The EU's Approach to the Syrian Crisis: Turkey as a Partner?/AB'nin Suriye Krizine Bakisi: Turkiye Bir Ortak mi?

• Author: Nas, Cigdem
• Position: Report

The Syrian Crisis became a critical problem of strategic concern for both Turkey and the EU since 2011. Turkey, being a neighboring country to Syria and an aspiring regional power, became involved in the disturbances in Syria early on and reacted to the use of force by the government towards peaceful protestors. Turkey's stance has aimed to bring about a transformation in Syria's regime in favor of the opposition forces. While doing this, Turkey cut off ties with the Assad regime and increasingly adopted a critical approach condemning Assad of crimes against humanity. (1) The EU also started to implement sanctions against the regime in Syria and adopted an increasingly incriminating and strict policy against the Syrian regime. (2)

The Syrian Crisis was another major step in a series of events that shook the Arab world including Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Such an unexpected turn of events that embodied the promise of democratization, but also planted the seeds of further instability could be seen as a victory for EU values. EU values of democracy, human rights and freedoms laid at the basis of the EU's transformative power in its neighborhood. (3) However, the EU's increasing security consciousness led to a heightened sense of anxiety in the face of the impending situation in the Arab world and especially Syria. The EU was caught between the need to verify and act upon the normative aspects of its foreign policy actorness and the urge to protect itself against the threats that may emanate from a volatile region such as terrorism and migratory pressures.

Two important by-products of the Syrian crisis proved to be especially contentious in terms of Turkey-EU cooperation with regard to the situation: firstly, the increase in terrorist activity bred by the instability and chaos in the region and secondly, the movement of Syrians out of the country in pursuit of refuge in neighboring countries and Europe. While these two issues necessitated close cooperation with Turkey, they also created a tension in bilateral relations due to differences in approach to the Syrian crisis. The EU counted on the support and contribution of Turkey in dealing with the threat of foreign fighters travelling to Europe with the aim of instigating terrorist acts and averting refugee flows towards Europe. However, it was also critical of Turkey's regional aspirations, support to the Syrian opposition that also included radical Islamist elements and Turkey's use of refugees as a bargaining card against the EU.

While the EU mostly tipped towards pragmatism in dealing with the crisis, it had to sacrifice its normative stance especially concerning the refugee situation. In the process, the EU's approach to Turkey was also very much influenced by the challenges brought about by the Syrian crisis. The EU prioritized its need for securing Turkey's cooperation and overlooked Turkey's move away from EU political criteria in favor of a transactional relationship. The article aims to characterize the intricacies of the EU's approach to the Syrian crisis with special emphasis on the role Turkey played in this instance. While the main research question concerns the role, Turkey played in the EU's approach to the Syrian crisis, it is argued that as Turkey contributed to the EU's handling of the challenges emanating from the crisis, differences in outlook complicated and drew the limits of effective cooperation with Turkey. In the meantime, the EU's approach to Turkey as a candidate to join the EU was also challenged and underwent a transformation from a potential member state to a partner country.

The EU in the Mediterranean and its Policy towards Syria

The EU's approach to the Syrian Crisis can be analyzed in a systematic way within the framework of its overall perspective on the Southern neighborhood and the series of events called as the 'Arab Spring'. The EU began to shape its approach to the Mediterranean region as early as the 1960's, and especially the 1970's with the development of the Global Mediterranean Policy and the Euro-Arab Dialogue. (4) Although much of the interest was focused on the economic cooperation, the EC's approach to the region displayed the character of a region-building process. Together with the launch of European Political Cooperation mechanism, the EC increasingly sought to enhance its political presence in the world and matter in a region which was historically and strategically important for Europe and the World.

According to Bremberg, the EU and its Member States had already begun to experience a dilemma between whether to focus on stability or support for reform in their dealings with the region prior to the Arab spring (5). Together with the entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the EC in the 1980's and fall of the Berlin wall, the EU's interests in region-building intensified. The Barcelona process of 1995 establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), targeted greater dialogue and integration between the north and south of the Mediterranean. The EMP reflected a continuation of the economic focus of the Union's previous outlook to the Southern Mediterranean, but also added political and security dialogue as well as social and cultural component based on civil society exchanges. (6)

The idea of an interdependence between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean was inherent in this attempt at region-building through closer economic and trade integration, political and social dialogue. As put by Bremberg, by the 1990's, "European diplomats and officials had... started to depict the geographical proximity and the 'closeness of all types of relations' between the member states and non-members around the Mediterranean basin as something that made the stability and prosperity of Europe ultimately dependent on the stability and prosperity of its southern neighborhood." (7) The EMP was adopted by the EU as a liberal idea that could trigger a process of interdependence, greater exchange between the two sides of the Mediterranean and hence a spillover of democratic and liberal values from the north to the South.

Prior to the Arab spring, the Member States of the EU together with 15 Mediterranean states as well as EU candidate countries in Western Balkans and Turkey initiated the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) process advocating an "enhanced partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries." (8) The UfM could be seen as a continuation of the Barcelona process and adopted a more down-to-earth and cautious approach incorporating the lessons of the EMP. The UfM mostly aimed at fostering regional cooperation and co-ownership and focused on support to projects aiming at the socio-economic development in the region. (9)

The Arab spring events starting in Tunisia and quickly spreading to Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, caught the EU by surprise. Analysts studying the EU's foreign policy and effectiveness in its southern neighborhood evaluated the Union's stance vis-a-vis the 'Arabellions' and mostly came to the conclusion that the EU was unable to have a determining influence over events and that it was helpless in the face of crises taking place in its vicinity. (10) In a paradoxical way, the EU's aim of spreading its values such as democracy and human rights in its southern neighborhood and the engagement with political and civil society actors in order to facilitate a process of socialization into these values paid off and had an impact on the chain of events that led to the Arab spring. If Arab spring events could be evaluated as a series of uprisings triggered by the dissatisfied middle and lower-middle classes who were weary of their autocratic and corrupt leaders and demanded more voice, prosperity and freedom, then such a process would be the exact purpose and target of the EU's perspective on the region. However, since the EU was not prepared for the chaos that would ensue following the uprisings in the region, considerations of security and stability outweighed unconditional support for democracy.

Following the events triggered by the self-immolation of Muhammed Bouazizi in Tunisia, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton together with Commissioner responsible for the Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, Stefan Fule made a joint statement four weeks after the event expressing their concern about the disturbances in Tunisia and calling for dialogue between the government and protestors. (11) France's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michele Alliot-Marie's unfortunate offer to send paratroopers to help Ben Ali repress the protestors in Tunisia (12) reflected this dilemma in Europe's outlook. She also authorized the shipment of tear gas grenades to Tunisia to be used against the demonstrators. (13) Despite the EU's self-declared values including democracy, human rights and fundamental freedom, a sense of unease and anxiety regarding the outcome and side effects of such volatile events were also felt. A joint statement by Ashton and Fule on the situation in Tunisia "reaffirm[ing] the EU's solidarity with Tunisia and its people" came only 3 days after President Ben Ali's fleeing the country on 17 January 2011. (14)

Despite an initial hesitation in the face of widespread demonstrations in the Arab countries, the EU eventually stressed the need for political reform and a democratic transition process and warned against the use of force against peaceful protestors. The EU noted in February 2011 that "the European Council saluted the peaceful and dignified expression by the Tunisian and Egyptian people of their legitimate, democratic, economic and social aspirations which are in accordance with the values the European Union promotes for itself and throughout the world." The Council also added that the EU would support dialogue and political reform and "lend its full support to the transition processes towards democratic governance, pluralism, improved...