Religion, Armed Conflict, and the Quest for "Secular": Mapping Martyrdom in Kashmir.

• Author: Yalcin, Resul

Introduction

In 1947, when India and Pakistan became political realities, Kashmir remained an ambiguity. In Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) the majority of the Muslim population (77 percent in whole of J&K and 92 percent in Kashmir Valley) was ruled by a Hindu Dogra ruler. If geography and religion were to determine the accession, then it would have been feasible for the Maharaja (prince) to accede to Pakistan. (1) Almost all of J&K's major geographical communications and economic links were congruent with the areas of Western Punjab and North West Frontier Province that were to become part of Pakistan. However, despite the Muslim majority, the political inclination of the leadership was uncertain, ambiguous, and divided. The Jammu massacre, the Poonch rebellion, (2) and the subsequent war finally forced India to refer the issue to the UN on January 1, 1948. (3) In response to the Indian complaint, the UN established the Commission for India and Pakistan to play a mediating role in Kashmir. With no respite in fighting between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the UN Security Council adopted a detailed resolution instructing the commission to proceed at once to the Indian subcontinent and establish offices and mediation at the disposal of the governments of India and Pakistan to facilitate the necessary measures by the two governments, both to help establish peace and order as well as a plebiscite, in cooperation with one another and with the commission. (4) However, no resolution has been implemented and the conflict has entered intangibility. A full-blown armed conflict started in 1989, which was preceded by the two wars fought over the territory by India and Pakistan and followed by another war in 1999. (5) The armed conflict in Kashmir has claimed more than 70,000 lives. (6) In the last decade, it has also witnessed huge protests and killings. On August 5, 2019, India abolished Article 370, which had symbolically been a source of political autonomy for Kashmir. (7) The instrument of accession signed between Maharaja and India was conditional. J&K became a special autonomous political unit within India, with only defense, communications, and external affairs to be maintained by the central government in India, while other matters would be the prerogative of the J&K government. Hence J&K had to have a separate flag, a separate constitution, and a separate prime minister and president. (8) An important provision within the J&K was that only the citizens of J&K could own property in the territory. This protected the larger autonomy and prevented any demographic changes. However the provisions of Article 370 were diluted by subsequent Indian governments and the final nail in the coffin was provided by the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, which completely abrogated Article 370 on August 5, 2019. (9)

Problematizing Concepts

The word 'militant' is used to denote an armed rebel, freedom fighter, insurgent, or in local Kashmiri parlance, someone known as a Mujahid. The word 'terrorist' is often used by opponents of militant cause to demonize and dehumanize the individual or group of individuals. While the term 'militant' is loaded with the agency, the word 'terrorist' is devoid of any agency. The local newspapers in Kashmir often used the word 'militant' to mean an individual who had rebelled against the Indian state and picked up weapons to pursue the same case. The Indian state geared up for strong reprisal, particularly after August 2019, against newspapers and journalists. (10) Media was coerced to tow the statist narrative. Hence militancy became terrorism and militants became terrorists. For the purpose of this paper, we have used the terms "militant" and "militancy" to encompass a wide range of references and labels. We have used the term "militant" objectively to mean an individual who challenges the writ of the Indian state in Kashmir and has picked up weapons to pursue the cause of self-determination, plebiscite, freedom from Indian control, merger to Pakistan, or endorse the cause of Islamic polity as against Indian polity.

Another concept that needs elaboration is the concept of secularism. The realm of this paper does not dwell on the genealogical approach adopted by Talal Asad. It focuses more on the benign approach in locating contradictions of Islamism and its confrontations with secularism in the Kashmir context. (11) Secularism has been negotiated by Kashmiris to cater to different frames and references. Secularism is the antithesis of religion in the framework in which secularism is seen as an ideology outside Islam. Secularism is a neutral value in the frame where it is a value that is Universalist. Secularism is used by apologists to survive in Islamophobic frames. Secularism is embraced when the perceived secular powers need to be turned in favor of a cause. The concept of secularism in Kashmir is thus used as a slur, abuse, a virtue, a value, an unnecessary evil, or even a utilitarian construct. The people interviewed during this research also adopted a similar line. (12) Some wanted to be identified with secularism to counter Islamophobia, while others saw secularism as entrenched in the institutions of the modern international system. Others saw it as a utilitarian construct used by those in power, needing to be negotiated by the weak and oppressed. The goal of self-determination entrenched in UN resolutions is an ambivalent concept in Kashmir. Here the paper also introduces the concept of structural or institutional secularism. The legitimacy of the "right to self-determination" is often attributed by militant leaders to the UN resolutions. (13) The invocation of the UN and its resolutions in speeches, pamphlets, and propaganda material of militant leaders signifies the trust and reliance on the concept of "secular," which is often labeled structural secularism. While talking about self-determination and UN resolutions, Kashmiris take on the role of international lawyers to build a case for themselves in international society. While invalidating international society and the UN as failures, Kashmiris step in the shoes of skeptics and victims of the international system, which brags and boasts about justice, peace, and freedom. In general, the use and abuse of secular structuralism stem from the desperation of being weak and oppressed or the strategic need to use everything as deterrence against a powerful enemy.

Militancy in Kashmir

Since its inception in 1989, militancy in Kashmir has been a "symbolic military engagement" rather than a hardcore guerilla military movement. Almost all popular militant commanders in Kashmir establish their charisma in socio-political domains rather than the militant arena. Mohammad Yousuf Shah, aka Syed Salahudin, the supreme commander of the United Jihad Council, has the charisma of a holy saint and is known as pir baba (revered saint) by most of his followers. He is a political science postgraduate and former Jamaat-e-Islami member in charge of the Srinagar district. He was also one of the Muslim United Front (MUF) candidates in the "rigged" elections of 1987. (14)

Burhan Wani, a popular militant commander killed in July 2016, (15) too banked upon what could be termed as "sacred sacrificial charisma." The term "sacred sacrificial charisma" has not been used in its anthropological sense here. When young boys join a militant group in Kashmir, they are not trained for any specific guerrilla warfare, nor do they possess any special weaponry and at times have been devoid of any weapons. The sole stress is on sacrificing life. The rhetoric of martyrdom surpasses the rhetoric of fighting with valor. Thus, the charisma that one would attribute to the militants and their leaders can be classified as sacrificial charisma, and the word 'sacred' is added to it to give it religious attire in the Weberian sense. Burhan Wani was not perceived as a military leader but as a rebel who romanticized militancy, chalking out no special military strategy but using social media to his advantage. The element of sacrifice in his charisma is evident from the 'romanticizing of death' by the breed of militants that he recruited. Huge funerals and last phone calls became more important than military actions. Often when some militants are trapped in encounters, they make phone calls from their mobile phones to their family or friends, which are recorded and shared on social media. In 2015, Burhan Wani had become the face of militancy in Kashmir. The use of social media became a novel mode of recruitment. (16) Photographs of the young Hizbul Mujahideen commander and his group began to be shared on social networking sites. Burhan and his group became household names. Rather than being active participants, like their predecessors, these militants laid back as if waiting for their turn to embrace 'martyrdom.' Most of them died without incurring severe damage to the 'enemy.' The stature and popularity of militants weren't measured by their military actions but gauged by the magnitude of crowds that swelled at their funerals. Certain myth-making machinery began to run and produce loads of sanctity and sympathy for Burhan and martyrdom. The funerals of many of these boys attracted huge crowds. Burhan Wani posed for a photograph with his...