Towards more pragmatism: German foreign policy after the euro crisis.

• Author: Frohlich, Stefan
• Position: COMMENTARY - Essay

The Current Debate

No matter who governs in Berlin in the near future there seem to be two possible scenarios for German Foreign Policy in particular and the role of Germany in Europe and the world in general according to most analysts: Firstly, Germany, as an irrefutable sign of its seemingly political safety and economic prosperity (despite the Euro crisis), will continue with its "strategic complacency"--a typical reflex in any extended period of economic and market strength--and not debate the big issues, particularly those related to foreign and security policy and Germany's role in the world. While politicians in the U.S., UK, France, Poland or elsewhere in the world are expecting more German leadership on global issues, commensurate with its weight in Europe and on the global stage as a strong economy and the second-largest exporter in the world particularly encouraging it to take more responsibility in Europe's wider neighborhood, the government in Berlin rather limits itself to a passive role of successfully managing political conflicts at home.

According to this view (for which you find representatives on both sides of the Atlantic), Germany will remain the "reluctant power" (1) the "unwilling hegemon" (2) never becoming a "normal" Western power, (3) not to mention the U.S.'s new "geopolitical partner" (4) It will thus further contribute to a new "unpredictability" of German foreign policy, as in the case of Libya (being even worse than its former "reluctance"), and "irreconcilable differences" between Berlin and its European partners and the U.S.

Secondly, rather than hiding away Germany is accepting the burden of responsibility that particularly follows from its relative economic strength and assuming the role of the "pre-eminent" power in Europe, pro-actively shaping the developments in the Middle East (Syria, Egypt), the negotiations of a transatlantic trade deal (TTIP), or the future of European relations with China and Russia. This view oscillates between those who mostly agree that currently it is still rather wishful thinking to expect Germany to take on this role, (5) but think that the country has the willingness to move along this direction, and those who believe that it has already assumed a larger role in shaping Europe and preserving the liberal world order (6) by using its geo-economic and structural power to extend its influence and advance its interests. What both have in common, however, is the strong belief in Germany's growing problem-solving capacity and the newly ascribed role as Europe's "central," "indispensable" (7) or even "exceptional" power. (8) In that sense, Germany has at the same time become Europe's (and even the world's) hope by adjusting Alliances and strategic partnerships as the "benign" hegemon and challenge by imposing its interests and own macro-economic traditions unilaterally (as during the Euro crisis, and, as some would argue, also in case of the refugee crisis).

Political reality in German foreign policy is somewhere in the middle of these two viewpoints of the second scenario. As a matter of fact, Germany is at the center of Europe, and even those foreign policy analysts in the country, who in the past preferably referred to the country's "culture of restraint," "civilian power" concept or "effective multilateralism" as the main characteristics/principles of its foreign policy, today bemoan the shortcomings for more global influence in terms of targeted investments in "power and its responsible use" (9) and ascribe it as the new, "irreplaceable" power center within Europe. (10) In other words, German foreign policy is changing and there are signs of a new strategic thinking on Germany's international role that is certainly not abandoning its normative impulse but complementing it by an astonishing rhetoric about Berlin's "enhanced responsibility" (11) shift to a "more active role," (12) and necessary investments in all power dimensions; this has considerable implications for Europe and the integration process as well as for transatlantic relations. On the other hand, this is an incremental process and its outcome remains uncertain as long as the political elites and analysts' foreign policy discourse don't reach the society.

The Main Parameters of German Foreign Policy

Against this background Germany's emerging role in Europe and the world and its new potential in the global arena is following three main assumptions:

1. The traditional role models/concepts for Germany as a "civilian" or "trade/commercial" power, which is typically reactive in nature, are overhauled and at least have to be complemented by the idea of a new self-understanding that the country is emerging as a regional great power with the willingness and ability to shape its global environment by overcoming resistance and resisting others in the sense of what Max Weber called "Gestaltungswille". This assumption ipso facto follows from the idea that the strategic culture of a country is not a unitary, but a semi-permanent feature of its national identity that can adapt to structural changes in international politics and alter the country's predispositions toward its role in the world. For this reason, German foreign policy (as any nation's foreign policy) does not follow a particular International Relations theoretical approach (in the case of Germany the mostly favored "social constructivist" or "liberal institutionalist" ones), but is the result of different lenses (liberalist, constructivist and realist) through which we have to observe and explain any country's foreign policy. Neither is the often cited concept of a "normalization" of German foreign policy--as the antipode to a German "Sonderweg"--a helpful analytical tool to conceptualize the country's external relations. In other words, German foreign policy over the last 25 years has gradually adapted to a new strategic environment, contributed more to peace and security missions (without being interventionist), and therefore undeniably acquired more influence. This, in turn, means that any attitude of reluctance or even humility is no longer authentic or being accepted.

2. German foreign policy of course remains value and soft power-oriented, but despite all diplomatic and military restrictions--which in turn...