The Macedonia Name Dispute: A Few Drivers and Spoilers of Success.

• Author: Koneska, Cvete
• Position: COMMENTARY - Report

Introduction

When in June 2018, the prime ministers of Macedonia and Greece signed an agreement aimed at resolving the long-standing 'name dispute' between the two countries, reactions among the domestic and international public ranged from disbelief to rejection, to congratulations. Putting an end to a bilateral dispute that had dominated Macedonia's foreign policy since independence--and has come to define its relationship with key international partners such as NATO and the EU--entailed some difficult decisions on behalf of both governments.

The Macedonian government agreed to change the name of the country to 'North Macedonia'--a major concession, and for many Macedonians a move indicating that Greece had 'won' the dispute. The new name is both for international and domestic uses, including in forums and in bilateral relations with countries that have already recognized Macedonia as the 'Republic of Macedonia.' The Greek government committed to revoke its vetoes in NATO and the EU and supporting Macedonia's membership in these organizations. It also accepted the use of 'Macedonian' to designate the nationality and language of Macedonia. In addition, both parties committed to improving mutual relations and working together to eradicate irredentist and hate speech aimed at the other. (1)

Whether the long-term effects of the agreement will be those that the Macedonian government desired--unblocking the EU and NATO integration--remains to be seen. The country has yet to start EU accession talks because the EU postponed the decision to open negotiations talks to June 2019. Progress with NATO membership was quicker. Once the agreement was ratified by both parliaments in February 2019, the alliance issued an invitation for membership. Nonetheless, opposition to the agreement, now referred to as the Prespa Agreement after the lake on the Macedonian-Greek border where it was signed, is still strong in both countries. The government had proceeded to implement the agreement even after a referendum on it in Macedonia in September 2018 had failed and many public concerns remain.

Moreover, the Prespa Agreement has opened several questions about the domestic political divisions in Macedonia, the declining power of the EU in the Western Balkans and its waning appeal to the populations, and the evolving geopolitical environment in the Balkans. The ultimate success of the Prespa Agreement to create a lasting solution to the dispute between the two countries depends on these domestic and external factors, even after both parliaments have ratified the document itself. Therefore in the rest of this paper, I address these issues, looking at the state of Macedonian democracy and its reform processes, the EU's role in encouraging domestic reforms, as well as some of the wider regional and geopolitical implications.

The evidence suggests that although the appeal and influence of the EU have been steadily declining over the past decade, the EU integration remains the only credible alternative to nationalist political ideologies. However, the EU's declining appeal means that domestic political elites are less willing to comply with the EU requirements for reforms, and more inclined to negotiate and bargain for the rewards given by the EU. As a result, political and democratic reforms have not accelerated, including in key areas for the EU accession such as fighting corruption and improving the rule of law.

Regionally, the EU remains the most dominant foreign actor. Despite the increasing influence of other regional actors, such as Russia and China, all states in the Balkans continue to prioritize relations with the EU and the U.S. However, the rising influence of alternative regional actors has contributed to the growing complexity of foreign policies in these countries, and a more nuanced domestic discussion about the role the country should play in regional and international politics.

Domestic Obstacles to Compromise

Internationally, the signing of the Prespa Agreement was largely seen as a positive development in Balkan politics. Yet the compromise enshrined in it was not widely welcomed among the domestic public in Macedonia. Although most of the population in principle supports integration in NATO and the EU, and many wished to see the dispute with Greece resolved, the change of the name to 'North Macedonia' was seen as too great a concession to Greece. Especially since the reward was rather small and not immediate: Greece would remove its veto in NATO and the EU, but there was no guarantee for starting the EU accession talks or NATO membership.

Moreover, since 1992, the dispute had evolved beyond the initial Greek objection to the name 'Macedonia.' In both countries, the dispute was linked to deeper social and identity concerns, which have been exacerbated by economic hardship over the past decade. (2) Therefore, while the Prespa Agreement provides a solution to the formal dispute over the name, the deeper identity and social concerns have not been fully addressed. They continue to drive resistance in both countries.

As a result, the public is deeply divided over the Prespa Agreement. (3) How the government deals with these divisions can potentially determine the success of the agreement. Nonetheless, so far the government has done little to address domestic resistance. Perhaps because it was in a rush to fulfill its obligations under the agreement, it proceeded with a...