Traditional Rivalry or Regional Design in the Middle East?

• Author: Ulutas, Ufuk
• Position: ARTICLE

Introduction

For the past seven years, the Middle East has been preoccupied with the repercussions of the process known as the Arab Spring. Today, the region lies at the crossroads of multiple rivalries and conflicts. With the notable exception of Tunisia's relatively uncomplicated transition to democracy, the Arab revolts unleashed a wave of violence and tensions in Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria, whose effects the entire region continues to experience. During this period, Libya set the stage for a bloody civil war and became a theater of regional competition. Egypt's democratic progress has been reversed by a military coup d'etat. Yemen, which suffers from a major humanitarian crisis fueled by civil war and military intervention by Saudi Arabia, also experiences additional tensions due to Iran's growing influence. Meanwhile, Syria became the source of bloody proxy wars and region-wide trauma. By contrast, Iraq, which triggered regional fault lines for twenty years, was not directly affected by the Arab Spring. In the wake of the 2003 U.S. occupation, however, the country became a 'failed state' due to instability, sectarian policies and terrorism. The country continues its efforts to recover from these crises to this day.

Over the past twenty years, and particularly in the last seven years, Iran has been the clear victor in a geopolitical competition with the Gulf and Israel--some of the strongest undercurrents in the Middle East. (1) Taking advantage of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Tehran was able to reap the benefits of its pre-1979 Islamic Revolution investments in its natural allies in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere in the region. The country, which played a crucial role in the transformation of peaceful protests in Syria to civil and proxy war, single-handedly changed the balance of power in the conflict zone by deploying militias from all over the Shia world. As a matter of fact, Iran effectively became the de facto dominant force in Iraq through its proxies, in Lebanon through Hezbollah and in Syria due to its most recent military intervention there. At the same time, Tehran strengthened its ties to Shia communities in the Gulf. Although the country's efforts ultimately resulted in failure in Bahrain, it successfully created a patronage relationship with the Houthis in Yemen, a group with traditionally weak links to Iran, to establish a military base capable of threatening Saudi Arabia. (2)

Meanwhile, the opposite camp--the Gulf countries and Israel--experienced major strategic setbacks in the wake of Iraq's occupation and with the consolidation of Iranian influence. During this process, Israel and the Gulf countries did not always form a united front. However, it is possible to claim that their relationship became stronger due to their mutual opposition to Iran. Unlike in earlier attacks against Palestinians, Israel has been unable to assert its dominance over Hezbollah. Most recently, the country suffered a humiliating defeat against the group in 2006. During the Obama presidency, Israel was concerned by Washington's efforts to use Iran to counterbalance the Sunni bloc in the Middle East. As such, Tel Aviv was among the most vocal critics of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the West, which alleviated international pressure on Tehran. Although the country welcomed Hezbollah's decision to suspend attacks against Israeli targets and concentrate on the Syrian conflict, Israel views the group's potential empowerment in this process as a serious threat. Meanwhile, the Gulf countries have been distracted from their rivalry with Iran, as they focused on implementing pro-status quo policies and crushing revisionist players during the Arab Spring. Moreover, the threat of 'Iranian expansionism' became far more visible due to Tehran's growing hard power in a range of countries, including Yemen and Syria.

The Trump Administration's approach to the Middle East created new dimensions in the polarization between Iran, Israel and the Gulf States. Bearing in mind that the Obama effect triggered the first wave of chaos in the region, it is possible to argue that President Donald Trump launched the second wave. The Qatar crisis and Saudi Arabia's reform efforts in the wake of Trump's participation in the May 2017 Riyadh summit arguably marked the beginning of a new era. In other words, the Trump Administration played a crucial role in the most recent developments--which seemingly fit into Iran's traditional rivalry with the Gulf countries and Israel, but also represents an attempt at regional design.

