Turkey's proposed presidential system: An assessment of context and criticisms.

• Author: Iyimaya, Ahmet
• Position: COMMENTARY - Essay

ABSTRACT Debates over presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary government systems have continued unabated in Turkey for almost 50 years. However, the future of Turkey's system of government no longer constitutes a ground for theoretical argument, but, rather, is a political reality shaping the agenda of the country. This commentary proposes a historical examination of the debates and also aims to present a clear perspective on the nature of the present ground of debate over the presidential system.

Introduction

In recent years, Turkey has discussed the issue of its system of government at both intellectual and political levels. Debates over presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary government systems have continued unabated in Turkey for almost 50 years; however, the future of Turkey's system of government no longer constitutes a ground for theoretical argument, but, rather, is a political reality shaping the agenda of the country, especially in the wake of the election of the president by the public on August 10, 2014. Consequently, a substantial amount of literature has accumulated about which system of government is better for Turkey, in general, and about the merits or drawbacks of presidential system specifically.

Conversely to the ongoing debates and analyses about the structural properties of various government systems, and their pluses and minuses, this analysis will evaluate the current transformation already under way in Turkey. The actual socio-political process in which the presidential system is discussed, and within which these discussions are framed, provides a logical basis from which to pass judgements on prospective changes to Turkey's political system. Hence, the following analysis proposes a historical examination of the debates and practices relevant to any such discussion. The analysis also aims to present a clear perspective on the nature of the present ground of debate over the presidential system.

Unearthing the Process

rent ground of the issue, it is critical to briefly touch upon the systems of government, or the system practices, in Turkey through the lens of perceptions of and debates on the system. In this sense, the analysis concentrates on observations based on data, not on the course of the process, or rather, not on the tomography of the issue, so to speak. Of course, one cannot say that observations are not open to discussion, or that more observations are impossible. The observations made and the results based on them can be discussed under the following headings:

The Two-Constitution Reality and the De Facto Presidential System

Until recently, Turkey has had two constitutions simultaneously in effect: One is the official thread, written, yet not applied in difficult times, the other is the de facto version, applied during tough times. It may not be totally wrong to evaluate the period of 1920-1950 as a de facto presidential system, if we regard the presidential system as "a type of structure in which the president has the executive power." The 1921 Constitution envisaged the conventional system of government (le systeme conventionnel) and the 1924 Constitution proposed the parliamentary system. That, however, could not prevent the presidents of both periods from exercising super presidential authority. It may be said that the "presidential system" was practiced in a period even when the parliamentary system was the law.

De facto presidentialism was the case as well during Turkey's post-coup periods and near transition out of them. For instance, on legal ground the parliamentary system was in effect for about three years after the September 11, 1980 military coup d'etat, but in practice the president pretty much held all the executive power. The problem with these historical practices is not solely that they differed from the written law, but the fact that such practices lacked the most critical foundation of a democratic system, that is, electoral legitimacy.

The Prevention of Maturation of Existing Systems of Government by the Tutelage Regime

The tutelage regime has existed to a certain extent throughout Turkey's history, reaching a peak of influence during coup periods, and laid waste to Turkey's entire system of government and constitution. In this regard, it would not be inaccurate to claim that the 1961 and the 1982 Constitutions in Turkey included transitional exit and tutelary terms. The history of the tutelage regimes is written on the axes of institutions and processes, and the analyses of these regimes will be educational and dissuasive for Turkey.

Coups and military memoranda corrupt and rot all democratic structures. Coups and the order of tutelage first of all distract the military away from its legitimate purpose and mission, and corruption in other institutions follows. In this sense, the spoiling effect of tutelage may be observed in the underachievements and performance weaknesses of Turkey's democracy, its systems of government and political institutions. Certainly, systems of government and tutelage regimes thrive at each other's expense.

The Constitution Reform of 2010 significantly downgraded the tutelage regime and laid a rational ground for democratic systems of government to be preferred. Attendantly, recent legal changes (e.g. removing the legal foundations of the military's influence over politics, electing the president by popular vote, etc.) eliminated the tutelary structures which had set the most important obstacles in the way of the proper functioning of Turkey's democratic system following the transition to democracy; therefore, the possibility of practicing a presidential system extra-democratically was removed.

The Existence of an Intellectual Reaction to the Presidential System of Government

There is an intellectual reaction against a presidential system in Turkey. This reaction has been nurtured by the practice of the de facto presidential system and the deeply rooted imperial tradition (sultanate). It may also be said that prejudices related to lack of knowledge about the presidential system, and the opposition bloc that formed against the elements of the political arena that favor a presidential system, have also contributed to the same reaction.

lectual reaction...