Russian-Iranian Relations through the Prism of the Syrian Crisis.

• Author: Kozhanov, Nikolay

Introduction

Since 2012, Russia and Iran have been undertaking serious efforts to improve their relations and bring them to a new level that would imply strategic partnership between them. In 2013-2015, the Russian authorities intensified their efforts to settle the Iranian nuclear issue. Moscow helped to facilitate Iran's negotiations with the international group of negotiators whereas Lavrov's 2012 proposals on the settlement of the nuclear issue laid the necessary ground for the resumption of talks. In this case, Russian motifs were determined by a number of factors. First of all, Iran armed with a nuclear bomb was not desirable for Moscow, as this would change the balance of power in the region and encourage other, even less stable, Middle Eastern regimes to join the nuclear club. Secondly, Russia believed that an unsettled nuclear issue could have hypothetically led to the destabilization of Iran as it created pretexts for a potential military conflict between the U.S. and Tehran. Under these circumstances the Kremlin did not want Iran to become another failed state near the border of the post-Soviet space in addition to Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Thirdly, Russia's role in the multilateral negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue helped to promote Moscow's importance as a constructive international player. The latter was also important given the negative reaction of the international community to the annexation of Crimea and Russian support to the separatist forces in the East of Ukraine. Thus, Moscow's involvement in the negotiation process with Iran was considered by some U.S. analysts as one of the main factors that guaranteed the success of the negotiation process. (1) In July 2015, the U.S. President, Barack Obama, even telephoned Putin to thank him for Russia's role in reaching the P5+1 agreement with Iran. (2) Finally, by helping Tehran to settle the nuclear issue and lift international sanctions, Moscow was creating the positive image of Russia as a reliable partner. The latter brought obvious results by helping to revitalize Russian-Iranian relations.

Yet, in spite of strong mutual intention to bring the bilateral relations to a new level, the pace of their development obviously dissatisfies both sides. Thus, in spite of the positive media coverage, Rouhani's visit to Moscow (March 27-29, 2017) ended with very modest results. Most of the documents signed during the visit were either non-obligatory memorandums or supplementary agreements that were supposed to add some minor details to existing treaties. Moscow even refrained from promising the reciprocal visit of Putin to Tehran. The Iranian side was obviously disappointed by the absence of a breakthrough during these negotiations, although Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javad Zarif, and the President of Iran Hassan Rouhani himself remained determined to seek further progress in Russian-Iranian relations.

The limited results of Rouhani's visit could be explained by several reasons. First of all, most of the economic projects discussed by Moscow and Tehran are still raw. Secondly, the Kremlin also wants to keep its relations with Tehran low-profile as it does not want to irritate other Russian partners in the region such as Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Finally, Russia simply does not believe that it should be in a hurry when dealing with Tehran. Trump's anti-Iranian rhetoric naturally pushes Iran towards Russia and keeps it in the sphere of Russian influence. Meanwhile the communalities in Russian and Iranian approaches to existing regional issues (such as the security of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; legal status of the Caspian Sea; cross-border crimes; Eurasian transit routes; situation in trans-Caucasia and Central Asia) can always ensure the minimal positive degree of bilateral dialogue. Under these circumstances, Moscow prefers to work on the improvement of bilateral relations thoroughly and without making rushed decisions.

This complexity of Russian-Iranian relations and the influence of the above-mentioned factors on their development found implicit reflection in the dialogue of the two countries over one (if not the main) key issue-the Syrian crisis. The expert community is still far from being unanimous regarding the nature of the Russian-Iranian dialogue on Syria. While some argue about the emergence of a strong regional alliance between Moscow and Tehran, others insist that cooperation between the two countries remains extremely fragile and predict the near end of the Russian-Iranian collaboration. (3) Who is right in the analysis of the nature of the Russian-Iranian dialogue on Syria? Both the opponents and supporters of the theory about the emergence of the Russian-Iranian alliance refer to the solid and real facts when proving their position. However, neither side is correct in its conclusions. The devil, as always, is in the details. For sure, the Russian-Iranian interaction on Syria will have a long-lasting positive dynamic. However, there are factors that will not allow this dialogue to reach the level of a full-fledged military and political alliance.

