The impact of the "new" zero problems policy and the Arab Spring on the relations between Turkey and Lebanese factions.

• Author: Yetim, Mustafa
• Position: COMMENTARY - Essay

Up until the start of the Arab Spring, both local and foreign scholars put particular emphasis on certain aspects of the "zero problems" policy, such as win-win, regional stability and economic integration, in order to comprehend Turkey's growing role in the Middle East. Those initial aspects of the "zero problems" policy, seemingly driven by a liberal stance, were based primarily on maximizing state level cooperation and, to a lesser extent, on limited calls for political and democratic reforms in the region by leading Turkish figures. However, popular demonstrations in the region against autocratic rulers and subsequent revolutions and counter-revolutions since 2011 have revealed the significant pitfalls of the earlier version of the "zero problems" policy, thereby forcing Turkey to reconsider and reformulate this vision. While various commentators have interpreted these modifications as a sign of Turkey's departure from the "zero-problems" policy, this paper claims that such changes can be read as maintenance of an earlier version of the policy.

Soon after the start of the Arab Spring, Turkey faced a second and possibly more serious test for its modified "zero problems" policy: the revolutions in Bahrain and Syria, which are arguably based on supporting popular movements as they began with calls for democratic and political reforms of autocratic regimes. This new conundrum put Turkey at the center of a regional dispute and led Ankara to adopting a selective policy towards popular movements, thus limiting its mediator and neutral role to some degree in certain countries, particularly in Lebanon. Turkey's decision to side with the influential Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Western states during the Syrian crisis caused the other camp--comprised of Russia, Iran and its Lebanese partner Hezbollah--to perceive Turkey's role negatively. (1) In light of this and after briefly presenting the earlier version of the "zero problems" policy as well as recent modifications, this paper attempts to answer rarely raised questions regarding Turkey's current foreign policy approach: Can this new vision be seen as a departure from the long-term "zero problems" policy or just a new dimension of it? To what extent have such changes to the "zero problems" policy affected the stability of countries in the region, especially Lebanon? And how is Turkey's new position or reformulation of its policy perceived among the leading factions in Lebanon?

"New" Dimension of the Zero Problems Policy: From State Level to Popular Movements?

Famous for his "zero problems" policy, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu envisioned a soft-power strategy for Turkey in 2002. This strategy relied on the establishment of better relations with almost all actors in the region in order to achieve stability. The prediction was that a multidimensional relationship, cultural interaction and genuine dialogue with neighboring countries could generate stability and prosperity in the region. In this context, Turkey was involved to varying degrees in mediation efforts to achieve permanent peace between conflicting sides, such as Hamas and Fatah, as well as the between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

From a Turkish standpoint, an active and assertive role in the Middle East would increase its leverage in regional politics. However, such a strategy did not materialize precisely because such a role is largely based on interstate relations with little consideration of the type of regimes that Ankara dealt with. Although Turkey attempted to encourage certain regional countries to initiate reform and "put their home in order before other countries do so for them," Ankara was not consistent in keeping human rights at the top of its foreign policy agenda. It was not until the advent of the Arab Spring that we saw a change in the Turkish position towards regimes in Syria, Egypt and Tunisia. To put it differently, it becomes clear that Turkey only dealt with human right issues if there were popular movements. Therefore, since such an active stance on human rights is not generally a fundamental aspect of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey turned a blind eye to some degree towards the repressive practices of Gulf Monarchies and continues to do so today.

In other words, while putting great importance on regional stability based on state-to-state relations, the earlier version of the "zero problems" policy (2002-2011) placed limited emphasis on democratic demands and popular grievances. Therefore, when such demands surfaced with the start of the unrest, Turkey, like the rest of the world, was caught off guard. The peoples of the region rose up against long-exercised social, economic and cultural repression by entrenched autocracies. While Turkey initially welcomed the popular demands and supported the people's movement in Egypt, it showed some hesitation towards other movements in Yemen and the Gulf countries, especially Bahrain, due to the potential for conflict between Iran and Saudi...