Turkey as Normative Power: Connections with the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring/Normatif Guc olarak Turkiye: Arap Bahari'nda Musluman Kardeslerle Baglantilar.

• Author: Futak-Campbell, Beatrix

Introduction

Since the 19 (th) century, there have been multiple forms of regionalism to challenge great power interventions. (1) Having said that, the study of regionalism has been quite limited to the European Union (EU) and seeing the EU as the model that other regions ought to be compared to. (2) While there are some notable exceptions/ mainstream scholarship on regionalism has overlooked other, but especially so called 'peripheral regions' such as the Middle East and/or considered them from a Eurocentric perspective. This oversight, as argued by Muge Kinacioglu, has not allowed us to consider Turkey's changed self-image under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the different form of regionalism it has promoted as the leader of the Islamic world. (4) Moreover, previous studies on middle and regional powers have predominantly focused on power in material terms, rather than their influence on ideational or normative terms. The EU is the exception to this.

In 2002, Ian Manners introduced the concept of normative power. He argued that the EU acts as a 'normative' rather than 'civilian' power by being able to 'shape conceptions of the normal'. (5) The 'ideational nature' (6) of normative power can be observed by focusing on examples such as the abolishment of the death penalty or on promotion of children's rights. For Manners this demonstrates that the EU aims to change norms without seeking clear material gains. (7) For Thomas Diez, reflexivity is the key to being a normative power: without reflexivity, the EU runs the risk of becoming 'a self-righteous, messianistic project'. (8) Portraying the EU as a messiah or saviour could lead to the EU being considered a moralising power rather than one possessing moral authority. (9)

Unsurprisingly, the application of the concept of normative power has remained Eurocentric--which is indeed the case with most works on theories of regionalism. (10) Only a handful of scholars have extended it to actors outside of the EU Nathalie Tocci (11) introduces a framework to identify the normative foreign policy behaviour of different actors. Elisabeth de Zutter, (12) through her four-step analytical framework however, discards the implicit and Eurocentric 'force-for-good' assumption that makes it difficult to apply the concept outside of the EU. For her normative power is identified by juxtaposing the identity of a normative power to that of a civilian power. A civilian power's core norms are to protect its sovereignty and to apply the principle of non-interference and non-intervention. A normative power exports its norms while a civilian power favours status quo. (13) Normative and civil power share the same norms, such as democracy market-economy human rights and fundamental freedoms, and employ exclusively soft instruments to diffuse these norms. Both seek to change the international system, but 'while a civilian power wants to civilize international relations, a normative power seeks to project its norms into the international system'. (14) As a result, three forms of normative power can be identified: a cosmopolitan normative power (using socialization, persuasion, and emulation), a soft imperialist normative power (implementing incentives), and a despotic normative power (utilizing physical means). (15)

Using Tocci's framework, Emel Dal examines the extent to which Turkey has been pursuing a normative foreign policy in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria during the Arab Spring and concludes that Turkey had a normative foreign policy during specific periods. (16) Nonetheless, she argues that Turkey cannot be considered a normative power, or at least, not yet, because it simply, 'does not possess a cohesive and ambitious Normative Foreign Policy Agenda'. (17) Ozden Oktav and Aycan Celikaksoy argue that Turkey's support for Western intervention in Syria reflected Turkey's ambitions to adhere to the normative aspect of its foreign policy at that time. (18) Turkey was able to practice its humanitarian foreign policy despite a large numbers of Syrian refugees entering Turkey. (19) However, they also drew attention to the fact that by not working with international bodies and by expressing a preference for Sunni Syrian refugees, Turkey's capacity to exert normative power has suffered. (20) Turkey however, does not use norms as an antithesis to the normative power Europe concept.

What these accounts of Turkey as a potential normative power reinforce is that normative power is equivalent with very specific Eurocentric/western centric norms. In turn, this raises the question as to why Turkish support for Western intervention is normative, but being critical of international bodies is not? As Pinar Bilgin and Gulsah Capan argue, in order to apply IR concepts (for example normative power) outside of a European/Western context, it is important to move beyond the idea of Eurocentrism as a 'problem of geographical location". (21) Doing so will allow us to become critical when utilising these concepts.

