The June 24 Elections: On Political Change and the Future of Turkey.

AuthorSaribay, Ali Yasar
PositionCOMMENTARY - Essay

Introduction

On June 24, 2018, two intertwined elections took place simultaneously: the electorate settled the presidential race and decided who would represent them in Parliament. At the same time, the 'presidency system of government' officially took effect. Another significant part of the June 24 elections was the competition between various alliances comprised of multiple political parties. In this regard, the contest primarily pitted the People's Alliance (Cumhur ittifaki), which consists of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AK Party), the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, MHP) and the Great Union Party (Btiyuk Birlik Partisi, BBP) and received 53.7 percent of the vote, against the Nation Alliance (Millet Ittifaki), which won 33.9 percent with the support of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), the lyi Party (IYIP), the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) and the Democratic Party (DP). The Peoples' Democratic Party (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi, HDP), which was part of neither alliance, passed the 10 percent election threshold by receiving 11.7 percent of the vote to send its representatives to Parliament.

The election fielded six presidential candidates: Recep Tayyip Erdogan won the race with 52.6 percent, the CHP's Muharrem Ince received 30.6 percent of the vote and finished second, the HDP's Selahattin Demirtas received 8.4 percent, the lyi Party's Meral Aksener received 7.3 percent, the SP's Temel Karamollaoglu received 0.9 percent, and the Homeland Party's (Vatan Partisi) Dogu Perincek received 0.2 percent of the vote.

Instead of providing a quantitative analysis of the election results, this commentary will concentrate on the political transformation that shaped the June 24 elections and produced its outcome, and what it signifies. In doing so, I will first touch upon the political logic of the June 24 elections. Later, I will discuss the various factors that generated the outcome within a historical and sociological context. I will focus on the AK Party, which has been the dominant political subject of the election and its results, to describe the movement with an eye on its competitors. Finally, I will concentrate on the nature of Turkey's political transformation, which the AK Party has pioneered, and its future direction.

The Political Logic of the June 24 Elections

First and foremost, the June 24 elections in Turkey represented a single decision made over two channels. In this regard, each channel had unique qualities that affected how the process played out: it is an indisputable fact that the decision making process in the presidential race, in which 'personal' factors played a key role, and the parliamentary election, which determined which party's representatives would serve in the Parliament, were completely different. The most obvious evidence that supports that claim is the gap between the number of votes cast for Recep Tayyip Er-dogan and his party. The same goes for Muharrem Ince, Meral Aksener and Selahattin Demirtas, and their respective parties.

At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the campaign rhetoric that Erdogan's opponents in the presidential race adopted and the political logic it reflected. Whereas the People's Alliance backed a single contender, the Nation Alliance fielded three presidential candidates. The electorate perceived this decision as an attempt to prevent a victory for Erdogan alone -which candidates backed by the Nation Alliance openly indicated at campaign events. Although leaders of the political parties that formed the Nation Alliance asserted that they were united by shared principles, it was noteworthy that they dissolved the alliance immediately after the election. Furthermore, the lyi Party's initial assessment of the election results was that partnering with the Republican People's Party was a serious mistake.

Obviously, individuals running for public office can reasonably convey the message that they, rather than their opponent(s), are the best choice. This is not only natural but also legitimate and democratic. What happened ahead of the June 24 election in Turkey, however, was something completely different. All three presidential candidates of the Nation Alliance made the following assumption to reach inaccurate conclusions: the People's Alliance, they posited, supported a candidate and a new, 'authoritarian system of government that would institutionalize the one-man rule.' Personal attacks against Erdogan, the man who had already been in power for sixteen years, would serve to deny him the presidency, the argument went.

Unfortunately for them, there was a serious paradox here: they critiqued Erdogan and his party as an 'authoritarian' figure and political system respectively, by positioning themselves as the dominant political figure of that line of criticism. Statements made by ince and Aksener, in particular, support this claim. Both candidates pledged to issue 'orders' and provide 'instructions' if elected. In this regard, it was noteworthy that Ince threatened to strip off the ranks of the Second Army Commander who applauded Erdogan's critical remarks on Ince. Although the Nation Alliance candidates promised to restore and improve the parliamentary system in an effort to remedy this 'authoritarian' slide, their message fell on deaf ears, mainly because restoration would take a long time and there were no agreed-upon principles to guide this effort.

Similar problems surrounded the opposition's assessment of the election results. In line with tradition, the opposition parties were quick to claim that institutions responsible for conducting free and fair elections had engaged in election fraud. In the end, however, even the same people rejected those claims. Although this isn't the proper platform to discuss the impact of the election results on the CHP, suffice to say that the decline in the party's popular support to 22.6 percent, compared to Muharrem ince's 30.6 percent, fueled not just intra-party tensions but also made ince look like a new source of hope for the Turkish Left. As mentioned above, ince's individual performance was the outcome of a personal competition between the various candidates. Although his performance was indeed successful for a first-time candidate, it is important to acknowledge that it was, at the same time, a reflection of the broader political context. In this sense, ince's performance does not necessarily suggest that he could win the same number of votes in the future if he were to take over as CHP chairman. After all, ince received some 'borrowed votes' in the presidential race, just as some CHP supporters opted to vote for other candidates and political parties.

Western Hostility and the July 15 Coup Attempt

Which factors contributed to the June 24 victory of a political party whose leader had won 15 elections and referendums over the past 16 years -despite a minor decline in popularity? To answer that question, I will discuss the Western hostility towards Turkey, as personified by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the July 15, 2016 coup attempt. Building on that discussion, I will offer some projections for the future.

Before analyzing the impact of the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey, it is necessary to identify the historical and sociological forces behind this uprising -which took place just as the Turkish people declared an end to the era of military coups. Many narratives have emerged to account for what happened on July 15, 2016. Those narratives, however, have notably failed to take into account the structural mechanisms that paved the...

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