The Cyprus Conflict: A Case for 'Joint Decision Trap'.

• Author: Ulusoy, Kivanc

Introduction

The Cyprus conflict has been the key deadlock of the Turkiye-European Union (EU) relations. Since the accession of the Greek Cypriot administration to the EU in 2004, Turkiye's strategy has undergone a deep change. This was in response to the EU strategy to require Turkiye to commit itself to good neighborly relations, international agreements, and the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter. (1) The UN-led peace negotiations in Cyprus have been revolving around forming a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation based on the political equality of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. (2) In fact, the Greek Cypriots' aim of rebuilding a 'unitary state' has conflicted with this framework. Since 2007, the conflict in the island became more complex as the Greek Cypriot side signed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitation agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel. (3) In response to the Greek Cypriot efforts to form a quasi-alliance with regional countries including Egypt and Israel, Turkiye underlined its guarantor power emanating from the founding treaties of the Cyprus Republic in I960. (4) Delineating its maritime zones with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Turkiye granted the Turkish National Gas Company (Turkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortakligi, TPAO) an exploration license in areas colliding with the Greek Cypriot EEZ. (5) Noble Energy, licensed to operate in the area, announced in late 2011 that the discovery of the Aphrodite gas field located at the exploratory drilling block 12 of the Cypriot EEZ was believed to hold approximately 4.1 trillion cubic feet of gas. (6) This discovery and the UN pressure encouraged the sides to concentrate on convergences, conducing two proposals regarding any possible cooperation in the hydrocarbons issue. (7) This brought the Joint Declaration of February 2014. (8) However, as of February 2019, the relations between Southern Cyprus and Turkiye again deteriorated as ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum announced encouraging results in the South of the island. (9)

This paper argues that diverging claims of sovereignty by the parties of the Cyprus conflict brings inadequate cooperation for a comprehensive solution that might have impressive economic benefits. It argues that the EU's involvement with the conflict had a negative impact despite the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves around Cyprus, which could respond to the acute energy dependency of European countries and Turkiye. The international energy companies understandably have been staying away from the Eastern Mediterranean, faced with conflicting sovereignty claims in the region and the resulting legal puzzles. This paper provides a review of the latest developments with regard to exploratory drilling around the island and the reactions of the parties involved. We incorporate a framework of analysis based on the 'joint decision trap,' which we consider as the essence of the lack of a solution despite efforts to bring about one after the Greek Cypriot administration became an EU member. Despite the Europeanization of the conflict in the aftermath of the Greek Cypriot accession to the EU, the logic of conditionality operates in an opposing manner to the logic of 'joint decision.' This has pushed Turkiye to disconnect its geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean from its EU alignment process and to follow a traditional hard power strategy.

The Present State of the Cyprus Conflict

The Greek Cypriot administration ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1988 and adopted a new law in 2004, which limited its EEZ by 12 nautical miles. The EEZ was delimited by agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007), and Israel (2010). The then-Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Kozakou-Marcoullis visited both Greece and Israel for support in exploratory drilling. Since August 2011, the Greek Cypriot administration has drawn attention to Turkish warnings against exploratory drilling. In 2011, the Greek Cypriot government announced a significant gas finding in the parcel of Aphrodite. At the UN in 2011 and 2012, the then TRNC President Eroglu proposed the establishment of an ad-hoc committee, comprising Greek and Turkish Cypriots to give approvals and licenses for drilling rights. The Greek side rejected it as it would hamper sovereign rights and stated they share the benefit of gas with Turkish Cypriots. (10) In September 2011, the firm Noble Energy initiated the first drilling in block 12. (11) The then-Prime Minister and current President of Turkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that the TPAO's license was a reciprocal decision to the unilateral actions of the Greek Cypriots. (12) In late 2011, the Turkish vessel Piri Reis accompanied by warships began seismographic research in the South of the island. Announcing that she would not allow activities in blocks 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7, Turkiye claimed the EEZ delimitation rights. (13)