Turkey, which stands to experience the side effects of this new era directly, as part of the region and with regard to its bilateral relations with third parties, has attempted a balancing act in an effort to reduce tensions and prevent violent conflict between the two sides. As such, Ankara seeks to support countries, in a difficult position due to growing polarization between Iran, Israel and the Gulf, in order to avoid becoming party to polarization while maintaining neutral middle ground amidst chaos and conflict. At a time when polarization grows between great powers, including Russia and the United States (U.S.), Turkey has criticized the Gulf indirectly and Iran directly to stress the need for regional powers to establish a new order and cooperate more closely. (3) Unhappy with Iran's regional expansionism and the instability Tehran fuels through its proxies, Turkey's balanced policy could be perceived by the Gulf's ambitious crown princes as an obstacle to their goals.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's (MbS) assumption of power, the Qatar crisis, high-profile arrests on 'corruption' charges, an attempt to force Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri to resign, and the use of Iranian ballistic missiles by the Houthi rebels to attack Riyadh are among the many developments supporting the view that the current situation goes beyond the traditional rivalry between Iran, Israel and the Gulf countries. Such a view can also be supported by other events such as Trump's plan to 'contain' Iran, mounting pressure on Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to accept Washington's 'peace' plan, efforts by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to install its proxy, Mohammad Dahlan, as the leader of Palestine, pressure on the Syrian opposition by Riyadh to reinvent themselves and the emergence of a special relationship between Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. By contrast, these developments effectively suggest there is an attempt at regional design. Although public debate has almost exclusively focused on domestic changes in Saudi Arabia, the Qatar blockade and growing tensions with Iran, it is clear the dispute has regional dimensions and that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and the U.S. seem to have reached an agreement on certain issues. It is quite unlikely, however, that this agreement--an attempt at regional design--will play a founding role in the Middle East. Currently, expectations are low for at least two reasons: Washington's changing global role fuels uncertainty, creates a power vacuum and entails disorder in various parts of the world, including Europe, the Middle East and Asia-Pacific. At present, there is a major gap, for example, between U.S. foreign policy and national security discourse, the country's instruments on the ground and the capabilities of its alliances. Moreover, Trump Administration's unilateralist, vulgar and somewhat inconsistent policies, which seek to protect U.S. economic interests, further deepen instability. To make matters worse, it is important to note U.S. foreign policy and national security discourse has yet to translate into a sustainable and applicable strategy. In other words, Washington's statements fail to make a game-changing impact on the ground. This is largely due to serious disagreements and differences of opinion amongst Washington policymakers, domestic tensions and the Trump Administration's inability to exert control over the U.S. bureaucracy.

Secondly, the current attitude of the U.S., which desperately needs to set a new Middle East policy, creates a balance of power likely to transform regional tensions into hot conflict. The Trump Administration's Iran strategy, for example, seems more likely to transform competition between regional powers into destructive tensions--as opposed to creating a new regional order. As seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, theoretical comparisons of power and capabilities do not necessarily translate to actual influence in the Middle East, where chaos and violent conflicts make more room for state and non-state actors alike. Keeping in mind that Iran and Russia have been most successful at exploiting those new rooms for maneuver, it is possible to conclude that U.S. policy, which promotes conflict rather than order in the Middle East, creates serious risks.

Individual Game Plans

A number of major developments took place in the Middle East since Trump attended the Riyadh summit in May 2017 meeting with Arab leaders. (4) During this period, the most notable countries have been Saudi Arabia, where systemic changes are taking place, the UAE, the Gulf's most operational country, Israel, which has kept a low profile since the Arab Spring except for launching occasional airstrikes, the U.S., which entered a period of political chaos since Trump's surprise victory in the 2016 presidential election, and Iran, whose expansionist foreign policy secured its place atop the list of national security threats in many countries. While refusing to become party to the growing polarization in the Middle East, Turkey is concerned by the potential regional chaos and conflicts. Provided that most assessments of regional developments in recent months have been centered on Saudi Arabia, it would be best to start this rundown of individual game plans with Riyadh.

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