The Muslim Brotherhood Faultline in Saudi-Qatari Relations: Domestic Divisions and Regional Rivalry.

• Author: Menshawy, Mustafa
• Position: COMMENTARY

Introduction

The dispute pitting Qatar against three of its Gulf neighbors led by Saudi Arabia is predominantly viewed as a consequence of Doha's regional action, notably engaging with Iran, military ties with Turkey, and supporting Islamist groups across the region. In this interjection, we argue that the Saudi-Qatari tensions emerge out of competing understandings of authority and legitimacy, and with it, concern at the contestation of these claims. In other words, friction between Doha and Riyadh lies in conflicting perspectives held by Qatar and Saudi Arabia about the role of political Islam within the fabric of both states and their actions regionally. Fundamentally, the rivalry stems from contrasting relations between political and religious elites in each country which has taken on an increasing 'political' importance in tensions between Riyadh and Doha. Central to much of this are questions about the role played by the Muslim Brotherhood (and its various affiliates).

Both Qatar and Saudi Arabia adopt the Wahhabi strand of Islam, which is part of the strict Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the Saudi state has built the ideology as part of the rule-making process through which al-Saud rulers maintained domestic order through unifying territory and tribes. This order is partly imposed as the Wahhabi scholars evolved into an institutional shape-controlled and financed under the patronage of the political leadership. The alliance with Wahhabism has served Saudi Arabia's domestic politics of survival and legitimacy as well as its expansionist foreign policies and desire for hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. On the opposite side, Wahhabism presented Qatar with challenges and dilemmas related to both domestic politics and foreign policies as we explain below. More significantly, the comparison shows how political questions concerning the salience of religion within states-and the impact of such issues on claims to sovereignty (1)-are a point of ongoing friction, resulting in the withdrawal of ambassadors in 2002, 2014, and 2017 and the ensuing blockade. The 2017 blockade showed this element of religionization of the conflict. Saudi Arabia along with Bahrain, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates announced they would cut their diplomatic ties with Qatar, citing Doha's support for various terrorist and sectarian groups aimed at destabilizing the region including the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS, and al-Qaeda. (2) The years that followed were shaped by much hostility, with repeated calls to expel Islamists from Qatar and undermining their influence communicated across Qatar-owned media outlets such as Al Jazeera.

Saudi Perceptions: The Brotherhood as Liability

Saudi Arabia frames its rivalry with Qatar as a consequence of interference in its domestic affairs. (3) In 2014, it withdrew its ambassador from Qatar on claims that Doha failed to agree on a unified policy to "ensure non-interference, directly or indirectly, in the internal affairs of any member state" (4) when it did not sign up to a common security pact at a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign ministers meeting in Riyadh. In the 2017 crisis, the 13 demands after the Saudi-led embargo includes an explicit stipulation to end this interference. (5) The claims were made on the basis of the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood, to whom Qatar is seen as a patron, across the region, along with Al Jazeera's coverage of regional events.

The Kingdom's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood is complex. Saudi Arabia had earlier enjoyed cordial relations with the Brotherhood during which time the ruling family gave shelter to thousands of the group's members facing jail and repression in Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere, in the 1950s. However, relations deteriorated as the group's promotion of political activism, including support for elections, was seen by Riyadh as a direct threat to its dynastic system of rule. (6) This activism challenges the very terms of the close alliance between the al-Saud ruling family and the clerics of the Wahhabi school of Islam, an ideology based on no contestation of the political authority and full obedience to the ruler. The alliance has long given the Saudi regime a lynchpin for legitimacy and even its very existence. Al Saud unified territory and tribes and also founded the state itself on the basis of agreement between Mohamed ibn Abdel-Wahab and Mohamed Ibn al-Saud in the 18th century. The former found a 'sword' to implement his radical views and the latter found a 'religious banner' in order to unite the hitherto fragmented or hostile Arab tribes under his command within the bounds of a specific piece of land symbolically named 'Saudi Arabia.' The fusion of the al-Saud family with the Wahhabi ulama, drawing upon the historic relationship between the two groups, also provided the new Saudi state with a degree of legitimacy not found in their tribal lineage. (7) In the 1990s, the Brotherhood began contesting the agreement and the stability in rule based on a form of power-sharing between al-Saud and religious scholars. (8)

For example, the Brotherhood or groups affiliated with it directly criticized the kingdom's rulers for allowing U.S. military forces on Saudi soil during and after the 1990 Gulf War. (9) This criticism challenges the Wahhabi men of religion's loyal support to the monarchy and their counseling that it is the duty of good Muslims to obey their rulers' on the basis of citing puritanical interpretations of Islam that build such meanings. (10) The rulers felt their authority further dwindled as the Brotherhood's influence expanded into key ideological state apparatuses such as schools. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said that in an interview in 2018 that the Brotherhood 'invaded' Saudi school curricula and set himself the mission of having these elements 'eradicated fully.' (11) The kingdom also expelled many members of the Brotherhood as part of curtailing their influence.

Saudi demands to close Al Jazeera-one of the 13 demands presented to Doha-reflect these perceptions of the Brotherhood as a threat. The channel provided a platform and accommodation for several Brotherhood exiles. The closer...