Sharing power: Turkey's democratization challenge in the age of the AKP hegemony.

• Author: Onis, Ziya
• Position: Report

From the perspective of comparative democratization studies Turkey constitutes an unusual case. It is an example of a "second wave" democracy. The transition from the single party, soft-authoritarian regime of the inter-war period was accomplished several decades ago in the 1950s. Yet, in spite of major reform experiments, notably during the course of the early part of the past decade, democracy remains far from being consolidated. Indeed, international comparisons such as data based on Freedom House Surveys tend to classify Turkey as a "hybrid regime," whose standing is significantly low compared to many third wave democracies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere. (1) In retrospect, Turkey has succeeded in terms of establishing "electoral" or "procedural" democracy, but has failed in terms of generating "substantive" democracy based on a genuinely pluralistic political order. Turkish society and politics remains deeply divided and there are increasing concerns voiced by liberal intellectuals both at home and abroad about the endurance of authoritarian elements in the Turkish political system, going even as far suggesting that the differences between Erdogan's Turkey and Putin's Russia may not be as clear-cut as they may have appeared only a few years ago.

This paper tries to account for the apparent loss of momentum in Turkey's democratization drive in recent years. The loss of momentum observed is clearly a reflection of a variety of factors. Some analysts identify structural obstacles to further democratization, others pointing to the role of actors and their preferences raising fundamental questions concerning the quality of leadership, both in the context of the governing party and the opposition. While domestic context is crucially relevant, a progressively less favorable international context, notably with the dramatic decline in Turkey's aspirations for EU membership, both at the elite level and the public at large, has also contributed to the marked decline in the democratization impulse and the emergence of creeping authoritarianism. Hence, there is a need for a multi-dimensional holistic approach that tries to integrate structures and actors, domestic and external forces, rather than single-mindedly focusing on certain aspects while downplaying other crucial elements.

Turkey, at present, stands at a critical juncture. A parliamentary commission has been established with representation from the four major political parties represented in the Turkish parliament to prepare the draft of a new constitution. A new constitution embodies the potential to significantly extend the frontiers of liberal democracy in Turkey, by helping to replace the authoritarian elements of the 1982 Constitution, established during an interim military regime, whose legacy has been quite costly even after the re-transition to parliamentary democracy after 1983. A fundamental point that needs to be reiterated, however, is that top-down constitutional engineering per se may not necessarily succeed in establishing a more liberal and pluralistic political order. The process of helping up to draw a new constitution, via the active participation of key political parties and civil society organizations, may help to build a consensus among different segments of Turkish society, which are in conflict with one another. However, without achieving a genuine consensus among these diverse elements, a process that requires significant compromises on the part of the key actors involved, the simple act of drawing up a new constitution will not succeed.

Democratic Credentials of the "New Turkey:" The Achievements and Limitations of the AKP Era

It would be a rather static approach to suggest, simply by comparing Turkey's democratization credentials in the international league tables, that Turkey has failed to advance in terms of democratic consolidation and deepening over the years. Indeed, it would be a historical mistake to suggest that Turkey during the 1970s, for example, was more democratic than it is today. Both the coalition government of the 1999-2002 period and the AKP, in the post-2002 era, notably in its early phase, have accomplished a major set of democratization reforms, which clearly helped extend the frontiers of democracy in Turkey over the course of the past decade. Clearly, the role of the European Union and the impetus provided by the Europeanization process has been a central element or driving force in this process.

In terms of popular discourse, the "new Turkey" that has emerged following a period of dramatic change under the AKP rule over the course of a decade, is in a number of important respects more democratic than the "old Turkey," the Turkey of the Kemalist establishment. (2) Certainly, the most important dimension of change in a positive direction has been a dramatic decline in the power and influence of the military in Turkish politics. Most observers of Turkish democracy have underlined the military tutelage as one of the central obstacles towards democratic consolidation. (3) Although electoral democracy has been the norm, Turkey has experienced frequent breakdowns of its democratic regime due to military interventions. Even under normal times, the military has been actively involved in Turkish domestic politics, given self-declared guardianship position on issues relating to secularism and national unity as well as its constitutional standing and institutional standing over civilian political actors such as the status of the Chief of the Armed Forces and the National Security Council. With a radical re-ordering of civil-military relations in recent years, the power of the civilian politicians over the military elites has expanded considerably with the result that the likelihood of military interventions in the future appears to be rather remote. This dramatic turn in Turkish politics, with the progressive, if not complete, withdrawal of the military from the very center of Turkish politics, surprised many observers, especially foreign analysts, who tended to regard military tutelage as one of the enduring features of the Turkish political system. Parallel to the civilianization of civil-military relations, one also observes a decline in the dominance of the old or traditional Kemalist bureaucracy, in other realms, notably within the judiciary and the foreign-service.

The so called "new Turkey" is arguably more democratic from its predecessors in terms of its ability to accommodate "difference" or "diversity" based on claims for recognition of different religious and ethnic identities. Hard-line interpretations of "Kemalism," effectively with its strict and homogenizing understanding of "secularism" and "Turkishness" had effectively suppressed the identity claims of different segments of Turkish society. This, in turn, clearly acted as a major source of discontent in large segments of society and effectively constituted as a major barrier against democratic representation. Particularly, striking in this context is the recognition of Kurdish identity. This, in itself constitutes a tremendous development, especially if one compares the situation with the 1990s. A number of important reforms have been implemented in recognition of the extension of minority rights. In this respect, there has been a significant expansion in the cultural and language rights of the Kurdish citizens in Turkey, although significant problems remain in terms of translating these rights into actual practice. Another dramatic change in a positive direction in recent years has been the representation of Kurdish groups in the National assembly, by a separate political party.

Similarly, the identity claims of the more conservative, religious segments of society have received progressively greater recognition under the AKP rule. In the economic realm, the rise of the new business elites from conservative Anatolian cities to challenge the dominance of secular, big business and to "share the center" may also be interpreted as a move towards a genuinely more pluralistic economic and political order in the Turkish context. Hence, one should not underestimate the elements of exclusion, which appeared to underpin the "old regime," and to some extent new elements of inclusion have been built into the "new regime," which has helped to overcome the democratic deficits of the previous order.

In retrospect, the Constitutional referendum of September 2010 represented an important step in terms of challenging and overcoming the authoritarian legacies of the old constitution engineered by the military elites. With a new Constitution in the making, this could represent a genuine step towards further democratization. Turkish foreign policy in recent years has emphasized the importance of soft power, friendly relations with all neighbors, and more recently in the context of the Arab Spring, the promotion of democracy and human rights in the wider Middle East. Clearly, these elements represent the bright side of the picture and make one more optimistic concerning the future of Turkey's democratization trajectory.

The positive aspects of the change depicted so far, however, should not detract us from the fact that in certain important respects the momentum of the democratization impulse has declined during the later phase of the AKP era. Critiques of the AKP point towards a kind of "civilian tutelage" that seems to have replaced "military tutelage" of the previous era, consistent with the claim that while "old Turkey" of the Kemalist era displayed significant democratic deficits, the "new Turkey" under the AKP era has not necessarily become more democratic in total, meaning that positive steps in certain respects have been counterbalanced by a series of retrogressions, on the other. What we seem to be witnessing in the later phase of the AKP era is a kind of limited or majoritarian understanding of democracy with new elements of...