Russia's Policy During the 44-Day Karabakh War.

• Author: Jafarov, Nazim
• Position: ARTICLE

Introduction

The 2nd Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan, lasting from September 27 until November 9, 2020, is of critical importance in the South Caucasus in terms of its military results and effects on the regional balance of power. The attitude of international actors, as well as that of Azerbaijan and Armenia during and in the aftermath of the war, constituted a significant dimension for the solution of this conflict. Russia's attitude among the international actors was critical, considering its attitude towards analogous conflicts in the former Soviet geography. The importance of Russia's position stems from its strategic role, both in the emergence of the Karabakh conflict itself and in resolving the conflict. This strategic role was very influential because of Russia's position, first of all, as a mediator in a political resolution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, as well as its contributing role to altering the status quo through military means.

Russia, as one of the co-chairing states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, played an active and leading role in conflict resolution. In military terms, the Russian army, with its 366th regiment, took part on the Armenian side in the very development of this conflict in the early 1990s. In addition, some Russian officials displayed encouraging attitudes to Armenia during the 1st Karabakh War (19921994), and the Russian leadership had managed to halt the so-called 'Four-Day War' between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April 2016. The Kremlin's approach to the 2nd Karabakh War, however, deserves special attention in terms of Russia's roles in the other regional conflicts, namely in the continuation of the Transnistria conflict since 1992, its military attitude towards Georgia in 2008 regarding the Abkhazia and South Ossetia separatist regions, and the annexation of Ukraine's the Crimean Peninsula with its behavior in the Donbas region in 2014.

In this context, Russia's stance in the 2nd Karabakh War, which started with the breach of the ceasefire regime by the Armenian side on September 27, 2020, was unexpected by both Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as by international actors. With reference to previous experiences, the idea that Russia would not allow the war to start or would quickly stop it, in order to maintain the strategic balance kept between the parties, was dominant among the expert communities both before and during the war. In this sense, the policy followed by the Kremlin during the 44-day war has been regarded by many experts with surprise and intrigue. In this article, Russia's role in the war and its efforts to achieve a truce will be evaluated by taking into account the historical dimension of the conflict.

Russia's First Ceasefire Attempts on the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict

Although the roots of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict go back to the second half of the 1980s, until 1991 the Moscow administration attempted to achieve a solution for the conflict rather than merely maintain a ceasefire. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, notwithstanding the skirmishes which increased at the frontline, attempts for a ceasefire and achieving peace continued. The acceleration of the independence process of the (now former) Soviet republics from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Armenia's zeal to annex the Azerbaijani lands set a gradually expanding new dimension to the conflict.

In this context, the first ceasefire accord between Azerbaijan and Armenia in order to suspend the then-emerging crisis was concluded on September 23, 1991, with the mediation of Boris Yeltsin and Nursultan Nazarbayev, then presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan respectively. (1) The armistice declaration of September 23, 1991, stipulated the establishment of a ceasefire between the parties, the acknowledgment by Armenia of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) belonging to Azerbaijan, and the possibility of granting this region some opportunities to govern itself. (2) This declaration signed in the Southern Russian city of Zheleznovodsk was the first ceasefire document in the history of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The Azerbaijani side mobilized Russian and Kazakhstani observers to the frontline region to prove that the ceasefire was not respected by Armenia. (3) Shortly after, on November 20, 1991, a helicopter carrying members of the Azerbaijani government and security officials, two Russian generals, as well as Kazakh and Russian observers and famous journalists was shot down over the area under Armenian occupation. (4) This attack once more caused the failure of the ceasefire process.

The years 1992 and 1993 were a period of intensification for the Armenian attacks and ceasefire attempts imposed from abroad. Following the occupation of the Kalbajar district of Azerbaijan, with the involvement of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the process, the ceasefire efforts became more multidimensional. In particular, with the initiative of President Boris Yeltsin on May 3, 1993, Russia proposed an important peace initiative within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process. Azerbaijan, understanding the Russian pro-Armenian stance at that time, sought the U.S.' participation in the process to balance the situation with a country of equal weight. A trio of Russia, Turkey, and the U.S. was formed, marking the start of the involvement of Turkey in the peace initiative process. Although the proposals of the parties envisaging the evacuation of Kalbajar by the Armenian forces by May 14, 1993, and the continuation of peace negotiations within the framework of CSCE as of May 17, 1993, was accepted by Azerbaijan, Armenia did not agree. After the meeting of Boris Yeltsin and the then Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosyan on May 27, 1993, Armenia changed its attitude and accepted all the offers of the mediators. However, the peace process was then blocked by Armenia claiming that the Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh region did not 'accept' the conditions. Armenia's subsequent overconfidence was probably conditioned by the internal turmoil, i.e., the coup process in Azerbaijan staged by Russian intelligence.

On June 3-4, 1993, a new document that would be a basis for the solution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was prepared during the meeting of the representatives of nine OSCE member states (the U.S., Russia, France, Turkey, Italy, Germany, Czech Republic, Sweden, and Belarus) in Rome. (5) Thus, an 'Emergency Action Plan' envisaging the implementation of the UN Security Council's Resolution 822 and the continuation of the negotiations within the framework of the CSCE was accepted by the CSCE's nine members and presented to the conflicting parties. According to the 'Emergency Action Plan,' as of June 15, 1993, the Armenian side should complete the full evacuation of Kelbajar by June 20, 1993, and as of July 1, 1993, the OSCE's 50 observers had to be deployed to the conflict zone. Then, it was expected to resume the negotiations at the CSCE Minsk Conference, no later than August 7, 1993. Azerbaijan immediately accepted and signed this peace plan of the CSCE 'nines.' Armenia also endorsed this plan but alleged that some 'forces' in the occupied region were out of its control, and therefore demanded another month for the evacuation of Kalbajar district. However, with Armenia increasing its attacks afterward, as well as the internal turmoil intensifying in Azerbaijan, the peace process was undermined. Russian observers visiting the conflict region in June and July of 1993 witnessed the air attacks by Armenian forces over the city of Aghdam.

Between June and November of 1993, Aghdere, Agdam, Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Hora-diz, and Zangilan districts were completely occupied by the Armenian armed forces. In this context, the entire historical Karabakh region, including the former NKAO, had actually been taken over by Armenian armed forces and was out of Azerbaijani control. The UN Security Council adopted four resolutions (822, 853, 874, and 884) regarding the occupation of Azerbaijan's territories by Armenia. In each of the resolutions, the UNSC emphasized that the previous decisions should be implemented, and the Armenian occupation should be immediately and unconditionally ended. (6)

The small-scale attacks, from January to March of 1994, were condoned with the mediation efforts of the OSCE and Russia. Although Russia was a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, Moscow's constant priority was its plan to regain its...