Should Iran and Russia Be Friends?

Indeed, the public opinion in Iran is not unanimous on the prospects of Tehran's cooperation with Russia. Moreover, there are even some Iranian policymakers and analysts who cautiously question the rationale behind Tehran's military involvement in Syria itself. However, these questions are raised within a certain (not very large) group of the Iranian political elite without reaching the national level of discussion. Thus, some members of the Iranian mid-class demonstrate certain fatigue from Tehran's active and obtrusive involvement in regional affairs. They believe that it would be much more reasonable for the government of their country to invest the money it spends, in Iraq, Palestine and Syria on the support of the pro-Iranian forces, in the Iranian economy that is experiencing difficult times. The message of these people to the authorities of Iran is simple: "stop feeding the foreigners at our expense." (4) However, these views are not openly supported by other Iranian policymakers.

Unexpectedly, Moscow is also criticized amongst the traditional supporters of Tehran's active role in the Syrian crisis--Iranian radical conservatives and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members. These people believe that immense military efforts undertaken by Tehran in support of the Assad regime have bought the Iranian authorities the right to decide the destiny of Syria. Indeed, Iran deployed its military advisors and military forces in Syria long before Putin's decision to deploy Russian warplanes in Khmeimim and send special operation units to Syria. Tehran's proxies (such as Lebanese Hezbollah and the Shia militia) were the first to come to help Assad, as well. Moreover, even after commencing the Russian air raids, Moscow still tries to play the role of the third side in the conflict by flirting with the legal opposition in Syria and occasionally distancing itself from Assad. At the same time, Iran has been clearly positioning itself as the loyal ally of the regime from the very beginning of the civil war in Syria. In addition to the military assistance provided by Tehran, the Islamic authorities have been supporting the Assad's regime materially and financially: during the most difficult periods for Damascus from 2013 to 2014, Iran provided Damascus with money to pay the salary of the Syrian army while the Syrian economy was fueled by Iranian petrol and energy resources. (5) The Iranian military advisors trained the Syrian army for urban fighting whereas their civil colleagues helped the Syrian administration to build the effective war-time economy. (6)

Consequently, the Russian direct military involvement in the conflict creates serious concerns among the Iranian military elite. They are afraid that Moscow can "steal" the Iranian victory in Syria. Shortly after the beginning of the Russian military operation, the pro-IRGC media outlets of Iran started to argue that the Russian air raids and the huge psychological effect from them could make the Syrian regime forget about the Iranian input in the survival of Assad during the previous years. As a result, Tehran might not play the role it really deserves in determining the future of post-conflict Syria. Apart from that, some Iranian media outlets called upon the Iranian authorities to not trust Russia and argued that Moscow can easily betray them and might simply trade off its support of Damascus for the increased investments from the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The active contacts between Russia and the GCC only strengthened these concerns. (7) Thus, in October 2015, the IRGC commander, Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari openly questioned the loyalty of Moscow to Damascus by saying that Iran is much more concerned with Assad's destiny than Russia. (8)

Yet, the last word in determining Tehran's approach to Syria and Russia does not belong to the above-mentioned groupings. It is the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, who takes the final decisions on all sensitive political questions (and the Syrian issue is one of these). During his meeting with Vladimir Putin in November 2015, he gave the green light for the Iranian cooperation with Russia on Syria. This decision was largely supported by the moderate conservatives who dominate the political life of the country. Thus, immediately after Putin's trip to Tehran the advisor on international affairs to the Supreme Leader, Ali Akbar Velayati (who is deeply involved in the Iranian diplomacy on Syria) formulated the official point of view on Russian-Iranian cooperation that became widely accepted in the Iranian political establishment. He argued that the Iranian authorities are determined to have "continuous and long-lasting cooperation with Russia" on Syria. (9) According to Velayati, "Russian efforts...