The JDP's Changing Discursive Strategies towards Israel: Rhetoric vs. Reality/AK Parti'nin Degisen Soylem Stratejileri: Retorik Karsisinda Gerceklik.

• Author: Ozcan, Gencer
• Position: Justice and Development Party

When the first Justice and Development Party [JDP] government came to power in November 2002, future of Turkey's relations with Israel was a matter of curiosity. Some anticipated that the JDP would remain loyal to anti-Semitic tenets that it inherited from the Islamist National Outlook Movement, from which the party split in 2000. In spite of the anticipations, the early JDP governments, let alone veering away from the established course of policy towards Israel that previous governments cultivated, they displayed willingness to improve the relations with the "Zionist State". Continuity was to a large extent a manifestation of two factors. On the one hand, formerly being identified with the anti Semitic National Outlook Movement, the party's leadership strove to revamp its image abroad through maintaining good relations with Israel. On the other hand, to counter the strident opposition from the military in its first term in power, the JDP stayed away from a number of security sensitive areas including relations with Israel, which was monopolized by the military. Therefore, the alignment between the two countries forged in the 1990's remained intact during the JDP's first term in power.

With consolidating its position in 2007, the JDP's leadership diversified its power strategies and began to pursue more active regional policies. Soon Israel became one of the pivotal elements in intriguing regional strategies that the JDP's leadership devised to promote its power position at home. In the wake of several disappointments occurred in late 2008, the JDP abandoned Israel as a partner to work in its regional initiatives, and began instead to bring relations with parties affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood [MB] to the fore. With the "Arab Spring" spreading across the region in 2011, JDP's policy of support for MB became the hallmark of the party's regional policy. Moreover, discursive strategy of internalization of the Palestinian question and of demonization of Israel became an instrument to support party's mundane policies to hold on to power. However, close examination of discursive practices scapegoating Israel reveals that there has been a widening gap between the rhetoric and practicalities of the bilateral relations. Contrary to semblance of hostility implied by the despising discourse, the party leadership subtly controlled the damage occurred during the crises so that crucial avenues of dialogue remained open. The article aims to make an analysis of dynamics which led to the formulation of the Janus faced policy towards Israel that the JDP leadership formulated. In order to highlight the discrepancy between the rhetoric and reality, the article will first contextualize the change of discursive strategies in the light of power strategies that the JDP leadership put in effect after 2009. Within this context, the article will first take a closer look into a number of events which paved way to mini crises, and uncover discrepancies between the rhetoric employed and the way the JDP leadership considered the actual relations. The article will argue that as a manifestation of the party's changing power strategies, the hostile rhetoric towards Israel was instrumentalized by the party's leadership to bolster its position both at home and abroad, and that the hostility that the rhetoric implied was rarely consistent with the way the party leadership dealt with Israel in reality.

Throughout the 1990's, alignment with Israel had addressed to the strategic priorities of those in power. (1) From procurement of military supplies to intelligence sharing, and cooperation on other security-related issues, Israel seemed to be a suitable partner in Ankara. With the military at the helm of the foreign and security making process, the power configuration prevailing in Turkey created favorable political circumstances to forge the alignment. Concomitant Israeli readiness to cooperate with Turkey led some to name the 1990's as the golden age of the bilateral relations. However, in the 2000s, given the decreasing level of threat from the armed Kurdish resistance and changing regional power distribution after the US occupation of Iraq, Turkey reprioritized its strategic requirements and to some degree desecuritized its relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Adaptation of Turkey's regional policies was manifest in Foreign Minister Ismail Cem's Good Neighborhood Policy in very early 2000s and JDP's approach dubbed as "Zero Problems with the Neighbors" Policy. (2) It is to be noted that the first JDP governments took advantage of positive externalities provided by the US occupation of Iraq in 2003. Iran and Syria, under duress of the overwhelming US military presence in Iraq, appeared to have shelved troublesome issues to reduce the likelihood of any friction with Turkey. As a testimony to the reduced level of threat from its neighbors, Turkey's National Security Policy Document was edited in 2010 to the effect that all clauses of animosity towards neighbors were removed. (3) Therefore, while the regional landscape became conducive for cooperation with former regional rivals, military cooperation with Israel lost at least some of its relevance. Furthermore, the military, the main prop of the alignment in the 'golden age', lost its prerogatives in foreign policy making process and was no longer in a position to call the tune in conducting Ankara's relations with Tel Aviv. (4)

