The limits of norm promotion: the EU in Egypt and Israel/Palestine.

• Author: Lazarou, Elena
• Position: Report

The European Union's [EU] response to the events of the 'Arab Spring' has raised numerous concerns regarding the effectiveness and legitimacy of the policies it has launched aiming to advance prosperity, stability, security, and, perhaps most importantly, stronger economic ties with the Middle East and North Africa region [MENA]. Soon after the outbreak of the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian revolts, political analysts and scholars alike proclaimed the EU's Mediterranean policies unsuccessful and inadequate, (1) while the Commission itself assessed that the time was ripe for a renewed approach to the region. The latter has since materialized into the 2011 Joint Communication entitled 'A partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean.' (2)

Policy implications aside, assessing the EU's less-than-successful involvement in the region necessitates a reconsideration of the impact and limits of the so-called 'normative power' upon which its approach has been based, implicitly or explicitly. This paper aims to do so by examining the EU's engagement with Egypt and the Israel-Palestine conflict to assess these limits; it also wishes to challenge the notion that EU-style normative power alone is well-suited to promote democracy and regional cooperation, particularly in regions with diverging dynamics where the promotion of EU-associated norms may stumble upon European trade- and diplomacy-related interests. In this sense, the paper aims to enrich and inform the debates on 'normative power Europe' and Euro-Mediterranean relations.

On 'Normative Power Europe'

With the end of the Cold War, the debate on the nature of power in the international environment assumed new dimensions. While the centrality of power in relations among states and international actors remained unquestioned, the concept's definition underwent significant reconsiderations. Emerging typologies of power began to include dimensions other than material capabilities as factors in the ability to persuade or shift another actor towards a desired outcome. In his seminal books Bound to Lead and Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Joseph Nye coined the term 'soft power,' involving ideational rather than material elements, as 'the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior. (3) While Nye's work focused on United States' foreign policy, scholars of European integration, particularly those engaged with the EU's foreign policy and its identity as an international actor, (4) introduced various new terms in order to explain the non-material power of the EU such as 'civilian power', 'ethical power,' 'post-modern power,' 'quiet superpower,' and, most prominently, 'normative power Europe.' The latter, according to Ian Manners, referred to a power that acts through ideas and values. Thus, he argued that:

'the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it--that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quality to it--that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it--that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system'. (5)

The ideas of 'soft' and 'normative' power have been employed with particular intensity in the quest to explicate EU's identity as a global actor. In this context, the EU is viewed as exercising influence in the international system via the use of policy instruments and means that provide an alternative to traditional hard power, which is perceived as a less-than-positive force. As Smith observes, (6) the EU's foreign policy objectives operate mostly on the basis of milieu goals (7) using means that aim to shape the environment in which it operates. Combined with Manners' definition of 'normative power,' this suggests that, in managing its external relations, the EU actively pursues the formation of environments --or structures--which are receptive to EU-derived norms, and which might eventually absorb them.

It has also been argued that EU's foreign policy is unique because it derives directly from the very nature of the Union itself which, thus far, has yet to be emulated. Accordingly, the way in which the EU formulates and implements its foreign policy is 'reflected in the content of the policy produced', (8) as in the legacy and achievements of the EU itself. This suggests that the norms, or values, that characterize the EU are promoted and diffused through its agreements and relations with third states or groupings of states; thus, EU foreign policy becomes associated with a 'distinctive set of principles'. (9) Such norms and principles encompass the rule of law, democracy, cooperative institutional structures, diplomacy, mediation, human rights promotion, and--in the spirit of the EU itself--regional cooperation on the basis of a 'neofunctionalist model.' As stated in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU should, in international affairs, seek to promote the same values by which it is guided. (10)

Democracy promotion and the encouragement of regional processes are two of the principle areas on which research on the EU's normative power has traditionally focused. Both are related to the deeply-set fundamental aims of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as articulated initially in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, namely (1) to promote international cooperation, and (2) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. (11) The 'normative power' approach, in this context, proposes that these goals are best attained through the establishment of relations between the EU and third parties which should be governed by conditions and norms conducive to their accomplishment.

With regards to regional cooperation, the EU's normative power manifests itself through its ability to influence the political, economic, and social institutions that form the basis of other regional initiatives and processes by means of persuasion and attraction, rather than coercion. (12) To a large extent, the source of this persuasion and attraction is the appeal of the EU model itself: it constitutes an example of successful regional integration, (13) which has transformed relations between formerly warring parties into a cooperative structure where divergent interests converge through negotiation. (14) The EU's unprecedented supranational formation leading its member-states towards cooperation, policy coordination, normative alignment, and collective institution building (15) is thus perceived as the cornerstone in its efforts to promote intra-state cooperation, and to end conflict in its periphery. On this basis, the EU's strategy within its wider neighborhood and beyond has focused largely on promoting regional integration based on the 'EU model' (16) through the 'export,' or 'diffusion,' of norms. (17)

The encouragement of regional integration initiatives constitutes one of EU foreign policy's explicit objectives. (18) Both the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and the 2008 report on its implementation emphasized the necessity to promote regional organizations as a pillar of a more orderly world, characterized by coherent policies, and as a means towards the strengthening of global governance. (19) The ESS included 'building relations with the Mediterranean and East European states' as an example of enhancing security in the EU neighborhood, while the 2008 report made particular mention of the need for regional integration building. (20) The document specifically referred to the Mediterranean basin within this context.

As far as democracy promotion is concerned, the normative power approach has maintained that it is an entity built upon a set of values of which pluralism --together with peace--are central. Researchers have consistently argued that, through its presence and conduct, the EU has aimed to promote democracy. The most successful example of this facet of EU power has been the Union's enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. It has been successful in 'engineering permanent changes in the logic of behavior of domestic actors and institutions driven by EU norms' through what has also been referred to as its 'transformative power'. (21)

While research relating EU's capacity to promote democracy has mainly focused on the transformations resulting from EU-imposed conditionality as that relates to enlargement, (22) most of the EU's international relations--beyond the candidate countries--do not seem to follow this pattern. The objective of democracy promotion, in particular, is also consistent with the idea of a 'model power Europe' whereby the Union's international activity is guided by the very principles, which inspired its creation, (23) its enlargement and, arguably, its own decision-making process. Thus, democracy has been perceived as a core constituent norm in the EU's process of normative diffusion, (24) particularly in its relations with its former Eastern neighbors during the process of their accession. (25) However, the EU's rhetoric of democracy promotion through normative power alone has increasingly been criticized as a discourse-based 'moral crusade' (26) facing serious constraints in its practical implementation. (27) If anything, the 'Arab Spring' itself bears evidence to the latter.

Critics of the 'normative power Europe' concept target its incompleteness, or even hypocrisy, rather than its irrelevance. The argument brought forth is that the assessment of EU norm promotion should take into consideration the Union's own interests and objectives, as well as the means through which it is carried out. Often, these lead to more postcolonial and quasi-hegemonic interpretations of the EU's power. (28) They also urge for the need to examine external...