The role of the military in Syrian politics and the 2011 uprising.

• Author: Kurt, Veysel
• Position: Essay

The "Arab Spring" and the Rise of the Military in Middle East Politics

One of the most controversial issues in the Middle East in modern times is the relation between politics and the military of a regional country. Civil-military relations have developed in a different and more complex form in the Middle East than they have in democratic countries due to the fact that the states in the region have been ruled through authoritarian means, and have experienced their modernization processes through their militaries; the mechanisms of their political administrations have been shaped through their militaries, but they still have failed to establish a military regime.

Milan Svolik, examining government changes under authoritarian rules between 1945 and 2002 in 316 cases, shows why the civil-military relation is crucially important in such regimes. According to Svolik, among the 303 leaders who lost power in the period, only 32 were removed by popular uprising and another 30 stepped down under public pressure to democratize. Twenty more leaders lost power through an assassination that was not part of a coup or a popular uprising, whereas 16 were removed by foreign intervention. The remaining 205 dictators were removed by government insiders, such as other government members or members of the military or security forces, i.e. as a coup detat. (1) This pattern is quite valid for the Middle Eastern countries.

Since the establishment of the countries in the Middle East, civil-military relations have been quite complex in nature; therefore, the two areas have become quite transitive. In such a picture, it is difficult to say that the balance is maintained between the two. Civilian-military relations became a pressing subject at issue again in late 2010 with the sparkle of protests that began in Tunisia and rapidly spilled over to other regional countries. The evolution of civil-military relations since the independence of the countries in the Middle East may be considered in three periods. (2) The first one, which continued until the late 1970s, is the period of military coups, which are defined as "the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (military), which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder." (3)

As seen in Table 1, a total of 55 coups were attempted between 1949 and 1978. Military powers in the Middle East differ in their ways of using power, its effects, and the ruling typology. (5) Regardless of their numbers and scopes, military coups are arguably the most critical determining factor in government changes in the Middle East. Therefore, when we consider this situation from the viewpoint of political leaders, as Feaver puts, "the need to have protection by the military may bring with it the need to have protection from the military." (5)

The second period covers the time frame from 1979 until 2010, in which the civil-military relations were on a steady base and military interventions rarely occurred. In the three decades following 1980, successful coups numbered 17. (6) According to Beeri, this period of relative political stability was achieved when elements toppled a government by a coup "took measures to prevent the same mechanism from being used against themselves." (7) Although this mechanism works differently in every country, it basically follows the same processes and lays the ground for the continuation of military tutelage in different forms within a country. It is possible to talk about a power balance between the military and political forces. In a sense, the military uses mechanisms of suppression and force against an opposition, when necessary; therefore, contributes to the longevity of the ruling order, (8) and the political rulers, in return, clear the way for the military in the spheres of economy and politics. Such a form of relationship is not an indication of a sensitive balance between the two elements; to the contrary, as Cook says, the military rises in a position of "ruling but not governing." (9)

The third period started in late 2010; militaries played a quite determining role when the nature of mass demonstrations began to change in a negative way. The most distinctive feature of this period is that mass uprisings have emerged as a new factor in the civil-military relations. The Arab Uprisings are a new phenomenon for the Middle East in terms of their quantitative and qualitative scopes, demands for political change and the points they have attained. Up until late 2010, despite the "waves of democratizations" over different periods, and the structural transformations in international politics, such as the end of the Cold War, the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East had remained in place; with the popular revolts, however, they arrived at the edge of change. In the face of the revolts calling for government changes, militaries assumed the guardianship of the rulers; as such, they were expected to confront the masses. Militaries were capable of such an intervention; however, the determining factor at that point was the willingness of militaries to act on their capabilities. (10) Whether or not militaries are willing to take upheavals under control has always been one of the most critical issues that carry the transformation processes into different dimensions.

At the onset of the demonstrations in Syria in March of 2011, comments were made that the "change of government in Syria may be in stark contrast with those in Tunisia and Egypt." (11) In fact, military security units took action against the demonstrators in order to control the revolt and prevent possible breakouts from the military. The question at this point is, "Why did the military take action to protect the Assad rule in Syria?" This study elaborates the military's desire to suppress the uprising in terms of its relations with the ruling order, analyzes military-political power relations in Syria, and explains the military's attitude accordingly.

Military and Politics as a Power Bloc in Syria: From "Les Troupes Speciales" to the Uprising in 2011

The periodization on civil-military relations in the Middle East presents a clear-cut frame when Syria is at issue. The first term lasted from 1919 to 1946 during the French Mandate; the second mandate from 1946 to 1970 can be defined with the power struggle among the different ideological/sectarian groups within the politics and the military. Lastly, the third term started with Hafez al-Assad's military coup in 1970 until the Syrian uprising began in 2011.

The French influence is a critical factor in shaping the roots of the Syrian regime. The League of Nations had formulated the mandate regime in 1919 to provide assistance to the developments of some communities in their independence processes. (12) In this connection, the French presence in Syria until 1946 created opposite outcomes. France's political strategy, described as "minority politics," kept different bonds of belonging alive insofar as to pursue identity politics. Such identity politics also constituted the main reason behind the power struggle in the military.

The French administration preferred minorities while forming the Special Troops of the Levant and the Military Academies at Damascus and Homs -the backbone of the Syrian and Lebanese armies. (13) Minorities considered participation in the military as a way of raising their status. The upper social classes consisting of Sunnis and influential tribes view the military as a place for the "lazy, underdeveloped, socially disadvantaged or influential yet clumsy." (14) The French minority politics, the adaptation of minorities and the disadvantaged to such politics, and the preferences of the upper class of the period led to the rise of minorities in the military.

Since the 1930s, in particular, Alewites gained ground in the military -albeit in low rankings- as Sunni Arabs organized even more for independence, and the French favored Duruz and Alewites. (15) The influence of Alewites in the military became more visible in the 1940s. The percentage of Sunni Arabs in the military declined to 30 percent according to the population/military balance in 1947. (16)

Therefore, the military became an institution dominated by minorities in terms of identities and by lower social classes in socio-economic terms. As these military troops were transformed into the Syrian and Lebanese armies in 1945, the weight of minorities in the military composition remained unchanged. This factor would facilitate cooperation between the Baath Party and the military, both of which were nurtured by the same human sources and were powerful in the same regions.

The Power Struggle and the Military Coups after Independence

Between 1946 and 1970, Gordon Torrey indicates that a total of 15 coups were made in Syria. (13) The most effective interventions began with the Husnu Zaim coup in 1949, followed by the coups in 1951, 1954, 1961, 1963, and 1966, and ending with the military coup by Hafez al-Assad in 1970. This period should not be interpreted only as the reflection of a political power struggle within the military. The military was shaped by purges and through setting up new cadres. In this process of power struggle, the purging of various groups prepared the ground for minorities to gain strength both in the military and in the Baath party; therefore, these two factors became the main components of the ruling power. What I have described as the "ruling bloc" emerged from the co-dependencies of these two elements in a mutually supporting manner.

With the Baath coup in 1963, Syrian politics were presumed to have settled down to a paradigmatic ground. Despite the Baath's mission of ideological integration, full-fledged political stability was not completely achieved.

The coups in 1966 and 1970 are an indication of an internal feud within the Baath party. In fact, it was not simply a change of actors but rather a...