Turkey's stance towards the main developments in the south Caucasus.

• Author: Alipour, Ali
• Position: Report

Introduction

In the wake of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the Caucasus and Central Asia have emerged as some of the world's most unstable regions. The countries in the region have not been particularly successful in building strong, developed political and economic systems, nor in establishing stable national sovereignty. In addition, the countries face major security risks.

In the South Caucasus, the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, and the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, both reflect the lack of security in the region. Domestic ethnic conflicts, transnational crime, and political and economic instability also characterize the region. (1) In the midst of this instability, the South Caucasus has become a major arena of competition between international powers such as the United States, the EU and Russia, as well as adjacent countries including Turkey and Iran.

The heightened importance of the South Caucasus for Turkey was initiated by several factors. Turkey's initial bid for permanent membership in the EU, initiated in the late 1980s, marked the beginning of a slow negotiation process between Turkey and the European Council which, after thirty years, has still not culminated in EU membership. Turkey's policy makers, frustrated by the endless stalling of this process, eventually redirected the country's foreign policy to rethink the country's strategic position in world politics. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s marked major fallout for Turkey, namely the loss of its role as a regional buffer for the West against the Soviet threat. (2) These two factors could have led to the marginalization of Turkey among its Western allies. However, there were some factors that made Turkey an interesting partner for its Western partners both in the South Caucasus and Middle East regions. First, then President Ozal's pro-Western stance and legacy, combined with Turkey's support of the US-led operation during the First Gulf War, in which Turkey played a profound pro-Western role, squarely positioned Turkey as a loyal strategic partner for the West. (3) Further, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly emerging independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia provided another source of opportunity for Turkey to increase its strategic ties with the West. Moreover, in the early 1990s, many in the West viewed Turkey's pro-Western and secular political system as an ideal model for the newly emerging Caucasian and Central Asian countries, in contrast to Communism, and the type of Islamism initiated by Iran. (4) Well aware of this perception, Turkey attempted to take advantage of these opportunities and carve out a central role for itself in the region.

In addition to its importance in the political context, the South Caucasus is rich in oil and gas, which is paramount for its economic ties with Turkey. For instance, Azerbaijan has frequently been Turkey's strongest Caucasian economic partner especially since mid-2000s. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline (active since 2006), and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline (active since 2007) are cornerstones of Turkey-Azerbaijan economic relations. Already in 2008, Turkey was Azerbaijan's second largest trade partner, with 18.2 percent of its imports coming from Turkey. (5) The same held for 2010, with overall trade volume amounting to $2.416 bn; by 2013, trade volume had reached $3.3 bn. (6) Turkey is presently the first country for Azerbaijan's imports and eleventh for its exports; the trade volume between the two countries surpassed $5 bn. (7) Ali Babacan, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, stated that "We now aim for $15 billion in trade by 2023". (8) Georgia has also been a key partner for Turkey in the South Caucasus. In 2008, Turkey was Georgia's largest trading partner both in imports ($15.1bn) and exports ($19.3bn). (9) Turkey presently ranks first as Georgia's largest trading partner for imports and sixth in its exports. (10) These statistics could be of the indicators of the importance of the South Caucasus for Turkey's economy and foreign policy.

In spite of the pivotal role of the South Caucasus for Turkish economics, Turkey has not been able to successfully follow up on its policies and establish its influence to the full extent desired. In the 1990s, Turkey's domestic economic crisis and political unrest presented significant obstacles that limited Turkey's regional influence. (11) Russia's persisting

hegemony and its attempts to maintain the status quo are additional factors thwarting Turkey's endeavors in the region. From Russia's standpoint, Turkish presence in the region is equivalent to Western influence, and hence a decrease in its own power. (12) Turkey has also been cautions in its relations with Georgia due to its strong economic ties with Russia. Another important impediment to Turkey's overall role in the region stems from its economic relationship with Azerbaijan, which has been at war with Armenia since the 1980s. To date, Turkey has no diplomatic relations with Armenia, and its borders remain closed. Ostensibly, this is due to Armenia's claim regarding "the Armenian Genocide" of 1915 in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia, a claim that Turkey has, to date, refuted. (13)

Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923, the foreign policy of the country has been guided by two main principles. The first one is the "construction and maintenance of peace in its neighboring region and the world," and the second, "Kemalism with its program for modernization along Western, secular lines". (14) However, Turkey's early foreign policy stance towards the Central Asian and Caucasian states was mainly based on the Turkic-oriented idea of "A Turkish World from the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall", a stance that determied its political and economic policies within this geographic frame. However, this initially myopic conception of neighbours that ignored non-Turkic states has undergone a deep transformation since the early 2000s, giving way to "interdependency, economic cooperation, regional integration, proactive foreign policy, as well as peace and stability". Further, Turkey has more recently based its relations with its region on the principle of "Zero Problems with Neighbors". (15) Turkey's foreign policy towards its neighbors has thus shifted to four main principles: a) the establishment of the mechanisms of high-level political dialogue, b) economic interdependence, c) the development of regional policies that could include all regional actors, and d) coexistence in peace, diversity, and tolerance of differences. (16)

Some contend that with the rise of the AK Party, Turkey's foreign policy has deviated from the West. They argue that Turkey has turned more towards the East and the Islamic world. However, the real transformation of Turkey's foreign policy has less to do with East-West than the concepts of "Strategic Depth" and "Rhythmic Diplomacy" developed by Ahmet Davutoglu. These foreign policy tenets call for active and effective engagement with all regional systems in Turkey's neighborhood, including the South Caucasus. "Davutoglu advocates that Turkey should act as a central state regionally and that it has the potential to become a global actor in the future". (17) As one of the main architects of Turkey's modern foreign policy, Davutoglu believes that Turkey is a pivotal country with multiple regional identities. Thus, it does not fit into a narrow, singular category. "In terms of its sphere of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country all at the same time", a country that should appropriate a position in the region that provides security and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighbours and the larger region. (18) Davutoglu's conception provides Turkey with a leadership role, rather than a position as a simple bridge connecting the East to the West. On the basis of this conception, Turkey has been conducting a twofold foreign policy: a) relying on multilateralism and taking a more active role in international relations, and b) extending its relations with counries in the region where previously it has had little contact. (19)

Turkey is considered a latecomer to the Caucasus region due to its unsuccessful policies prior to the early 2000s. However, more recently, on the basis of Davutoglu's principles, Turkey has been able to take a more active approach in the region. (20) The role played by Turkey in the South Caucasus (as well as the Middle East) is highly valued by both the United States and many European countries. Turkey's role in these regions, based on its current foreign policy, has gained support of the US and the EU. They point out that Turkey has been able to do in regions such as the Caucasus what the EU would wish to do but has been unable to. (21) In addition, Turkey has had an impact on Russia's regional policies. Russia has exhibited concerns over Turkey's presence in the South Caucasus; its actions reflect its policy of keeping Turkish influence at bay, on the supposition that Turkish influence could be followed by more Western influence, which would threaten Russia's present hegemony in the region.

However, despite Turkey's active role in the South Caucasus, and its attempts to expand its influence, it has not been able to fully achieve its desired results due to many factors. Regarding its multidimensional role in the region, Turkey has faced many challenges in shaping its relations with its Caucasian neighbors. Significantly, Turkey's strong economic interdependence with Azerbaijan has highly affected its normalization process with Armenia, resulting in a profound strategic dilemma. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War put pressure on Turkey regarding its policy and approach towards Georgia, which became the main...