Quo Vadis Turkey-GCC States Relations? A Turkish Perspective.

• Author: Oktav, Ozden Zeynep
• Position: ARTICLE - Gulf Cooperation Council

The startling photograph of Donald Trump, King Salman bin Abdulaziz and Abdel Fattah al-Sisi placing their hands on a glowing orb at the summit in Riyadh in May 2017 and the following Qatar crisis clarified how the cards are being reshuffled in the Gulf. Trump's visit to Riyadh, during which an arms deal amounting to nearly $110 billion was made with Saudi Arabia, had four purposes. First was to exclude Iran from the region, second was to strengthen Saudi Arabia's role in the Gulf and Middle East. Third was to boost Israeli stakes in the face of the increasing influence of the Russian Federation and Iran in Syria. Fourth was to challenge the alliance of Iran, Turkey and Russia as they came together seven times in Astana for peace making in Syria.

Developments following Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia, specifically the Qatar crisis left no room to doubt that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were directing their alliance with Washington against Ankara. Therefore, Turkey's efforts to continue cordial relations with these two Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states remained fruitless. This article will focus on the reasons why Turkey's relations with the GCC states, primarily Saudi Arabia and the UAE, (1) have been increasingly strained, even though only a few years ago relations were at full speed with the Turkish-GCC Strategic Dialogue and ongoing Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. After a brief historical background of Turkey-GCC relations, the article will focus on the problem areas between Turkey and Saudi Arabia and the UAE especially after the onset of the Syrian crisis. The Qatar crisis and its impact on Turkey and the GCC states will be among the concerns of the study as the crisis showed the changing parameters of the GCC security understanding and brought the ideological, strategic differences between Turkey and the GCC to the surface. Last but not least, the fragmentation within the GCC and its impact on Turkey-GCC relations will be analyzed.

Background

Over the last decade, tectonic changes, such as the 9/11 incidents, occupation of Iraq, the outburst of the Arab Spring and the Syrian crisis fostered a gradual rapprochement between Ankara and the Gulf monarchs. Put differently, with the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime which resulted in the empowerment of the Shia majority of Iraq and rise of Iranian influence, Turkey's role as a counterbalance to rising Shiism became crucial in the eyes of the Gulf monarchies, principally Saudi Arabia, as Riyadh had a twofold aim. One was to create "a sort of Sunni alliance to oppose the so-called 'Shia arc,' that from Iran through Iraq extended up to Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah." (2) Second was to avoid the spillover effect of rising Shiism on its Shia minority concentrated in the oil-rich eastern provinces.

From Turkey's perspective, the driving motives behind Ankara's enthusiasm to build relations with the GCC states were mostly the economic ones, as Turkey was in need of new markets, foreign capital and diversification of energy resources. (3) In this context, as Talbot noted that "trade tremendously increased. While in 2002 the Turkish trade volume with the Gulf monarchies as a whole amounted to $1.49 billion (1.7 percent of total trade), in 2012 it reached $19.6 billion (5.0 percent of Turkish global trade)." (4) In 2005, both sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Manama, Bahrain, to support economic cooperation, encourage exchange of technical expertise and information, improve economic relations, and initiate negotiations to establish free trade zones. (5) It is also noteworthy that Turkey and Saudi Arabia signed the Security Cooperation agreement in February 2005 which included cooperation against the international terrorism and drug smuggling. A Turkish scholar, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu's election to the chairmanship of the Islamic Conference Organization became an impetus for the improving bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and after a 40 years interval King Abdullah visited Turkey in 2006 and 2007. (6) The President of Turkey at that time, Abdullah Gul, responded with an official visit to Saudi Arabia in 2009. That the GCC Foreign Ministers declared Turkey as strategic partner on September 2008 was a turning point in Turkey-GCC relations, since Turkey has become the first country outside the Gulf to be given the status of strategic partner of the GCC. (7)

In addition, the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in Jeddah, December 2011 laid the foundation of a regular dialogue at the ministerial level (8) between the two parties. From Turkey's perspective, it was an important step taken on the way of building institutionalized relations with the Gulf countries. Throughout the 2000s, Turkey has become an increasing magnet for Gulf-based investors while the GCC region, led by Saudi Arabia became one of the leading providers of energy to Turkey. When looking closely, however, latest developments following the Syrian crisis have had a negative impact on creeping relations between the GCC states and Turkey and led to the emergence of new problem areas between the two sides. Put differently, Turkey's ultimate preference for the Russian-Iranian alternative for the sake of coping with the PKK affiliated PYD/YPG, rather than containing Iranian expansionism in the region led to the deterioration of the existing problem areas between Turkey on one hand, and Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates on the other.

