The Evolved Security Dynamics of South Asia: Challenges to Pakistan's Nuclear Threshold.

• Author: Malik, Haris Bilal
• Position: COMMENTARY

Background

Soon after their nuclear-weapon status was announced in May 1998, the two South Asian rivals, India and Pakistan, witnessed a 1999 crisis (the Kargil conflict). Despite rapid escalation from both countries leading to a limited war, both sides were deterred from expanding the conflict, given the presence of nuclear weapons. The next big crisis was the military stand-off from 2001-2002, which went on for more than eight months and was seen as the region's first real nuclear deterrence test. Given its conventional military superiority, India remained deterred from conducting an international-border military offensive fearing a nuclear retaliation from Pakistan. The crisis ultimately dissipated after each side declared that its diplomatic and security goals had been achieved. (1)

Although India blamed Pakistan for sponsoring the 2008 Mumbai attacks, without any undeniable evidence, the incident did not result in a major military deployment from either side. Based on India's aggressive and offensive approach at that time, it might have resulted in an all-out war but it was the other way around. Pakistan's nuclear deterrence played an important role throughout the crisis by preventing the conflict from going beyond a certain point. Nevertheless, India exploited the emergent scenario in its favor on the political and diplomatic levels by shaping public opinion among the electorate and defaming Pakistan at various international diplomatic forums. The whole episode became a blueprint for all future South Asian geostrategic discourse, where India seeks to be perceived as a 'victimized state' and portrays Pakistan as an 'irresponsible' nuclear state. (2)

The 'Pulwama-Balakot crisis' occurred almost a decade later as a result of a suicide attack by a local militant, an Indian citizen residing in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK). Contrary to foreign observers' expectations, India was vigilant and initiated 'mock' surgical strikes, whether intentionally or accidentally is yet to be ascertained due to contradictory statements made by the Indian military; finally, contrary to the widely-held view, Pakistan did not resort to nuclear signaling but made a suitable conventional response. The Pulwama crisis, which marks a paradigm shift in the nuclear doctrine of India, poses questions about India's doctrinal evolution. Pakistan's Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) was in effect stopping India from escalating all the way through the crisis. (3)

Unlike several previous attacks, the February 2019 Pulwama attack was a crucial event in re-shaping the prevailing notions of South Asian strategic stability. The subsequent shortlived military confrontation between South Asia's two nuclear-armed rivals proved to be a dangerous one. Moreover, the relevance of the deterrence factor in such a critical situation has been discussed at global and regional levels. Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons maintained the idea of 'massive retaliation' in Indian strategic thought and undoubtedly stopped the entire crisis from escalating further. Pakistan's nuclear doctrinal posture of 'full spectrum deterrence' in line with 'credible minimum deterrence' remains noteworthy on a broader level.

Nuclear Deterrence and South Asia

Nuclear deterrence may be described as the threat of using nuclear weapons to prevent an opponent state from taking several actions that could be considered harmful to its security interests. Deterrence can be divided into two sub-categories: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. The first is offensive rhetoric and may threaten a nuclear war; the second is a defensive and more realistic tactic that seeks to highlight the adversary's cost-benefit analysis in a way that undermines the adversary's willingness to take an undesirable course of action. (4)

A brief analysis of all previous crises between India and Pakistan reveals that with the exception of 2001-2002, when Pakistan may have used the strategy of 'deterrence by punishment' to avoid a major conflict along the international border, most of the crises, like the current one, were deterred by denying the adversary's ability to escalate beyond a specific limit. In the background of Pakistan and India, whose direct air confrontation seriously violated the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence, the deterrent role of nuclear weapons has been profoundly undermined. To place the floundering nuclear deterrence in South Asia in perspective, it is important to revisit the core principles of the nuclear deterrence concept. Deterrence implies intimidating the aggressor with the threat of disastrous consequences. This tacit, reciprocal understanding guarantee mutually assures survival maintained by the fear of mutually assured destruction in the event of a nuclear exchange between two nuclear belligerents. (5)

In the context of the recent tensions between the two nuclear neighbors, revisiting some of the lessons learned from the Cold War era that remain important to South Asia could be helpful. First, no nuclear weapon state or non-nuclear-weapon state can initiate a military campaign against another nuclear power aiming to achieve complete victory, according to Colin Gray. (6) Second, political and military campaigns against a nuclear power must be undertaken with great caution because of the very high cost of nuclear war; finally, nuclear-weapon states do not go to war with each other out of fear of endless consequences. (7) The United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War developed and amassed nuclear weapons numbering in the thousands. The weapons were aimed at acquiring a credible preemptive strike capability. However, neither state ever used those weapons against the other, primarily because of the fear of retaliation. In this sense, the...