Russia in the Balkans: Great Power Politics and Local Response.

• Author: Samokhvalov, Vsevolod
• Position: ARTICLE - Report

Introduction (1)

This paper sets out to analyze Russia's position in the Balkans. The departure points for the paper are several problematic factors. Firstly, it has often been argued that Russia's identity as a great power shapes its assertive foreign policy. (2) While this might be true in Russia's relations with West, this type of account discards all the cases of collaborative Russian-Western interaction. Secondly, most analyses of Russian foreign policy tend to discard geographic variance in Russian foreign policy. One of the most obvious examples could be the striking contrast between Russia's active opposition to perceived Western expansion in the Black Sea region, as opposed to its indifference to Chinese penetration into Central Asia. (3) Driven on this problematique, the paper will seek to explore the meaning of the Balkan region for Russia's identity. Thirdly, Russian foreign policy is often analyzed by scholars working on Russian foreign policy in various regions; less attention has been paid to the response of these countries to Russian policies. Such a narrow perspective often misses the important input that the countries of the region provide to shaping the outcome of regional politics.

To address this, the paper proceeds as follows. First, it will explore the ideational background of Russian foreign policy and Russian perceptions of the Balkans. I will draw on these findings to understand how certain perceptions constituted possible and thinkable policy options. Additionally, I will seek to identify how Moscow's policies in the region have been shaped by the Russian-Western relations. Secondly, it will analyze Russian foreign policy in the region as it evolved from the 1990s to 2000s. In particular, it will look into the evolution of Russia's attitude toward the region in the context of Russian-Western relations. Thirdly, it will look at the response of the countries of the region to Russian foreign policy, and how this response has shaped the regional constellation in the Balkans. In particular, the paper will consider the political and economic dimensions of this interaction.

Russia and the Balkans: Historical Imaginaries

Many writings have focused on Russia's great power identity to highlight that the Balkans are important for Russia. This definition, while partially true, often implies that Russia pursues policies aiming to support "fraternal" Slavonic or Orthodox nations (Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, and Greeks) in their fight against external oppressors (the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary, Germany, or, in modern days, the U.S. and NATO). (4) The equation between Russia's great power identity and its special relations with the Balkan nations has rarely been properly analyzed. (5) Indeed, one can agree that the Balkans have played an important role in the formation of Russia's identity. In analyses of Russian literature, textbooks, and official documents, the Balkans are most often mentioned as the place through which Russia became a state and a European great power. The Balkans are repeatedly constructed as the place where Russia borrowed all of the sacral features of its stately-existence (Christianization, cultural artefacts, the double-hedged eagle, the title of the Russian Tsars all coming from the Black Sea and Mediterranean). No other part of Russia's vast territory or periphery--not even the Baltics or the huge spaces of Siberia and the Pacific-are mentioned as frequently or given such importance as the Balkans. (6)

At the same time, Russia's great power identity does not necessarily mean that Russian policymakers feel strong moral obligations toward the Balkan nations (some romantic nationalists in Russia might, but not the policymakers in the Kremlin). Indeed, Moscow (or rather St. Petersburg as the capital of the Russian Empire) entered into situational alliances with the Balkan insurgents when it needed their support in its expansion to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. However, such situational alliances did not necessarily mean any special emotional or spiritual bond between Russia and the Balkans nations. As recently acknowledged by a Russian scholar, even Catherine the Great's Greek plan, which has often been construed as Russia's commitment to create an independent Greece, in reality turned into a small-scale military operation under Count Orloff, aimed merely at setting up a naval presence in the region and not waging a major liberation war for Greece. (7) Later on, Russia was prepared to undermine or act against some of these nations when they became too strong, as was the case in Russian-Bulgarian relations in the late 19th-early 20th century. A similar approach was obvious in Stalin's attempt to subordinate Yugoslav leadership after WWII, which resulted in to the Soviet-Yugoslav rift in the early Cold War period. Therefore, one could argue that in the Russian Imperial period or early Soviet era, Moscow relied on the support of the Balkan nations in its pursuit of its policies without necessarily attaching sacred sentiments to this relationship. As a broader generalization, Russia's relationship with the Balkans was rather a function of the primary goals of Russian foreign policy--imperial expansion and great power politics in Europe.

