Re-evaluating Iran-Egypt relations: A look at the evolving geopolitical context.

• Author: Monshipouri, Mahmood
• Position: ARTICLE

ABSTRACT Egypt under President Abdel Fatteh el-Sisi appears committed to avoid falling into the contentious Sunni-Shia divide by reconfiguring its security considerations based on the recognition of new circumstances that prioritize stability above sectarian and ethnic identity concerns. While Egypt is unlikely to fundamentally alter its foreign policy anytime soon, largely due to its economic dependency on rich Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, its recalibration of relations with Iran has assumed a new level of importance. The growing threat of violent extremism to destabilize the regional order and state-system is undermining old political alliances. This paper provides a systematic attempt to examine the prospects of Egypt's foreign policy changes and their regional implications, particularly for its economic dependency on Saudi Arabia.

Introduction

The Arab spring, which initially obscured the prominence of religious and ethnic cleavages, has continually underscored sectarian tensions in a region already overrun with many political difficulties. The post-Arab Spring political dynamic, in various countries and contexts, has seen an unprecedented increase in sectarian tensions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Evolving sectarian tensions and identity politics in the MENA region have given rise to renewed threat and opportunity perceptions, prompting a shifting geopolitical context and the configuration of new security considerations. (1) Iran-Egypt relations have thus far managed to escape these sectarian tensions, as Egyptian leaders in the post-Arab uprisings have prioritized the region's stability over entangling Egypt in proxy wars that often signify broader political rivalries in the MENA region.

While Saudi Arabia, which has been the key financial mainstay of the Egyptian regime in the aftermath of the July 3, 2013 popular coup, anticipates further Egyptian cooperation in confronting Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, Egypt's approach to these countries has been to underscore the importance of domestic and regional stability. Egyptian leaders, for example, have made it abundantly clear that any attempt to disrupt the Syrian state could risk bringing to power a radical Islamic group--an eventuality that Cairo deems politically objectionable. (2) Increasingly, as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) expands its domain of control and quasi-authoritarian rule into new territories within Iraq and Syria, (3) as well as attacking Shiite mosques and government-affiliated organs and institutions, Egyptian officials find themselves undeniably on the side of the groups, organizations, countries, and alliances that are fighting ISIS.

The central aim of this paper is to demonstrate that Egypt under President Abdel Fatteh el-Sisi appears committed to avoid falling into the obvious Sunni-Shia schism by reconfiguring its security concerns based on the recognition of new circumstances that foster stability and economics above all sectarian and ethnic identity concerns. While Egypt is unlikely to fundamentally alter its foreign policy conduct, in large part due to its economic dependency on the rich Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, its calculation of relations with Iran has assumed a new level of significance. This paper provides a systematic attempt to examine the evolving prospects for foreign policy innovation and its implications given that Egypt's economic dependency on Saudi Arabia, for better or worse, is likely to endure. Yet at the same time, it is worth noting that the growing threat of violent extremism to the regional order and state-system is undermining the exclusiveness of more familiar and traditional political alliances. The age of terrorism may yet expand the terrain for new possibilities and a greater unity among different actors in tackling the pressing problems and challenges facing the region at large. It is within this context that we examine Iran-Egypt relations in the near future.

Recent History

Following the 2011 Arab uprisings, relations between Egypt and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf changed drastically, as more specialized attention was given to developments inside Egypt and their ramifications for the MENA region. But events took a turn for the worse after Egypt's popular army coup in 2013, which overthrew the democratically elected President Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood government. Both Qatar and Turkey had supported the Muslim Brotherhood's rise to power in Egypt, and both also condemned Sisi's popular military coup. Qatar, which had provided aid to the Morsi government, did not provide aid to the Sisi government. Saudi Arabia seized the opportunity to assert its regional dominance and filled the void of Qatari aid by offering generous assistance to Egypt. Thus, Saudi Arabia also played a mediating role between Egypt and Turkey, as Ankara continued to oppose the Sisi regime while accommodating the Qatari regional approach. (4) The Saudi mediating effort came to a standstill, and the longstanding differences between the two countries over Syria became noticeably obvious when Egypt voted in favor of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 12545 on October 8, 2016 by Russian draft proposal. On the same day, France submitted a proposal to the UNSC to establish a no-fly zone over Aleppo to protect civilians. Russia vetoed this proposal, and subsequently submitted its own proposal that all the "terrorists" and their organizations be destroyed in Aleppo before a ceasefire could begin. Egypt supported both resolutions. (5)

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During the Mubarak (Egypt) and early Ahmadinejad (Iran) administrations, rapprochement between Egypt and Iran would have seemed inconceivable. However, after the destabilizing fallout of the Arab Spring Revolutions, rapprochement became an increasingly likely possibility, as the Syrian crisis and poor economic conditions in Egypt revealed certain significant overlaps in the political agendas of the Egyptian and Iranian governments. It is thus critical to illustrate the potential for reconciliation between the government in Egypt under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the Iranian government. The new direction of foreign policy in the Middle East due to the Arab uprisings, and the mutual Egyptian-Iranian inclination to suppress Muslim Brotherhood influence has helped push the notion of this reconciliation forward.

Nevertheless, President Donald J. Trump's victory and the resurgence of populism in the West might hinder complete rapprochement between both countries, as the West and Saudi Arabia may now offer Sisi a much more strategic and needed partnership, in the form of an economic, political, and defense package, than Iran can offer. Regardless of future Western intervention, Tehran and Cairo have taken significant steps on the path to rapprochement over the past five years, and their common agenda allows them to continue exploring the beginnings of a partnership, or at least a united front against Islamic extremism in the region.

Egypt's apparently shared interests with the Syrian government to contain and defeat violent extremist movements could potentially provide grounds for improved relations with Iran. In this regard, radical extremist, Sunni, and Wahhabi-Salafi violence, destabilization, and terrorism pose as great a threat to Egypt as they do to Iran. Muhammad Said al-Idris, head of Arab and regional studies at the Cairo-based Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, underscores the importance of Iran-Egypt relations by noting that, "If Egypt wants to be active in the heart of the Middle East as a returning regional power, then collaborating with Iran needs to be on its agenda. This collaboration should not be limited only to Iran and Egypt, but it should include issues such as regional security as well." (6) A united front against extremism would mutually benefit both countries and serve as a starting point for a potential reconciliation.

In the sections that follow, a brief history...