Sway on a Tightrope: The Development of a Mutualistic Relationship between Turkey and DAESH/Ip Ustunde Cambazlik: Turkiye ve DAES Iliskisinin Gelisimi.

• Author: Bicakci, A. Salih
• Position: Report

This paper (1) presents the historical timeline to understand the emergence of Daesh and its interaction with Turkey in the context of the Syrian Civil War. A thorough understanding of the war is veiled behind the chaotic relations among the actors and their alliances. The literature on Daesh presents it with no account of its history and of its position with the alliances on the ground. Even though the organization has been suppressed by several militaries and militias, its continuing presence and the new phase of the jihadist ideology suggest that future manifestations with similar inspirations will continue to affect the global scene. To recapitulate the events pivoting around the interaction between Turkey and Daesh would assist us to better understand such global implications.

The Syrian Civil War and continuing conundrum affected not only the Middle East but also other regions. In the early days of the Syrian Civil war, the global community was unsure how to handle the clash among different ethnic groups. As the calamities and problems in Libya and the results of the U.S. incursion into Iraq continued, power broker states were reluctant to take a position in the Syrian conflict. In the International Relations literature, ongoing interventions and their results had already initiated intellectual discussions on the liberty-security equilibrium and on whether the international system would choose between chaos and a corrupted order.

Another problem was the unique position of Syria. In a country ruled by an Alawite minority for decades despite the Sunni majority population, the Syrian power elite historically supported Iranian policies in the Middle East. As the self-declared protector of the Shiite community in Syria, Iran was involved in the Syrian civil war early on. Turkey acted as another key actor, which had considered Syria as a threat during the Cold War but dramatically changed its position by late 1990's. Some researchers interpreted this shift as a 'desecuritization' process but the brief honeymoon would end in disgrace.

After the Arab Springs, a new form of terrorism, which was supported by the masses and held a sui generis ideology following the collapse of nation-states, was introduced to the international system. The international interventions to these sporadic movements catalyzed the metamorphosis of new terror groups. Ordinary, righteous and democratic public protests evolved into civil wars with no sure prediction on they would end or into which form they would transform. These social quagmire occasions provoked the Cold War rulers who were equipped with power and technological capabilities and maintained the illusion of shifting the events in the direction of their aspirations.

In the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, two major parties, one led by Bashar Al-Assad representing the Ba'ath regime and its sub-national interest groups, and the other by the opposition formed by Syrian civilians, existed. The initial prediction was that the power superiority and capacity of the regime would suppress the uprising of Syrian civilians. The war, as proved later, would have varied effects on different actors, such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, the Kurds, Hizballah in the region; and on the U.S., Russia, China, Germany, France and Britain, at the global level. Each actor promoted its own agenda by maximizing its own power. Thus, each moved to control the outcome to its advantage. One of the well-known moves was to carry different grade weapons into the conflict region to challenge the power balances at the local level and to form an organized resistance movement and debilitate the capability of the Assad regime. Students of International Relations observed similar strategies in different conflicts, such as in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, and Iraq.

Yet, the Al-Qaedah offshoot organizations, Al-Nusrah and Ahrar al-Sham, emerged in Syria quicker than expected as the products of unpredictable components. All states with connections to the Jihadi networks knew that these fighters would join any conflict as long as it was ideologically fitting. It was the appearance of Daesh in the middle of the Syrian Civil War, and its challenging of the world order and the nation-state concept, that upended the established balances in the region.

Unlike Turkey, most of the involved states and actors do not share a long border with Syria. Therefore, Turkey witnessed all the problems of proximity and involvement, as Pakistan did during the Afghan war. With this background, this research aims to examine Turkey's interaction with Daesh and its policy towards the organization through the series of events and within the tangled relationships of several actors in the context of the Syrian Civil War. What were the consequences of this mutual relationship? More specifically, how did the interaction between Turkey and Daesh change during the sequence of events in the Syrian Civil war? Finally, in what ways would the emergence of Daesh help us to understand the future of terror organizations?

