The New German Coalition and Its Impact on EU-Turkey Relations.

• Author: Mese, Zafer
• Position: COMMENTARY

New German Government's 'Assertive' Foreign and Security Policy Agenda

With the formation of the 'traffic light' coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Alliance 90/The Greens, and Free Democratic Party (FDP) as a result of the national elections of September 26, 2021, the Chancellor candidate of SPD, Olaf Scholz, became Germany's ninth post-war Chancellor. Moreover, the first three-party coalition in German history marked the beginning of the post-Merkel era. The shift from a two to a three-party coalition in Germany reflects the same erosion of the established large Volksparteien already seen in many other European countries.

In fact, German foreign and security policy is under new management after sixteen years under Angela Merkel. With reference to the coalition agreement, there is no reason to expect radical departures from Germany's existing foreign policy orientation, however, the new coalition government will still bring in different perspectives on Germany's international role.

According to the coalition agreement (the playbook of the government) with reference to foreign policy, all three parties are committed to deepening European integration with the ultimate vision of the establishment of a federalized 'United States of Europe' as the sole facilitator of an endogenous European 'strategic autonomy,' capable of collectively safeguarding European interests in the near future. The implementation of such an ambitious vision seems to be less realistic than intended. It may address and please the expectations of some EU member states calling for German leadership in times of challenges within the EU (geopolitical tensions, financial, and migration crisis). (1)

It is assumed that Germany will not deviate from its multilateral approach tradition in foreign policy by actively pushing for a common European approach to the major geopolitical challenges instead of engaging in exclusive unilateral initiatives. From the U.S. perspective, the critical question will be whether the strategic sovereignty of the EU will be complementary to NATO, as the German government is in favor of, or will it duplicate NATO in Europe as the French government's intentions seem to be. The U.S. administration will definitely oppose French-style autonomy. Nevertheless, in line with the historically cemented paradigm of German foreign policy, Scholz will push back against any tendencies to frame a more 'sovereign' Europe as standing apart, or even against the U.S. A more united Europe would have to unquestionably remain an integral part of the U.S.-led Western alliance. A dispute between France and the EU can be seen on the horizon.

Crucial negotiations will take place in Brussels over the next year and a half, including over the reform of fiscal rules (officially the Stability and Growth Pact), the long-term viability of EU's [euro]750 billion recovery fund, and the huge investments needed to decarbonize and digitize the entire economy. All of this offers Olaf Scholz a rare opportunity to set EU's long-term agenda alongside likeminded European leaders, at least on paper. However, Scholz will also encounter fierce resistance should a disciplined fiscal policy a la Merkel anger the heavily indebted southern member states in particular.

A Value-Oriented Foreign Policy versus Realpolitik?

During the election campaign, the Green candidate for chancellor, Annalena Baerbock, underscored her political stance that the guiding principles of foreign policy in the next federal government will consist of a value-oriented policy with a focus on human rights and democratic standards, combined with the international dimension of climate policy. The crucial question is whether Baerbock can reconcile her values-based foreign policy with Germany's significant economic and trade interests. It will be a difficult balancing act, if not impossible. What appears to be a clear commitment by all three parties in the traffic light coalition to work harder for a value-based foreign policy will reach its limits with Russia and China. Chancellor Scholz's statement on bilateral relations with Russia and China confirms the limits of values-based politics and opens a wide window to Realpolitik.

On Russia, Scholz said that the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which is passionately opposed by Baerbock as a geostrategic weapon of Russia against Germany and the EU, is not a political project, but a private one and that it would be up to the authorities to approve it or not. (2)

With regard to China, Scholz assured the Chinese leadership as early as mid-October 2021 that Germany's attitude towards China would not change significantly. Scholz put the German economic interests ahead of values. (3) The crucial question is whether Scholz, like his predecessor Merkel, is pushing for a more independent European policy towards Beijing instead of supporting the more combative U.S. strategy. Another question is whether Scholz will avoid policies that would isolate China? In any case, Scholz's first steps towards Russia and China are a slap in the face to the Greens and the FDP, who had to force a passage into the coalition agreement that expressly mentions China's human rights violations in Hong Kong. (4)

Even within the EU, the federal government will not be able to consistently challenge Poland and Hungary for violating 'European values.' Otherwise, both countries have instruments of retaliation in other areas of European politics.

The new government's crusade for 'Western values,' led by Foreign Minister Baerbock and driven primarily by the Greens, will be overtaken by reality when Germany remains silent on France's brutal and disastrous Africa policy, which systematically violates human rights and international law. Germany will not dare call France what it is: a country that operates as a rogue state in Rwanda, Mali, and other former French colonies in Africa, by labeling it as common European foreign and security policy under the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. Even though the new German government will not continue to support France in Mali with a military contingent.

There is a German saying: Papier ist geduldig (paper is patient, means lack of implementation concerning the coalition agreement). It seems that the essential content of the coalition agreement won't be followed extensively, but only partially with the exclusion of stringent implementation of normative values for all countries Germany maintains diplomatic relations.

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