The United States and Military Coups in Turkey and Pakistan: Between Conspiracy and Reality.

• Author: Aslan, Omer

Within the context of their bipolar rivalry, both the United States and the Soviet Union have supported or hindered coup d'etats in various parts of the world. They built their policies taking into consideration their eclectic concerns, often with the aim of thwarting each other's influence. Nevertheless, the role of external actors in military coup d'etats has been overlooked for many years, creating a vast gap in academic literature. In The United States and Military Coups in Turkey and Pakistan: Between Conspiracy and Reality, Omer Aslan attempts to fill this gap by analyzing the role played by the U.S. in four successful coup d'etats in Turkey and Pakistan throughout the Cold War. In his endeavor to provide an answer to how external factors helped shape the trajectory of these coups in each individual case, Aslan scrutinizes the role of the U.S. every step of the way: before, during, and after each of the four coup d'etats he presents.

For the purpose of building a nexus between the coup d'etats and the impact of an external dimension, Aslan bases his analyses upon the 1960 and 1980 coups in Turkey, and the 1958 and 1977 coups in Pakistan. The similarities of the two countries' geopolitical significance and the essential role played by their militaries in their establishment serve as a ground for the author's decision to shed light on their domestic civil-military relations. Throughout the Cold War, Turkey and Pakistan were of crucial importance to Washington as part of its policy of containment toward the Soviet Union. Both Turkey and Pakistan underwent transformation from Prussian and British to American military tactics and weaponry, respectively (p. 211). While Turkey enjoyed an institutional linkage with the West via NATO, Pakistan was institutionally allied with it via the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Thus, due to their geopolitical positions, both countries secured an idiosyncratic position for the U.S. Hence, the domestic atmosphere in Turkey and Pakistan directly correlated with the success of the American policy of Soviet containment in the region, which was significantly jeopardized after Qassim's coup in Iraq in 1958 (p. 113).

Aslan begins to present his rigorous research by describing a coup as a two-level game that revolves around both external and internal dimensions. Having underlined that the coups are usually triggered by domestic factors, such as weak...