A Tale of Four Augusts: Obama's Syria Policy.

• Author: Oncel, Rifat
• Position: Book review

By Kilic Bugra Kanat

Istanbul, SETA Publications, 2016, 297 pages, $30.00, ISBN: 9786054023790. (Revised and Enlarged Second Edition)

Reviewed by Rifat Oncel, Middle East Technical University

As Barack Hussein Obama's second term in the office finalized, one of the hottest debates about his administration recently has been the American foreign policy towards Syria. Although many pieces have been written about the U.S., Syria and the Arab Spring, a complete work focusing on U.S.' Syria policy seems lacking. Kilic Bugra Kanat's A Tale of Four Augusts: Obama's Syria Policy represents an important study to fill this gap by shedding light on the developments, discourses, and policy preferences in the American side. The author provides a detailed account for four years between 2011 and 2015, focusing on the four Augusts; in each case a milestone event was witnessed for Obama's foreign policy towards Syria. Kanat argues that despite the major triggering events of four Augusts, the U.S. could not overcome its inaction and develop a clear response to the crisis in Syria because of the insufficient motivation and resource allocation, conflicting arguments and lack of coordination among decision-making institutions, and the exclusionary hegemony of Obama's 'inner circle' on the U.S. foreign policy decisions.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

In chapters one and two, Kanat explains the changing course of U.S.-Syrian relations. While the relations was abysmal under the George W. Bush's 'war on terror' campaign, in Obama's first term, a rapprochement took place between the two countries because of the other U.S. strategic priorities in the Middle East, such as preventing Syria from transforming into a safe haven for terror groups. Chapters three and four point out the major U.S. delusion or wishful thinking that Assad could reform the country and how this faded away withthe serious disagreements among bureaucratic institutions which further inhibited the development of consistent policies. Chapter five and six explain the implications of Obama's famous 'red line' speech and argues that in spite of the strong messaging, the U.S. had not developed a clear strategy; it even did not undertake serious preparations to deliver its promise. Furthermore, as Kanat argues, the usage of chemical weapons in spite of the clear messages of Obama meant the U.S. deterrence obviously did not work. Chapter seven discusses the ultimate failure of the Train & Equip program because of...