Syria: the hope and challenges of mediation.

• Author: Monshipouri, Mahmood

Introduction

The persistence of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria has thus far been reinforced by a multitude of factors, including disorganized opposition factions, the diplomatic, military, and logistical support of Iran and Russia, as well as the cohesive nature of its state, which has survived three years of civil war. (1) Many argue that alternatives to Assad's rule are complicated and ominous. The breakup of the country, for example, would hold grave implications for the region as a whole. The status of the Free Syrian Army as the main opposition force has been eclipsed by the rise of more militant Islamist groups. (2) International attempts to push for peaceful regime change have proven disappointing. The model of NATO's humanitarian intervention in Libya illustrates a poor strategy for security and ineffective mechanisms for democratization. The new Libyan government has failed to bring the militias that arose during the revolt against the previous regime under control. This failure has led to fatal turf battles between rival tribes and commanders, creating ungoverned spaces in which radical Islamists flourish. (3) These radical groups have effectively forged a bloc with the Libya's interim parliament (General National Congress--GNC), which approved a new government, led by Prime Minister Ahmed Mitig, in a controversial vote on May 25, 2014. This development is certain to further deepen the country's political and security crisis. International involvement in Syria does not promise to generate better results than it did in Libya.

The so-called "responsibility to protect" (R2P) has been abused in the case of Libya and discredited in Syria. The UN Security Council has been indifferent to political unrest and human rights abuses in Bahrain and Yemen. This questionable level of commitment has strengthened the suspicion of many in the region that R2P is nothing but the latest cover for Western neo-imperialism and liberal interventionist policies. (4) The lack of an active and more determined intervention--either for humanitarian or geostrategic reasons--can be explained in several ways. The United States spent a trillion dollars on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and has no appetite for further military intervention in the region. The ambitious, risky, and catastrophic foreign policy goals pursued by the George W. Bush administration, largely within the framework of military intervention, democracy promotion, and regime change, resulted in political backlash. President Obama decided to pull back from Iraq and other global hot spots and abstain from major military action. It was a decision that the American public has continued to strongly support.

The dominant view among President Obama's advisers today is that the administration should recalibrate US foreign policy to be more realistic and pragmatic. Practical necessities and pragmatic multilateralism have taken precedence over the ideological factors that motivated the foreign policy of the Bush administration. President Obama supported intervention in Libya and has stood in favor of internally generated regime change and democratization in Egypt and Syria, despite the massive costs to those nations, but he has reversed his predecessor's tendency to commit US troops to intervene in favor of these policies. The public also seems content to let Iraqis and Syrians fight it out among themselves.

Russia and the United States are making significant efforts at mediation, especially since an agreement was reached to dispose of Syrian chemical weapons. However, it appears that the efforts of global powers to mediate are limited by regional and local realities, which must be sorted out by players who doubt US and Russian sincerity, or question the ability of those two powers to agree on workable terms. Given these realities and the fact that the international community is unlikely to intervene in Syria as it did in Libya, attention has increasingly been drawn to regional initiatives and mediation.

This article seeks to put into perspective the critical role that regional mediation can play in nudging along global action. Without regional commitment and coordination among key Middle Eastern powers, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, international peace efforts to restore order and stability in Syria will be less likely to succeed. It is generally argued that the three most important principles and strategies of international mediation in settings involving atrocity and civil war are impartiality, inclusiveness and non-coerciveness. Given that it is difficult to closely adhere to these principles at all times and within all contexts, their application continues to be situation specific. (5)

In the sections that follow, we attempt to refocus attention on the mediation practice of inclusiveness. In the case of Syria, the central question remains the degree to which regional inclusiveness is crucial and necessary for a successful mediation process. We argue that all key regional players--namely Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey--should be engaged in the mediation. Without the participation of all three nations, partial settlement of the Syrian conflict might be conceivable but a sustainable, full settlement will be highly unlikely. Furthermore, we assert that the prospect of increased regional cooperation might be bolstered by the current tentative progress made in the talks between Iran and the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States plus Germany) over Tehran's nuclear program. Some influential Western analysts have compellingly argued that progress in this regard has the potential to remake the Middle East in a positive way. (6)

Revamping Iran-Saudi Relations

Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but especially in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq and the resurgence of sectarian tensions in the region following the eruption of civil war in Syria, Saudi Arabia has become the leading Sunni Arab government in the face-off against the rise of Shi'ism in the Persian Gulf region and beyond. The Saudi role has been driven by both geopolitical and ideological factors. Concerning the key status of Wahhabism in the Saudi political system, one expert writes, "anti-Shi'ism is built into the structure of political and religious authority and has become pervasive in cultural and social institutions." (7) The Saudi education system, for instance, has explicitly advocated intolerance of other religious views that diverge from central Wahhabi tenets. (8) Whereas other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have adopted a conciliatory approach toward their Shia populations, the religious divide has become increasingly pronounced in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. (9)

The 2011 turmoil of the Arab Spring initially caused the collapse of the so- called moderate camp (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt), resulting in the emergence of new coalitions and strategic alliances. However, after a coup deposed the Morsi government in Egypt on July 3, 2013, Saudi Arabia managed to cobble this alliance back together with great amounts of financial persuasion. The Saudis appear ready to guide the alliance away from US foreign policy. Egypt will no doubt be preoccupied for a considerable period of time with getting its house in order and sorting out civil-military relations in this new era.

Nowhere is the competition between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia more fierce and direct than in Syria. While Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE have become the main suppliers of arms and money to the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front, Iran has supported the regime of Bashar al-Assad in a conflict that has turned into a deadly civil war.

Astonishinglyut understandbly, susiastic about offering his services to youink of a better candidate for the WACansition from BaThe present trajectory of the civil war in Syria appears to lead toward the permanent partitioning of the country into at least three potential entities: a Sunni state or two, depending on the fate of the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al Nusra, in the East, North and South; an Alawite state in the center and West; and a Kurdish state in the Northeast corner. In fact, since its emergence, the ISIS has drastically altered the political equation in the Fertile Crescent. Disarray in the Syrian National Coalition, coupled with the rise of the ISIS, has caused new concerns over the future of Syria in a post-Assad era.

Ironically, some observers in the West have suggested that President Assad may have to remain in power for some time to maintain stability during the transition from Baath-controlled power to multi-party rule.10 Even if some coalition of rebels prevail and form a new government, there will be other rebel factions who are in conflict with the winners, while minorities and militarized groups who have stood by the state will be marginalized. Peace may prove to be elusive. If these groups are excluded from the new government, it is safe to predict...