Turkey's choice.

• Author: Mufti, Malik
• Position: ARTICLE - Essay

ABSTRACT This article argues that recent upheavals in Turkey's domestic and regional dynamics--the transition to a more crisis-ridden foreign policy around 2011 and the breakdown of the "Kurdish Opening" in 2014-2015--arose not from any fundamental change in strategic vision, but primarily from external developments such as the collapse of central authority in Syria and Iraq. These developments emboldened the PKK and its offshoots to adopt a more intransigent attitude, and prompted Turkey to add a hard power component to its previously soft powerdriven effort to expand its regional sphere of influence. With events unfolding rapidly, however, Turkey's leadership now confronts some urgent decisions with implications both for its long-standing strategic vision and for the future character of the Turkish state.

This article proceeds from the premise that there has long been fundamental continuity both in the overall strategic vision of the Turkish leadership, and in the centrality of the Kurdish question in shaping the pursuit of that vision. This was true of Ahmet Davutoglu's tenure in office as foreign minister (May 2009--August 2014) and then prime minister (August 2014--May 2016), despite the fact that it can be divided into two sub-phases which to many observers appeared radically opposed to each other: the first from 2009 to about 2011 and best characterized by Davutoglu's famous "zero problems" formulation, and the second from 2011 to 2016 marked by escalating crises with almost all Turkey's neighbors. I have already argued elsewhere that this apparent contradiction masked a deeper continuity in outlook --not just in Davutoglu's mind but also in those of the other main AK Party leaders--extending back even before 2002, and marked by a combination of hegemonic ambition with a realistic appreciation of regional power balances. (1) The transition around 2011 was accordingly occasioned not by a change of outlook, but primarily by regional transformations such as the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings. Here I will argue that the subsequent unfolding of those upheavals, beginning with the turning point of the battle for Kobani in 2014, has brought Turkey's leadership to a critical juncture in which the pillars of its long-standing strategic vision are being put to a decisive test.

"Zero Problems"

Between 2009 and 2011, Turkey's policy toward Syria and Iraq seemed to mirror its generally cooperative, economics-driven engagement with almost all its other neighbors. On the Iraqi front, the reopening of the Gaziantep-Mosul rail line in February 2010 symbolized a new phase of growing integration. Turkish exports to Iraq, which had grown from $188 million in 1996 to $829 million in 2003, skyrocketed to $8.3 billion by 2011, with much of this growth concentrated in northern Iraq. A key turning point came in 2009 when Turkey's governing AK Party finally wrested control of the state's Kurdish and Iraqi policies from the armed forces. Domestically, its announcement of a "Kurdish Opening" (a democratic outreach initiative) in July 2009 seemed to consolidate the AK Party's break with the monocultural nationalism of its Kemalist predecessors; encouraged about half of the country's Muslim and generally conservative Kurdish electorate to continue voting for it; threatened the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) with political marginalization; and induced Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK's imprisoned leader, to begin direct negotiations with the government culminating in a ceasefire. Externally, the AK Party's recognition of Kurdish identity freed it to pursue a rapprochement with northern Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) under the leadership of Masoud Barzani and his Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)--a rapprochement signaled by the first high-level meetings between the two sides in March 2009. Himself seeking support against internal rivals as well as external pressure from Baghdad and Tehran, Barzani reciprocated Ankara's overtures and called on the PKK to lay down its arms. As Turkey's exports came to dominate Iraqi Kurdistan's markets and its share of total foreign direct investment in the region reportedly reached 80 percent, and as the KRG began to export oil from territories under its control to Turkey without the approval of the Iraqi central government, the two economies grew increasingly intertwined. Barzani's trip to Turkey in June 2010 laid the groundwork for a deeper security alliance as well, with Barzani pledging to help push the Kurdish

Opening forward, and unnamed "Kurdish and Turkish officials" subsequently suggesting "that Ankara would be ready to defend the KRG if Baghdad moves with force to challenge Kurdish autonomy." (2)

On the Syrian front, bilateral relations improved at least as dramatically after Turkey pressured Damascus to crack down on the PKK in 1998. A free trade agreement had already been signed in 2004, and all visa requirements between the two countries lifted in 2009. Turkish exports to Syria consequently rose from $411 million in 2003 to $1.6 billion in 2011. (3) By 2009, Turkey was supplying Syria--like northern Iraq--with electric power, and by 2010 a daily train service connected Gaziantep to Aleppo. Here as well, however, one could detect signs of concern in the capital city about Turkey's deepening presence. As an International Crisis Group report noted in 2010: "some Syrian officials have begun to worry that the balance of payments is now in Turkey's favour, and wonder whether northern Syria, parts of which are only loosely connected to Damascus in terms of infrastructure, services and even identity, may slip into a Turkish sphere of influence." (4)

As if to confirm such concerns, a public opinion survey conducted by a Turkish think tank in 2009 revealed that 82 percent of Syrians and 73 percent of Iraqis believed "Turkey should play a larger role in the Arab world." Apparently impressed by the AK Party's experiment at synthesizing Islamic values, multiculturalism, and democratic practice, moreover, and also in an indication of frustration with their own authoritarian governments, 72 percent of Syrians and 62 percent of Iraqis polled in the survey agreed that Turkey offered a "model for the Arab world." (5) Although these developments convinced some observers that Davutoglu's "zero problems" approach constituted a shift to a "desecuritized" liberal foreign policy, they were also congruent with a more realpolitik interpretation according to which Turkey's soft power now complemented its hard power as twin elements of growing regional influence.

From the Arab Spring to Kobani

The spread of the Arab Uprisings to Syria in March 2011 ended this phase of Turkish foreign policy. Convinced that a fundamental transformation of Arab politics was underway in which Turkey was well positioned to play a guiding role, Ankara first urged the Syrian leadership to carry out meaningful political reforms, and then when that failed cut its ties with the regime and set about trying to organize the Syrian opposition. Ahmet Davutoglu's public rhetoric evolved in line with the collapsing Arab status quo, initially maintaining the modest tone of previous years:

Our foreign policy is essentially based on the principle of "Peace at home, peace in the world" as laid down by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk... Turkey has, in this regard, also managed to de-securitize its foreign policy understanding, which allows us to see our neighborhood through the prism of opportunities rather than a perception of threat.... Certain circles accuse us of pursuing a neo-Ottoman agenda. These allegations are baseless.... The key word defining Turkey's relations with the Arab countries is not 'hegemony,' but 'mutual cooperation.'... [W]e do not want to present ourselves, nor to be seen, as a role model. (6) Other government officials, however, had no hesitation about presenting Turkey as a role model for the Arab world, (7) some going so far as to assert that this "third wave of democracy is very important for Turkey. We must turn it to our advantage. We've been in a phase of retreat since 1699.... Now we are rising once again after 300 years. There is now a Turkey that lays claim (sahip cikan) to the lands we ruled in the past." (8) As the Arab Uprisings continued to unfold, Davutoglu's language grew more ambitious as well. In April 2012 he announced that Turkey intended to "direct the great transformation wave in the Middle East," and by March 2013 he was declaring that "we will render these borders meaningless.... If Diyarbakir is cut off from Aleppo and Urfa is cut off from Mosul, won't they be losing their hinterland?... We will break the mold Sykes-Picot drew for us." (9)

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When it came to Syria, this new approach took the form of assistance and sanctuary for both the political and military arms of the opposition. Early hopes of a rapid victory evaporated, however...