In spite of these dynamics, the JDP maintained good relations with Israel. As they came to power, the JDP leaders made it clear that they would cultivate good relations with Israel. (5) As a token of importance attached to its relations, the JDP governments appointed the best diplomats, such as Ahmet Uzumcu, Feridun Sinirlioglu, to Tel Aviv. Turkey continued to purchase the military equipment from Israel. (6) Israel was one of the countries which took part in joint exercises, the Anatolian Eagle, carried out in Konya. The relations remained on a cooperative basis and became successful in surmounting several challenges. After the bombing of two Istanbul synagogues on 23 November 2003 which killed scores of Muslims and Jews, the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Israel vowed to fight terrorism. The size of Turkey-Israel Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group reached to 307 MPs during the JDP's first term in power. Of its members, 247 were the JDP members, overwhelming majority of the party's group in the parliament. (7) On 13 November 2007, when Israeli President Shimon Peres delivered a speech before Turkey's National Assembly, bilateral relations reached its peak.

On 22 March 2004, the stability in bilateral relations was distorted after the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder and spiritual leader of HAMAS. The assassination prompted critical statements from Prime Minister Erdogan calling the Israeli action as "intolerable" and an evidence of "state terror". (8) After few weeks, the tension recurred when Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, Sheikh Yassin's successor was assassinated on 17 April 2004. This led to the postponement of Prime Minister Erdogan's visit to Israel. In the wake of Israeli operations in a refugee camp in Gaza in May caused civilian casualties, the JDP top brass condemned Israel. Prime Minister Erdogan "I invite all those in a position of responsibility -prime ministers, heads of state- to take a joint stance against these steps which have escalated almost to a level of state terror" and asked about "the difference between a terrorist who kills civilians and Israel, who kills civilians." Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul warned Israel of the ramifications of such policies that they would harm Turkey's relations with Israel. (9) However, in spite of these rebukes, the JDP government's effort to keep the crisis at bay was palpable. When the assassination led to street demonstrations, Erdogan was careful not to let protests got blown out of proportion: "We do not want what has happened to ruin our relations with Israel." (10) The following year the bilateral relations were looking as good as ever. Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul on 4-5 January 2005 and Prime Minister Erdogan on 1-2 May 2005 visited Israel. (11) Erdogan's visit was full of symbolism with pictures depicting Erdogan visiting Yad Vashem and shaking hands with Ariel Sharon. In June 2005, Erdogan received "Courage to Care Award" from the Anti-Defamation League on behalf of diplomats who saved Jews during the Holocaust. In his speech he defined anti-Semitism as "a manifestation of a criminal disease of mind." (12)

The following crisis broke out in February 2006 when Khaled Meshaal, the leader of HAMAS visited Turkey after HAMAS won the Palestinian elections. The first official statements on the visit were carefully worded to downplay the event that it was merely a contact between two parties. (13) Although he was among those who decided to receive Meshaal, Prime Minister Erdogan declined to meet with him. (14) Reports based on sources of Foreign Ministry maintained that the visit was meant to give HAMAS a conciliatory message that it should take the right direction under the new political circumstances. Several reports underlined that Gul suggested Meshaal that HAMAS should change its rejectionist policy and recognize Israel. Gul was also quoted to have told his guest that:

What should be done is what realpolitik requires. Even when passing from Gaza to the West Bank, one should get permission from Israel. When there are such circumstances, it is meaningless to say that "we do not recognize Israel". If you say that "you want peace", whom you will have peace with? From now on, what comes first on top of your responsibilities is to solve mundane problems of Palestinian people. (15) One of the phenomenon that characterized the first six years of the JDP's foreign policy was the willingness that the party leadership has to play role of mediation on regional issues. In...