Russian and Turkish Foreign Policy Activism in the Syrian Theater/Suriye Sahnesinde Etkin Rus ve Turk Dis Politikasi.

• Author: Ruma, Inan
• Position: Report

Russian Federation and Republic of Turkey have been through a striking redefinition of their foreign policies in the Post-Cold War era. In the 2010s, within the framework of the global economic and increasingly political crisis, they have both been ruled by a mentality obsessed with the ambition to have a great power status. This is rather keeping this status in the Russian case at least as inherited by the Soviet Union while acquiring it in the Turkish case. The transformation of so called Arab Spring protests in Syria into a tragic civil war has been the theatre of these ambitions for both states in highly controversial ways.

This article aims to analysis the turbulent Turkish-Russian relations in recent years, being shaped, more than anything else, under the multi-layered pressures of the Syrian crisis. Its main questions are: What are the key drivers of contention first and then rapprochement? What are the limits of Russian-Turkish reconciliation/cooperation while the factors of contention still prevail in Syria? For that aim, the article will approach Turkey's perception of Russian policies in the Middle East from a historical Turkish-Russian relations perspective of competition vs. cooperation, as well as Russian foreign policy perceptions and actions.

Russian foreign policy has substantially evolved in the post-Cold War era. It was marked by the so called Atlanticism in the 1990s, based on the cooperation with the US, Europe and international organizations. In that process, Russia perceived that it was not treated equally and fairly, particularly in the crisis in the Balkans. Thus, Atlanticism was replaced by Eurasianism. (1) As early as 1992, Russia's first Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev declared that Russia would have "a normal view of national interest" that would be in contrast to ideological Soviet foreign policy (2) Russian elite has apparently perceived in time that Atlanticism was not serving to Russian national interest. Russia's main claim has been to be recognized as a center of power with equal rights in multipolar world and having a say on discussions on the main topics of world politics. (3) Within this framework, geopolitics in measuring power, status and relative position of Russia in terms of hegemonic spatial control has become a crucial aspect of Russian foreign policy (4) In other words, Russian national interest and security have been redefined in terms of geopolitical expansionism rather than the institutional cooperation. (5)

The main engine in this new foreign policy understanding has been the reform of the Russian army. This reform, to end the mass mobilization army of the Tsarist and Soviet regimes, indicated that the threat perception is from the south and coupled with its foreign policy aiming to be regionally focused. (6) Its effects could be observed in Ukraine and Crimea as Near Abroad, and in Syria that showed Russia acquired the capability of military intervention in distant geographies. (7) It seems insightful to remark that Russian elite's perception of the world is still at state-level and they perceive systemic level behaviors, such as those by US, EU and even China, as further advancements of the interests of these particular states. From such state and geopolitics centered perspective, to consider army as the strongest foreign policy asset and military operations as the clearest foreign policy show of force seems as a natural corollary. To note, Russian success in reformation of its army stemmed from the revenue provided by price increases of energy resources that is its main export material.

Russian-Turkish relations have been subject to these developments. Turkish-Russian bilateral relations developed with a constant acceleration from the mid-1990s up to November 24, 2015, downing of the Russian military plane. Turkey and Russia, while considering each other rivals in all neighboring regions in the early 1990s, have changed their perceptions with the aim of establishing a 'new strategic partnership in the new century' and started to come closer with a focus to concentrate on the flip-side of relations. This meant Turkish decision-makers see Moscow as either supportive of Ankara's regional security or as an obstacle. Similarly, Russian authorities consider Turkey as either a locomotive of cooperation or an adversary preventing the advancement of Russian interests in its neighborhood. To briefly cite within this framework, the problems in Turkish-Russian relations in 1990s can be summarized as security, energy, and activity in Eurasia. (8)