When Russia reappeared on the international scene as a new, independent actor in the early 1990s, its policies in the region were shaped by its relationship with Europe. Unlike previous periods, Moscow was less interested in imperial expansion (in fact, it sought to prevent territorial shrinking and institutional implosion). What Russia was more concerned about in the early 1990s was to remain among the major European great powers, i.e. to be accepted into the club of great powers. While Moscow could not rely on its material capabilities in pursuit of such a status, it could still sustain such claims by contributing or participating in the great power concerts that decided the fates of the Balkan nations. (8) Indeed, Russia still used historical narratives to maintain its place in the great power deliberations about the Balkans.

This modus operandi was openly voiced by senior Russian politicians and diplomats in the Balkans. President Yeltsin argued that Russia should build its policy on the basis of Russia's great power relations with the West. (9) During the war in Bosnia, Vitaliy Churkin, the Russian envoy to the Balkans, made it explicitly clear that Moscow valued its cooperation with the West more highly than the map of Bosnia. (10) In 1995, Russia supported the Dayton Agreement despite the fierce protests of Bosnian Serbs. This policy continued after the much-criticized liberal period of Russian foreign policy (1991-1995). Under the 'statist' foreign minister Evgheniy Primakov, Russia supported and even actively took part in the military operations which effectively squeezed the most popular and radical leaders such as Radovan Karadzic from the Bosnian leadership and deprived them of media resources in 1996-1998. (11) During the NATO intervention in Kosovo, Russia did not seriously consider providing military support to Yugoslavia. Apart from symbolic actions such as the U-turn of the plane by Prime Minister Primakov and some intelligence sharing, Moscow's primary rationale was to maintain its role among the great powers and return the situation to the negotiating table, where Russia would be one of major mediators. Even the 'epic march' of the Russian peace-keeping battalion from Bosnia to the Kosovo airport sought more to secure Russia's presence in the region than to challenge the Western military operation.

While NATO intervention in Kosovo is often mentioned as one of the turning points in Russia-Western relations, such interpretations could not explain why President Putin decided to support the U.S. operation in Afghanistan and help Washington gain basing rights in Central Asia. Moreover, after and despite the Kosovo crisis, President Putin raised the issue of a potential Russia application to NATO in 2002. Similarly, under President Putin, Russia was prepared to accept an independent status for Kosovo--if the West had properly worked with Moscow and allowed sufficient time to prepare the local public opinion. However, the information was leaked from the negotiation room and became public, forcing Moscow to disavow such a possibility. (12) These decisions suggest that Russia is more concerned about being recognized and included in the great power concerts than about negotiating arrangements for the failing states in the Balkans. The sections below suggest that Russia's policy in the Balkans is an outcome of this quest for recognition by the West--recognition that the West has often refused to grant. It reveals the limit where Russia would stop from seeking engagement with the West.

Claiming Great Power Status

The fact that Russia's policies in the Balkans are often defined and envisaged through the prism of Russia-Western relations becomes obvious upon a cursory look at the Russian foreign policy doctrine of 2016. While the document is full of references to the West, the U.S., Europe, and Asia, the Western Balkans are never mentioned. (13) This, according to Russian researchers, reflects the state of interests and opinions about the region. (14) At the same time, one cannot but notice that Russia's indifference to the region is not an unconditional one. As long as the region remains at the margin of the attention of Western powers, Russia's interest in the Balkans is also limited. However, when the West engages in certain actions in or toward the region, Moscow seeks to become 'part of the game,' ideally on equal terms or as a veto player. When the West fails to fully include Russia into their 'great power' decision making or action-taking, Russia adopts disruptive actions against the Western policies in the region.

While some leading experts often argue that Russia has pursued the policies of a spoiler...