The AK Party: dominant party, new Turkey and polarization.

• Author: Keyman, E. Fuat
• Position: COMMENTARY - Essay

The March 30, 2014 local elections epitomized the fiercest battle fought in Turkish political history between the government and an anti-government coalition that included a range of legitimate and illegitimate actors from opposition parties to the furtive agents of a phantom "parallel structure" embedded in vital branches of Turkish bureaucracy. A series of momentous events that unfolded between mid-2013 and the eve of Election Day practically turned the March 30 local elections into general elections, as well as a vote of confidence for the AK Party rule and the leadership of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan. The Gezi Park protests, the military coup in Egypt, the increasing disconnect and erosion of trust between the West and Prime Minister Erdogan, and the December 17 corruption allegations influenced the psyche of leaders, politicians and constituents on both aisles of the political spectrum to the extent that each waged an existential war against the other. By doing so, as will be elaborated in this paper, they appear to have set the wheels in motion--albeit inadvertently--for the AK Party's electoral victory and contributed to its metamorphosis into a dominant party, the emergence of a "New Turkey," and unprecedented polarization on all levels of Turkish society.

The December 17 raid on the homes of three cabinet ministers' sons and a government bank executive on money laundering and bribery allegations not only increased the political tension and polarization in the days leading up to the elections, but also transformed the local elections into a referendum on the place and position of Prime Minister Erdogan in politics. The AK Party leadership reacted similarly by denying the charges and shifting the blame to a conspiracy to remove Erdogan, implemented by a "parallel structure" deeply embedded in key state apparatuses, such as the judiciary and police. In his campaign speeches, Erdogan accused the self-exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen, who resides in Pennsylvania, United States, of contesting his rule through the agents of his religious order (known as cemaat or Hizmet movement in Turkish), who allegedly penetrated vital branches of the Turkish state. A clash between the ruling party and the Gulen movement had already surfaced on two occasions: first, a secret meeting between the Turkish intelligence agency and members of the PKK terrorist organization in 2012 was leaked through Gulenist channels; and second, the government retaliated by deciding to close private tutoring facilities in Turkey, which are a major source of funding for the Gulen movement. Furthermore, Gulen had criticized the AK Party government in a number of instances, such as the handling of the tragic Mavi Marmara raid by Israeli commandos in 2010, the Kurdish question and the Peace Initiative, and the Gezi Park events of last year.

As the elections drew near, attacks against the AK Party leadership increased. The illegal tapping of high government officials' phones exposed shocking revelations regarding the extent of the government's seeming involvement in corruption and its interference with fundamental freedoms of expression, press, and enterprise, as well as the rule of law. The AK Party government responded by attempting to consolidate its control over the police and judiciary, suspending or relocating more than 5000 law enforcement officers, as well as the prosecutors who authorized the raids. With the release of more illegal recordings, including deliberations between high-level government officials, the military, and intelligence officers concerning "clandestine operations" in territories adjacent to the Turkish border, the AK Party administration reacted more severely by banning access to Twitter and YouTube. On the other hand, opposition parties based their campaigns on these revelations to taint the legitimacy of the ruling party in their constituents' eyes. The result was the strengthening of the AK Party's support, its post-election vow to design a new Turkey in its image, and increased polarization.

The March 30 local elections were therefore the most tense and polarized elections in contemporary Turkish political history vis-a-vis discourse, rhetoric, and the attitude of political leaders toward one another. Nevertheless, the AK Party and, more specifically, Prime Minister Erdogan have come out as the decisive winners. Fethullah Gulen and his movement have lost. The opposition parties, especially the Republican People's Party (CHP), on the other hand, did not receive the percentage of votes that they had projected before the elections. This was the third consecutive local election victory for the AK Party--similar to its third general election triumph on June 12, 2011. Although the AK Party appears to have lost almost two million popular votes since 2011, the results reaffirmed Erdogan's advent as a strong candidate for the presidential elections and the AK Party for the 2015 general elections. The election results consolidated the electoral hegemony of the AK Party, fortified its rule and governance without strong opposition, increased its power and legitimacy, and maintained the strong leadership position of Erdogan within his party, as well as in Turkey. It is likely that the AK Party will remain in power until at least 2019. Concomitantly, the "New Turkey" and "2023 Vision," upon which Erdogan has structured his electoral strategy, will hail as an achievable reality, rather than a utopia, at a time when our globalizing word is in turmoil and severe crisis. Yet, the New Turkey appears to be a highly polarized and fragmented society along secular, religious and ethnic lines, with a strong leader and weak opposition. This leaves us with a picture that points to risks and uncertainties in the areas of democracy, living together in diversity, and active foreign policy.

Electoral Hegemony and Dominant Party

The AK Party's rise to the top started with the November 3, 2002 national elections. Eleven years on, the AK Party clings to power ever more resolutely. The consecutive electoral successes of the AK Party since 2002 continue to generate "a political earthquake-like impact" on Turkish politics and modernity. In 2002, the three governing parties that formed a coalition government after the 1999 national election, as well as the two opposition parties, failed to pass the 10 percent national threshold. They were thrown out of...