Problem Areas between Turkey-GCC States

The diverging interests became most evident after the fall of Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi in Egypt in July 2013 when the Saudis and Emiratis sided with putschist Sisi and were angered by Turkish (and Qatari) patronage of Morsi. Erdogan, who was puzzled by Saudi backing of the coup in Egypt, openly asked Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, "How could a country claiming to uphold Islam and Sharia support the overthrow of an elected Islamist president (Mohammed Morsi) who came to power after fair elections?" (9) Turkey's vocal insistence that Morsi should return to power and then Turkish Prime Minister, Erdogan's harsh rhetoric towards the interim government in Egypt, however, endangered Turkey's efforts to build energy and trade based relations with the region. (10) For example, the suspension of the UAE's $12 billion investment in a coal-based energy project in Turkey had a cold shower effect on Ankara at a time when direct exports to Syria and Egypt--and via Turkey to other countries--were steadily declining. Ankara, being alarmed by the probability that Saudi Arabia might have played a part in the cancellation of the UAE investment, was afraid of losing the complete support of the Gulf capital. (11) In addition, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait's decision to provide financial aid, of $12 billion to Egypt's military rulers, prompted Ankara to mend the bilateral relations. (12) The rift over Egypt showed the limits of Turkey's norm diffusion policies, such as standing against the putschists in Egypt, as economic priorities rather than politics have shaped the Turkey-GCC states relations.

Leaving aside economic reasons, Ankara also wanted to mend the relations for strategic reasons as it viewed the GCC states as a counterweight to Iran, whose influence in Syria and Iraq as a warrior against Sunni extremism in the form of ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham), had been increasing since 2015. For example, Erdogan openly stated: "Iran is trying to dominate the region to chase ISIS" "Could this be allowed? This has begun annoying us, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. This is really not tolerable and Iran has to see this." (13) In an interview with the France 24 TV channel in 2015, Erdogan took an open stance against Iran by supporting Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen and said that "Iran and the terrorist groups must withdraw" from Yemen. "Iran is trying to chase ISIS from the region only to take its place." (14)

Turkey's ultimate preference for the GCC alternative over the Iranian one in the region was partly due to dramatic change in Saudi foreign policy after King Salman bin Abdul Aziz's ascendance to power in January 2015. King Salman's decision to reconstitute an alliance with Muslim Brotherhood against Iran, (15) while previously in March 2014 the Kingdom under Abdullah had designated the Muslim Brotherhood a "terrorist" group, led to a rapprochement with Turkey. In other words, the common threat perceptions, i.e. the Iranian nuclear deal and rise of the ISIS, had a gluing effect in bilateral relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Both defended the idea that moderate and mainstream political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular should have been supported against ISIS whose brutality had promoted the status of Iran in the eyes of the West as a warrior against the Sunni radicalism, ISIS, in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

The Kingdom spearheaded the creation of an 'anti-terrorism' coalition together with 34 other, mainly Sunni, countries including Turkey and Egypt in December 2015 to confront Iran and ISIS. However, this move of Riyadh remained fruitless because, as many analysts alleged, Saudi Arabia's anti-terrorist alliance was not a real one and it only served to the sharpening of the split between Sunnis and Shias. (16) In parallel with the failure of Riyadh's leadership to create an anti-terrorism coalition and to adopt a policy of tolerance toward Muslim Brotherhood, the Jordanian Brotherhood's Hamam Saeed, and other moderate Sunni groups, Turkey's Syria policy also appeared to shift. Erdogan implied that "Turkey could potentially accept a transition process, with the Assad regime temporarily...