Globalization of Jihad

The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan had caused the emergence of an experienced jihadist culture. When the conflict ended, some fighters returned to their prior life in their home countries. Other fighters stayed behind, because either their adaptation would not be possible or their names appeared in the terrorist lists. Following the Afghan war, those who never returned, fought in Chechnya, Bosnia--Herzegovina, Iraq and Libya. With each conflict, these jihadists accumulated experience with improved levels of sophistication, such as expertise in finance, forging documents, counterfeit currency, hiding places, means of secret communication, information and its technology, arms and ammunition and transportation. (2)

The emergence of Al-Qaedah was the most remarkable development following the Afghan war. Its Salafi oriented jihadi culture, multinational membership and eclectic strategical mindset became evident after 9/11. Today a vast literature exists on Al-Qaedah and its operational code. The U.S. incursion into Iraq in 2003 was another milestone in the popularization of jihadi culture. The jihadi networks in Iraq, thus, emerged with a new syncretic formulation in the Middle East regional security complex.

Spread of the Arab Spring to Syria and Turkey

Before the end of the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the Middle East and North Africa witnessed the self-immolation of Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi to protest the economic situation which initiated a series of uprisings. Marc Lynch's article in Foreign Policy coined the term 'Arab Spring' for these movements which have been extensively discussed in the literature. (3) In the Turkish public and academic discourse, the Arab Spring was seen as a movement limited in North Africa. Following the heydays of the uprisings, Erdogan even visited the post Arab Spring states, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The media interpreted his visits as "Ankara is seeking to consolidate its growing influence in a region shaken by the Arab Spring." (4) The visits enabled the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government to cultivate relations with the new actors in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in North Africa. Turkey's eagerness to lead an order-establisher role in the region beyond its capacity was already in motion. (5)

At the beginning of the Syrian Civil war, it was not clear on whether the protests were minor clashes against the Assad regime or an extension of the Arab Spring. The mixed reports blinded the international and regional actors who would later become involved in the conflict and provide various types of assistance to the groups on the ground. Ankara too had limited foresight that the spark of the Arab Spring would flare up close to its borders. The initial impression in Ankara was that of modest public protests against the Assad regime. However, Ankara's neutral stance quickly turned into support for the protestors. In the early days of the events in Syria, Erdogan said that Turkey had waited for a long time to see a change but its patience ended, adding "in addition to our cultural, historical and kinship ties, we share an 850 km physical border with Syria; therefore, what is happening there does not permit us to just observe (follow)". (6) This approach expedited Turkey's involvement in the Syrian civil war against the Assad regime.

Formation of a Jihadist Culture

During the Cold war, Islam was utilized to slow down the expansion of communism. In the Middle East, Shiite groups were seen as the main supporters of the leftist ideology. The rise of a socialist movement in Iran was prevented through coup attempts. The rise of socialist movements in Pakistan, where the second largest Shiite population in the world resides, alarmed Washington in the 1970's. To counteract these movements, the U.S. motivated its allies to promote the Sunnification activities. Saudi Arabia sponsored and supported Zia ul-Haq who "integrated and prioritized Hanafi fiqh in the constitution, which mobilized Shia resistance in Pakistan". (7) Pakistani authorities formed a protective belt against the Shiite Pan-Islamist expansion by building Sunni mosques and madrassahs along the Iranian border. The mainly Saudi-backed Deobandi madrassahs, leading a reformed Islam in Pakistan, were chosen as pivot actors (8). The Deobandi madrassahs sent mullahs to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Kuwait to train scholars and turned Pakistan into a cradle of the jihadi ideology.

By early 1980s, another proxy war, the Soviet-Afghan war, helped to legitimize the culture of Sunni fighters and enabled Zia ul-Haq to transform Pakistan into a center of U.S.-funded Sunni Islamism which represented a religious nationalism. As the Deoband madrassahs cultivated the Sunni jihadism of Afghan mujahedeen, the long-lasting war popularized jihadi culture. Countries sent fighters to help...