Despite all, Turkish-Russian relations have witnessed increasing cooperation beginning with 1990s and then reached a conflictual stage in 2010s. Following its military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, Russia displayed a sort of encirclement that can be perceived as a security threat to Turkey (9) From the other way round, it is observed that Russia got into conflict with countries important to its foreign policy, namely Ukraine, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. (10) As a result, 2010s marked the disagreements between Moscow and Ankara on a number of serious issues such as NATO missile defense shield, the military coup in Egypt, fight against ISIS, conflict in Ukraine, Crimean status referendum and the Syrian civil war. However, both countries tried to transcend these serious disagreements with a strategy called 'compartmentalization' in order to be able to continue the multidimensional cooperation that they started in 2000s. (11)

The Syrian civil war has been the showcase of this new activism in the foreign policies of both countries as well as the controversial character of their bilateral relations, being -at least- yet another apple of discord. Turkey has openly declared its policy for a regime change in Syria and enthusiastically acted with those who wanted to topple down the Ba'ath regime. To the exact opposite, Russia openly declared support to the regime including a full scale military involvement. Within a broader framework, it is argued that Russia seeks to present itself in the Middle East as a pragmatic, non-ideological, reliable, experienced player that is capable of diplomatic and military means. (12) Its involvement in the Syrian civil war signified not only its interests in the Middle East but also the show of force that Russia is as influential a great power as USA. It also displayed that its relations with Turkey is rather of secondary importance. (13)

These adamantly opposite policies of Turkey and Russia in Syria clashed. However, both countries could curiously restore their relations to usual, mostly due to Turkish and American ambivalences. It seems best to analytically outline their story.

Turkish-Russian Relations and Syria: Perspective in Brief

Turkish-Russian bilateral relations developed with a constant acceleration from the mid-1990s. The Turkish authorities have always considered Russia to be a counterweight to the West and have played the Russia card in their negotiations with Washington and Brussels on different issues. Despite promising relations between the two countries, it is not easy to say that the legacy of historic distrust between them has been successfully removed from their political relations. Ankara and Moscow could not manage to establish fully harmonious relations on some basic political issues such as the Kurdish issue, the Cyprus conundrum, or Armenia- related disagreements. Turkey's NATO membership and the complicated the European Union accession process have also been concerns for the Russian side.

In this regard, Turkey's recent cyclical alienation from the US and the EU has been a positive development from Moscow's point of view. Similar to the current political and security environment in the Middle East, Turkey has quarreled with its Western allies especially over Iraq and the Kurdish issue since the early 2000s; and this approach and attitude is shaping Ankara's policy toward Moscow. At the beginning of 2000s, Turkey disappointed US because of Ankara's reluctance to help topple Saddam Hussein, while the US alienated Ankara because of American forces' active engagement with the Kurds without considering Turkish consent. In March 2003, the Turkish parliament's rejection of the deal that would allow US troops to move through Turkey to open a northern front against Saddam, created a major crisis in Turkish-American relations. The decision was a severe blow to the US war plans, which Pentagon was compelled to change while troop ships waited offshore of Iskenderun port. This was a turning point in US-Turkish military relations, which hit rock bottom when the Turkish Special Forces compound in Sulaymaniyah was stormed by their American counterparts. The US Special Forces humiliated the Turkish military by hooding the Turkish soldiers they apprehended. This event left a notable scar in the memory of the Turkish military as well. The current discomfort between CENTCOM and the Turkish Army in Syria and Iraq stems from almost 20 years ago, while the Kremlin often watching carefully.

Similarly, the lack of progress in Turkey-EU relations and problems between Russia and the EU regarding the urgency to fight against extremism, namely by Kurds and Chechens, contributed to changing perceptions. It is now apparent that both parties have started to see each other as potential partners with a capacity to open up bright futures in Eurasia. Indeed, Eurasianism often emerged as an alternative to be discussed in Turkish public opinion whenever there is an unwanted development in the relations with the EU. It seems that its weight is to continue as a result of controversial policies by the US. (14)

What turned friends into the worst of foes overnight in November 2015 with the downing of the Russian plane was mainly the two countries' uncompromising perspectives towards Syria. Syria had been the top political issue for Turkey and Russia since 2012. While Ankara remained dedicated...