The AK Party and the evolution of Turkish political Islam's foreign policy.

• Author: Dalay, Galip
• Position: Report

Almost two years ago, after the first wave of Arab uprisings, cheering throngs hailed Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as he toured the Middle East. Questions about a supposed "Turkish Model" saturated the English and Arabic media, and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu spoke about the uprisings as if they were the natural course of events in the region. As the Syrian uprising--which Turkey prominently supported--became increasingly bloody and intractable, domestic critics turned sharply, proclaiming the failure of the AK (Justice and Development) Party's foreign policy and indicting Davutoglu's performance. (1) When the Syrian conflict spilled over into Turkey, and the AK Party government first threatened and then responded with artillery fire, some analysts wondered if Turkey would transition to a more muscular foreign policy. (2) At best, these efforts to build narratives out of Turkish foreign policy were overzealous. Still, they represent only the most recent attempts to define the "new" Turkish foreign policy.

These constant, instantaneous redefinitions of Turkish foreign policy under the AK Party's leadership reach flawed conclusions precisely because they eschew a longer historical view. The evolution of the AK Party's foreign policy--and the recalibration instigated by the Syrian conflict--can be better understood by exploring the foreign policy visions and practices of the Islamist parties that preceded the AK Party. The rise and fall of Necmettin Erbakan's Refah (Welfare) Party, and the internal contestations over the short-lived Fazilet (Virtue) Party, deeply affected the AK Party as it rose to power and defined its foreign policy approach.

The AK Party--and the Fazilet Party before it--emerged from the ashes of the Refah Party, and the current ruling party's leadership spent its formative years within the ranks of Erbakan's party. Because of the deep links among, and common political Islamist tradition of, the parties' respective founders, their foreign policy visions may be better understood when situated within a historical narrative. Such a narrative presents a history of neither total continuity nor complete change in the foreign policy views and practices of these parties; rather, it bears elements of both. However, this narrative does reveal how the evolution of the parties' foreign policy visions across historical periods were motivated by different factors. The ways the AK Party understands Refah's failure and seeks to transcend it help frame the evolution of AK Party's foreign policy--particularly in its first term--and illuminate the reassessment necessitated by the Syrian uprising.

The Limits of Refah's Binary Vision and the Transition to Fazilet

When the Refah Party rose to power in 1996, it espoused a foreign policy vision centered on a binary, identity-based worldview: the West and the Muslim world were in opposition. (3) Of course, given Turkey's steadfast Western alliance through the Cold War, to newly elected Prime Minister Erbakan Turkey's foreign policy had been improperly oriented for 50 years. Erbakan adopted a familiar Third Worldist critique of the international system, viewing it as dominated by--and serving the interests of--the Western world.

In response to the Western-dominated international system, Erbakan argued, the Islamic world should set up a parallel, and independent, structure. The Refah Party advocated Islamic analogs to the UN and UNESCO, an Islamic common market, and a unified Islamic currency--the dinar. Erbakan initiated a Developing-8--mirroring the then-Group of 8 developed economies--comprised of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Egypt, and Nigeria. (4) Given Turkey's historical leadership of the Islamic world, naturally Erbakan believed that Turkey should lead the establishment of this new transnational Islamic system. (5)

Refah's foreign policy was shaped in opposition to the West in two different ways. Erbakan attacked Western values and imperialism--in keeping with the party's Third Worldist perspective. He accused the West of under-developing the Muslim countries. Beyond these familiar critiques, Erbakan used Turkey's historic alignment with the US to set Refah apart. Other parties had done the US's bidding for decades he argued. These "imitator" regimes had been eager to serve the US and Europe. (6) Refah offered an alternative international alignment and, more resonantly, a remedy for the years of foreign policy constrained by Cold War alliances. (7) Refah described its foreign policy as possessing an independent character--sahsiyetli dis politika--that gives priority to the interests of Turkey and reflects its values. Erbakan's identity-driven vision of Turkey leading the Islamic world was in part an early effort to increase power and carve out maximum flexibility in foreign policy.

However, Refah was unable to implement its foreign policy vision, in part due to the nature of its coalition, and in part because Refah's ideas roused the suspicions of the still politically dominant military. The political climate in June 1996 diminished Erbakan's ability to carry out his foreign policy goals. From the military's perspective, both Islamic and Kurdish identities posed expanding challenges to the secular and Turkish nature of the republic. The armed activity of both the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and the Hezbollah of Turkey contributed to the securitization of these identities and the increased power of the military in matters of security and foreign policy. The military perceived Erbakan's revisionist foreign policy as a threat to the secularism and Turkishness of the republic.

Thus although Refah attracted ardent support from a plurality of the electorate, its starkly different political ideology remained polarizing. Having won just over one fifth of the vote, Refah formed a coalition government with Tansu Ciller's Dogru Yol (True Path) Party. Under the power-sharing agreement, Ciller owned the foreign ministry portfolio and pursued policies more in line with Turkey's traditional Western-oriented foreign policy. The National Security Council was heavily dominated by voices opposed to Erbakan's foreign policy vision. Of the 10 members on the mixed military-civilian Council, Erbakan and Justice Minister Sevket Kazan were the only Islamists. (8)

Despite these structural challenges, Erbakan continued promoting his own foreign policy from the prime ministry. His first trip abroad included visits to Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. He visited Libya despite warnings from his advisers that this would be misunderstood by opponents of political Islam. He remained critical of the European Union (EU) and unbending in his opposition to the accession process. Though Erbakan possessed limited direct power over foreign policy, his brash statements and actions alarmed the military and simply reinforced the military's narrative that the Refah-led government threatened the secular nature of the state. (9) Despite Erbakan's politically expedient concessions--including signing a major defense pact with Israel and implementing the military-mandated February 28th process--the Refah government was toppled in the 1997 postmodern coup and the party was disbanded.

With Erbakan temporarily banned from politics, Refah reconstituted itself as the Fazilet Party. Fazilet was a transitional party, serving as the ideological battleground between Erbakan's closest followers and Turkish political Islam's younger generation, whose leaders would go on to found the AK Party.

This younger generation grew disenchanted with Erbakan for political, personal, and ideological reasons. As the central figure within Turkish political Islam from the 1970s onward, Erbakan was a known commodity--and one that attracted the scrutiny, skepticism, and ire of the Kemalist establishment and military. The closure of Refah was the third time an Erbakan-led political party had been shuttered in the name of Kemalism. (10) Yet, in each new iteration of the party, Erbakan maintained great personal influence over the movement. Refah's closure and the rise of Fazilet brought new voices to the leadership conversation. With Erbakan temporarily banned from politics, former Refah MP Abdullah Gul challenged Recai Kutan, a close Erbakan ally, for party leadership. Though he lost, the contest sharpened the ideological divergences of the new generation of Turkish political Islamists. The part of the new generation that would go on to found the AK Party understood that Refah had advanced a polarizing vision but ultimately failed to implement it in concrete policies.

Though both factions sought to temper the Refah vision, they did so for different reasons. These differing rationales for change were revealed in divergent attitudes toward the EU between the old and new guards. The disciples of Erbakan were chiefly concerned that the party should appear different in kind from Refah. Professing support for the EU served as a symbolic gesture to the secular state apparatus of Fazilet's independence from Refah. This...