On September 29, 2012, Greek Cyprus rejected a proposal including a bi-communal technical committee for natural resources and a pipeline transporting hydrocarbons through Turkiye. (14) In January 2013, the Greek Cypriot government approved licenses to ENI-Kogas (blocks 2 and 3), TOTAL (block 11) and Novatek and TOTAL (block 9). From June to October 2012, Greek Cypriots assumed the EU Presidency, which could have been used in a positive way for the solution but the then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that the negotiations were over after the talks in Long Island (U.S.). There were differences between a settlement model that the leaders agreed upon and the expectations of the two communities. Both communities were opposed to the models that were similar to the cases of 'Taiwan' and 'Kosovo.' They were also opposed to the current situation, describing the 'federal' model as a preferable solution. A survey showed that the Greek Cypriots were in favor of restrictions on settlement and acquisition of property and opposed the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (72 percent). The Turkish Cypriots were opposed to a model excluding the three freedoms and the guarantees (48 percent). (15)

In late February 2014, the Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades threatened to extend the new round of negotiations if Turkish vessels continued to intrude into the EEZ declared by the Greek Cypriot administration. (16) The February 11, 2014 Joint Statement was a result of the initiatives taken in the atmosphere of 2013. This process could not proceed to any new phase of negotiations but reiterated the UN parameters of the bi-zonal and bi-communal character of the prospective settlement. Turkiye's Barbaros seismic vessel entered Greek Cyprus' EEZ in October 2014. (17) Turkiye issued a NAVTEX between January and April 2015, reserving areas in the Eastern Mediterranean, colliding with the zone declared by the Greek Cypriots. (18) In May 2015, the EU declared that it would grant [euro]2 million to the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Project (EastMed), a project transferring gas from the region to Europe through Greece. (19) Greek Cypriots announced the third licensing round in early 2016 for blocks 6, 8, and 10. (20) In November 2016, following the failed coup on 15 July, the European Parliament's resolution underlined a deteriorating human rights situation in Turkiye due to the state of emergency and called on the member states and the Commission to initiate a temporary freeze of the accession negotiations. (21)

In 2016, the UN-led negotiations intensified and brought Anastasiades and the new TRNC President Mustafa Akinci to the negotiating table in November, in Mont Pelerin, Switzerland. Both sides declared their commitment to continue negotiations, but it was not possible to reach an agreement on territorial adjustments. Proximity talks began as Anastasiades and Akinci agreed to meet in Geneva on January 9, 2017. Resuming negotiations in Nicosia, they were committed to presenting maps on proposals regarding the internal boundaries. This process stalled in mid-February and the negotiations in June collapsed on the issues of security and guarantees. Turkiye maintained the rights of guarantee as a 'red line,' in negotiations that the EU participated with as an observer, along with other guarantors--Greece and the UK. (22) Prior to this, the Greek Cypriot parliament ratified a bill to introduce an annual commemoration of the January 1950 Enosis (union with Greece) referendum in public schools. Turkiye issued the first serious warning on Greek Cypriots' planned hydrocarbon activities and reserved parts of the Greek Cypriot EEZ for the Barbaros drilling ship to conduct surveys. From April 2017 onwards, the Greek Cypriot administration granted licenses to the ENI (block 8), the ENI/TOTAL consortium (block 6), and the Exxon/Qatar Petroleum consortium (block 10). (23)

The EU granted the EastMed project another [euro]34.5 million in January 2018 and endorsed the agreement signed between Israel, the Greek Cypriot administration, Greece, and Italy in December. (24) The ENI announced discoveries of lean gas in Greek Cypriot EEZ, Calypso 1 of block 6 on 8 February 2018. However, Turkiye has claimed this block and in February 2018 the Turkish navy, while undertaking drilling in the same region, blocked the ENI's drilling ship. This incident was the first serious incident of military activity since the beginning of the Greek Cypriot exploratory program. (25) In the last quarter of 2018, ENI and ExxonMobil started exploratory drilling in block 10. In response, Turkiye's Barbaros drilling ship began a new round of seismic surveys and issued a NAVTEX for military exercises within blocks 7 and 8. The tension between Turkiye and the EU increased as the ENI was involved. Stressing Turkiye's continued statements challenging Greek Cypriots' right to exploit hydrocarbon resources, the EU warned her regarding the tension and invited her to respect Greek Cypriot sovereignty and to act in accordance with...