In addition, neither Dal, nor Oktav and Celikaksoy explore the fundamental factors that underpin Turkey's ambitions to be seen as a normative power. These factors include, first and foremost, the internal struggle between the secular elite, also known as the Kemalists, and the AKP, in both domestic and foreign policies. Second, these studies neglect the significance of the strategic depth doctrine, put forward by Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey's foreign minister (2009-2014) and then prime minister and leader of the AKP in 2014, which was the basis of Turkey's regional engagements. Third, Turkey's Ottoman history is also relevant for the way Turkish foreign policy is practiced. (22) Finally, neither study compares the norms that underpin Turkey as a normative power with the way those very norms are used by the EU. Addressing these offers a chance to explore the value-based assumptions that underpin norms, and to evaluate whether normative power as it is currently conceptualized can actually travel beyond the EU.

Therefore, the question we address here is: could Turkey be considered as a normative power? The aim of this article is two-fold. It examines whether the concept of normative power can be applied to Turkey. At the same time, it explores how the concept of normative power can be made applicable outside of the EU to make it less Eurocentric. This article considers the time period between 2011-2013 during the Arab Spring and uses two case studies, Egypt and Syria. Under Davutoglu's leadership, there was an ideological shift within Turkish foreign policy and practice during the height of the Arab Spring. Besides official government papers, speeches and declarations by Davutoglu and Turkish foreign policymakers and diplomats, newspapers such as Today's Zaman, Daily Sabah, Hurriyet Daily News, Milliyet, Egypt Independent, and TV programmes such as the Egyptian TV show 'Dream' and an Egyptian political talk show are also used as data for the article.

Following de Zutter's four-step framework to normative power spotting, the remainder of the article is as follows. First, it considers Turkey's role in the international system and whether Turkey has helped to redefine the international system. This first step allows us to determine 'the power capacities of the political entity under consideration without any assumption about the self-image of the identity, others' recognition of it or specific practices'. (23) A normative power has to be a significant actor in the international system. Second, it considers the identity and role of the actor. This includes the identification of an awareness of power capacities; the construction of particular norms as universal; and a role as norm-diffuser'. (24) Third, it demonstrates that others confirm the given actor's status as a normative power. (25) Confirmation not only concerns the image of the actor, but also examines the recognition of the norms in question, and '(perceived) consistency between role, norms and practice'. (26 )Finally, it assesses the impact of the power's norms in terms of their other practices. (27) In both cases, Turkish positions regarding the selected case study countries, and the Egyptian and Syrian positions on Turkey are examined.

This article claims that while Turkey might have seen itself as a normative power and pursued a normative foreign policy during the Arab Spring to influence the Egyptian and Syrian political landscapes, there was just not enough recognition by these two countries to fit the claim. Despite this mixed reception, Turkey could be identified either as a cosmopolitan or as an imperialist normative power. In addition, the article demonstrates that the concept of normative power is applicable outside the EU-context.

Turkey's Role in the International System: Material Conditions

The first step in identifying normative power is to reconsider if this potential normative power is a power at all, without making assumptions about its self-perception or others' recognition of this specific perception. De Zutter defines power capacities by economic weight within the global economy and population size. (28) In contrast to Islamic political movements that predated its creation, the AKP decided to adopt a liberal economic agenda. (29) By presenting itself as a conservative centre-right party pursuing neo-liberal policies, it appealed to the conservative values of Turkey's society, while at the same time achieving significant economic success.

While it is hard to precisely establish the military power of a country, as there is contested information on military spending and the lack of parallel that can be drawn from such spending to actual military power, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) shows that Turkey was a significant military actor between 2011 and 2013. (30) In 2012, Turkey was seventh in the world for submarines stocks. It had the second largest stock of tactical and tanker...