The 4th Industrial Revolution, Military-Civil Fusion, and the Next RMA.

• Author: Bitzinger, Richard A.
• Position: COMMENTARY

Michael Raska notes that there have been five major waves of military innovation--that is, Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs)--since the late 1980s. These are: first, the initial theorizing and development of the concept of a Military-Technical Revolution (MTR) in the Soviet Union, based on "reconnaissance-strike complexes" (1980s); second, the study and refinement of MTR concepts by the U.S. military (early 1990s); third, the development of the Information Technologies-led RMA (IT-RMA) in the U.S. military (mid-to late-1990s); fourth, limited implementation of the IT-RMA under the guise of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's "defense transformation" efforts (early 2000s); and, fifth, a growing questioning of the overall RMA concept (mid-2000s onward). (1)

Raska now asserts that we are on the cusp of a sixth RMA wave, based on a 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR) and particularly on developments in artificial intelligence (AI). This new AI-RMA differs radically from previous RMAs in that it "signifies a real disruptive shift in warfare--in the framework of new or different instruments (technology), practices (doctrines and operational concepts), to the formation of new organizational force structures." (2)

The 4IR is driving this new RMA wave, and AI is particularly viewed as a key force multiplier. As the U.S. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) puts it:

A new warfighting paradigm is emerging because of AI... called "algorithmic" or "mosaic" warfare; China's theorists have called it "intelligentized" war. All these terms capture, in various ways, how a new era of conflict will be dominated by AI and pit algorithms against algorithms. Advantage will be determined by the amount and quality of a military's data, the algorithms it develops, the AI-enabled networks it connects, the AI-enabled weapons it fields, and the AI-enabled operating concepts it embraces to create new ways of war. (3) The Commission goes on to state that:

AI will transform the way war is conducted in every domain from undersea to outer space, as well as in cyberspace and along the electromagnetic spectrum. It will impact strategic decision-making, operational concepts and planning, tactical maneuvers in the field, and back-office support. (4) How exactly the 4IR--and particularly AI--will transform future warfare is still undetermined. Few chores are more difficult than predicting the future. The past is littered with failed predictions, and so it is easy to become jaded and cynical. Yet, when it comes to envisaging future advances in military capabilities--and, subsequently, future areas of military advantage--few requirements are more critical. We care about RMAs because we ignore them at our peril. It is doubly difficult when we realize that we are not only attempting to predict RMAs but to actualize them as well.

RMAs are, of course, much more than 'mere' technology. As Cheung, Mahnken, and Ross put it: "Technology is the most visible dimension of military innovation, but military innovation is not to be equated with, or reduced to, technological innovation...the organizational and doctrinal components of military innovation are no less significant than its technological component." (5) RMAs entail "innovative operational concepts" and "organizational adaptation," done in such a way as to "fundamentally alter the character and conduct of a conflict," and produce "a dramatic increase... in the combat potential and military effectiveness of armed forces." (6) And yet technology and technological innovation are what we always come back to. Mostly this is because technological advances are central to implementing the organizational and operational aspects of the RMA. Without the requisite technology, the RMA cannot be imagined or implemented, and this is what makes the 4IR so relevant.

Still, technology is perhaps the most crucial determinant when it comes to military innovation, effectiveness, and advantage. Even Cheung, Mahnken, and Ross agree that "technology, in the form of weapons and weapon systems, serves as the source of the hardware dimension of military innovation and its concrete products." (7) Furthermore, Keith Krause argues that "the possession of modern weapons is a key element in determining the international hierarchy of power." (8) In other words, the possession of cutting-edge militarily relevant technologies equals more effective weapons systems, which in turn results in greater military power, which in turn translates into greater geopolitical power.

Technology is still one of the most critical enablers of defense transformation, and the transnational diffusion of military-related technologies is an important factor affecting the distribution of power in international politics. Consequently, the global dissemination of advanced, militarily relevant technologies should be as great a security concern as the spread of weapons systems themselves.

Complicating this predicament, we live in a time when 'militarily relevant technologies' are becoming harder and harder to identify and classify. Technological advances, especially in the area of military systems, are a continuous, dynamic process; breakthroughs are always occurring, and their impact on military effectiveness and comparative advantage could be both significant and hard to predict at their nascent stages. In particular, advanced technologies--many of which are embedded in commercial, rather than military-industrial sectors--offer new and potentially significant opportunities for defense applications and, in turn, for increasing one's military edge over potential rivals. Finally, such technologies and resulting capabilities rarely spread themselves evenly across geopolitical lines. Around the world, the diffusion of new and potentially powerful militarily relevant technologies--as well as the ability...