major crisis between the two countries, leading to Turkiye being charged with an 'axis shift.' It is important to note that Ankara's accusers refused to acknowledge that Israel's aggression was the main reason behind the deterioration of bilateral relations. Those criticizing Ankara also remained frustrated with Turkiye's attempts to cooperate with Muslim nations in the Middle East, a policy that raised questions about the regional order that the U.S. had established.

Unhappy with Turkiye's pursuit of an independent foreign policy, which inevitably clashed with their vested interests, the U.S. and some European countries attempted to mount pressure on the AK Party by supporting a coup attempt and collaborating with terrorist groups in the 2010s. Such transgressions encouraged Ankara to work more closely with Russia to offset the Western pressure. That cooperation extended to energy and other economic sectors as well as defense. Turkiye's decision to buy the Russian S-400 air defense system, in turn, subjected it to greater pressure and sanctions from its Western allies. It remains unclear whether the Western states took into consideration the possibility that their continued pressure might push Turkiye further away, encouraging Ankara to work even more closely with Russia and China, Asia's rising power. Nonetheless, it may be easier for them to take such risks because they know that Turkiye would be reluctant to become dependent on either Moscow or Beijing in a way that could result in disagreements akin to those between itself and the West.

With the exception of balancing, expanding its economic and military capacity has been the main method that Turkiye used under the AK Party to alleviate pressure and neutralize threats from the West, Russia, and other countries. In this regard, the Turkish economy grew 340 percent in terms of the nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and 420 percent in terms of GDP based on the purchasing power parity between 2002 and 2021. That the size of developed industrial nations' economies only doubled during that period demonstrates that Turkiye took major steps to catch up with those nations.

This article will primarily explain how the expansion of Turkiye's economic and military capacity contributed to its pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. It will proceed to dissect the impact of emerging fault lines in the global political system and especially the rise of Asia on Turkiye's pursuit of a more independent foreign policy as well as how Ankara has adapted to those circumstances. Furthermore, it will analyze how the escalating competition between the West and Russia (following the latter's attack on Ukraine) has been interpreted from the standpoint of Turkiye's policy of balance. Last but not least, this piece focuses on how Turkiye's steps in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East (within the contact of its pursuit of a more independent foreign policy) led to a confrontation between itself and the U.S., the European Union, Russia, and their local partners. It also discusses the policies that AK Party governments implemented to manage those tensions.

The Impact of Economic and Military Capacity on Foreign Policy

During the AK Party years, the expansion of Turkiye's economic and military capacity was the main factor influencing the overall direction and inclinations of Turkish foreign policy. (1) The shrinking power gap between itself and developed industrial nations, in particular, encouraged Turkiye to act independently of those countries. A comparison between the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2002, the year that the AK Party came to power, and 2021 reveals that the Turkish economy made significant progress toward closing the gap with Western countries. For example, in nominal GDP terms, Italy's economy was 5.3 times larger than the Turkish economy in 2002. By 2021, the Italian economy was just 2.6 times larger. That number decreased from 6.3 to 3.6 for France and from 17.4 to 6.1 for Japan, as seen in Figure 1. During the same period, Turkiye's share of the global GDP increased from 0.68 percent to 0.84 percent.

A quick look at GDP figures based on the purchasing power parity, which reflects Turkiye's economic progress over the last two decades more accurately, reveals the country's strong performance to catch up with developed nations. Accordingly, the gap between Turkiye and Germany narrowed from 3.9 times in 2002 to 1.8 times in 2021 (Table 2). According to the purchasing power parity, the Turkish economy had caught up with the Italian economy in terms of gross domestic product by 2021. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that Turkiye would overtake Italy in 2022 to become the world's 11th-largest economy. (3) Again, based on the IMF's purchasing power parity data, Turkiye's share in the global economy (in GDP terms) increased from 1.32 percent in 2002 to 2.01 percent in 2021. (4)

It is possible to observe that Turkiye recorded more robust economic growth than Italy and Japan during the AK Party years. Except for 2008, when the German economy outperformed the Turkish economy, Germany's growth rate has been consistently and notably less than Turkiye's growth rate (Figure 1). Recalling that Turkiye has experienced many negative developments since 2013, including the Gezi Park revolts, the December 2013 judicial coup attempt, the July 15 coup attempt, and Western (especially U.S.) sanctions, in addition to carrying the weight of more than 4 million (mostly Syrian) asylum-seekers, one must stress that the Turkish economy's ability to outperform developed and industrialized countries in terms of growth represented a significant achievement. (5)

The expansion of Turkiye's economic capacity had an impact on the military domain, among other fields, as the country began to produce a significant percentage of the weapons that it required. (7) With the share of local defense products skyrocketing to more than 70 percent, Turkiye's need for Western weapons plummeted, making it easier for the Turkish government to pursue an independent foreign policy. In addition to the improvement of economic conditions, attempts by traditional arms suppliers to punish Turkiye or force it to change its policies by rejecting the sale of various products were among the main reasons why Ankara decided to actively strengthen its local defense industry. For example, the U.S. refused to sell armed unmanned aerial vehicles (or armed drones) to Turkiye, resulting in the emergence of Baykar Technologies and TUSAS as local drone developers and, eventually, globally competitive companies.

Indeed, the effective use of Turkish armed drones in Syria, Libya, Karabakh, and Ukraine led to the emergence of a major export market and contributed to Turkiye's economic growth. Whereas Baykar Technologies sold $664 million worth of armed drones in 2021 to become the country's top exporters in aerospace and defense, (8) TUSAS ranked second with $567 million. Meanwhile, Turkiye's total defense and aerospace exports soared to $3.2 billion in 2021. (9) Turkish defense and aerospace companies continued their export drive in 2022, with the country's relevant exports reaching $1.98 billion within the first six months. (10)

In addition to unmanned aerial vehicles and armed drones, Turkiye's defense industry completed many projects to build combat helicopters, warships, armored vehicles, and missile systems over the last two decades. In this regard, the number of local defense projects increased from 62 to 750 between 2002 and 2022. During the same period, the total budget of defense projects skyrocketed from $5.5 billion to $60 billion. Likewise, the country's defense R&D budget soared from $49 million to $1.24 billion and the defense and aerospace industries increased their exports by 13 times. (11)

It is possible to argue that the expansion of Turkiye's diplomatic capacity and soft power (in addition to its economic and military capacities) has facilitated the active implementation of Turkish foreign policy. With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs increasing the number of Turkish diplomatic missions from 163 to 248 between...