The Role of the Gulf in Iraq after 2017.

• Author: Al-Hadithy, Mohammed Muazaz

Introduction

Some of the challenges on various levels surrounding the Gulf role in Iran relate to the Gulf position on the Iraqi political reality after 2003, by refusing to deal with several governments, accusing them of being too close to Iran, especially in the two governments of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (2006-2014), where discord prevailed. As a response, the Iraqi governments have accused some Gulf countries of supporting armed groups in Iraq. Other challenges related to the political and security instability in Iraq manifested in great obstacles to Iraqi openness towards the Gulf regional environment.

However, the pivot point in the context of Iraqi-Gulf relations was in 2014 with the arrival of former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to power in Iraq. Then the Gulf-Iraqi relations witnessed an improvement in the diplomatic atmosphere, especially with the appointment of the first non-resident ambassador for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The political role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia affects, to a large extent, the behavior of other Gulf countries.

We can say that the Gulf's role in Iraq after 2017 witnessed a great development compared to the previous stages, with the coming to power of Iraqi governments that do not adopt policies hostile to the Gulf countries. This contributed to the increasing Gulf-Iraq interactions and led to the exchange of diplomatic visits between Iraq and the Gulf states at the highest levels. However, this does not preclude the existence of a number of dilemmas and obstacles facing the Gulf role in Iraq, foremost of which is the lack of Gulf consensus in managing political relations with Iraq, or other regional issues in the region, as was evident in the Gulf crisis. The other obstacles related to the Iraqi internal environment appeared in political and security unrest, internal or external, especially regional developments in the Middle East, as well as the role of the variables affecting the Gulf role in Iraq, including the roles of Iran, Turkiye, and the major powers, such as the U.S. and the Russian Federation.

This study attempts to identify the nature of the Gulf's role in Iraq after 2017, according to the following axes: (i) the turbulent course in Iraqi-Gulf relations, (ii) the repercussions of the Gulf crisis on the Gulf's role in Iraq, (iii) the development of the Gulf's role in Iraq, (iv) the future of the Gulf's role in Iraq.

A Turbulent Course in Gulf-Iraqi Relations

The Iraqi-Gulf relations have passed through various stages, including a partial opening after 2003 in the presence of the American occupation and the establishment of the political system in Iraq. Later on, differences prevailed over the relations, especially after 2006, when former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who is close to Iran, came to power. Iraq's violence and security instability at that stage increased the differences between Iraq and the Gulf. As a result, the Iraqi government accused some of the Gulf states of supporting the violence by facilitating the entry of armed groups into Iraq.

Despite the great support provided by the Gulf states to the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003, they failed to adopt an effective and clear vision of establishing a Gulf influence on Iraq. Unlike the Gulf's position, the Iranian position was clear. That was evident in the statement of former Iranian Vice President Muhammad Ali Abtahi, who said: "If there is no Iranian support, the American forces would not have been able to occupy Afghanistan or Iraq." (1) This explains the reality of the pragmatic Iranian policy whose interests agreed with the U.S. despite the conflict between them. In the post-U.S. occupation stage, Iran was the most prominent factor in curbing the Gulf's role in Iraq, especially with the Gulf states accusing the Iraqi regime of relying on sectarian foundations in managing political affairs, whether internal or external. In addition, Iran was accused of employing the Iraqi government to achieve its strategic interests in the Middle East. The escalation of sectarian and religious discourse in the region has contributed increasingly to the complexity of the Gulf-Iraqi relation.

Some Gulf countries re-opened their embassies in Baghdad in 2008, one being Kuwait, which had ceased diplomatic relations since the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, and the other the UAE. (2) Relations, however, remained limited to economic and social affairs, and political relations did not develop as required. Gulf governments tried to intervene forcefully in the Iraqi political scene by supporting the Iraqi list, led by former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, who was close to the Saudi leadership. His list managed to win the Iraqi parliamentary elections in 2010, but an Iranian American deal meant that al-Maliki remained as Prime Minister of Iraq for a second term, which to a large degree, led to the escalation of the Iraqi-Gulf disputes. (3)

In the context of studying and analyzing the Gulf-Iraqi relations, it can be argued that the post-2011 period witnessed the escalation of the Iraqi-Gulf disputes due to a set of variables, including but not limited to: (i) The withdrawal of the American occupation forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 contributed to the increase of Iranian influence in Iraq and led to the decrease of the Gulf's influence. (ii) The start of protest movements and the escalation of sectarian and religious dimensions in the crises in the Arab region, most notably Syria, where the sectarian conflict reached the highest level. Iran used its economic potential and the geopolitical position of Iraq to support the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, in exchange for the intervention of the Gulf states to support the Syrian opposition. (4) (iii) The Gulf intervention through the Peninsula Shield Force to suppress the protest movement in Bahrain, which put Iraq in confrontation with the Gulf countries due to the Iraqi-Iranian political association. (iv) The success of Iran in extending its regional influence from Iraq to Syria and Lebanon, its intervention in Yemen to support the Ansar Allah al-Houthi group, and its attempt to support the protest movement in Bahrain led to the escalation of the Iraqi Gulf disputes as the domination of Iraqi political forces linked to the Iranian project of power in Iraq, and their hostile statements made against Gulf. (5)

In this regard, the features of the Iraqi Gulf political differences became clear during the Arab summit in Baghdad in 2012. While the former Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, was the only leader present, the other Gulf states' representation was limited to the level of ministers and ambassadors, and the presence of Sheikh Sabah may be the indication of his effort to enhance the Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations in the post-2003 era. (6)

The occupation of Iraqi territory by ISIS in June of 2014 and the holding of the parliamentary elections...