Nuclear deterrence, missile systems and the security of Turkey in the "new" Middle East.

• Author: McLean, Wayne

A deterrence-based analysis of Turkey's security can provide descriptive clarity in a complex region. The common position when approaching Turkey is that the U.S. nuclear umbrella, as a result of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership, is the ultimate guarantor of the security of Turkey. Since 1952, this collective arrangement has provided Turkey with a great deal of stability and continuity. This stability is in sharp contrast with its neighboring states, such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Georgia, who do not possess this guarantee, and who all have been the focus of security competitions. With this in mind, it seems puzzling on the surface that Ankara is prepared to antagonize its key security partners by engaging China to jointly develop an air and missile defense system.

This analysis suggests that Ankara's decision to engage China on missile technology is actually a prudent move, and is a justifiable attempt to maximize the security of Turkey during a period of transition. This claim is based on a number of new and emerging regional concerns and issues. There are genuine concerns about the U.S.'s long-term commitment to extended deterrence. China has a growing Middle Eastern footprint, while Russian revisionism seeks opportunities to escape perceived encirclement by NATO and its allies. At the regional level, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt contribute to a restless region, which problematizes the Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) vision of Turkey at the top of the regional political and security hierarchy. Another important variable is changing technology. This helps explain Turkey's desire to reconsider its threat environment, given that rapid advances in technology are breaking down traditional notions of deterrence. For example, highly technical systems, such as missile shields are now more accessible and cost effective for smaller actors, such as Israel and its Iron Dome project.

Consequently, this period of geopolitical change and technological advancement presents Turkey with a number of difficult choices. Correspondingly, this article considers three options available to Turkey's strategic policymakers, using technology and the emerging regional order as the key variables. The first option assesses the extent of Turkey's participation in the NATO missile defense system, set to go online in 2018. This provides both defense and deterrence because of NATO's collective defense agreements and the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The second option assesses the development of an indigenous missile defense capability primarily controlled by Turkey. In this scenario, Turkey retools a Chinese system as part of the T-LORAMIDS (Turkish Air Force Long-Range Air-and Missile-Defense System) program, such as the HQ-9/FD-2000, to suit Ankara's specific requirements. There are a number of advantages to this option, including placing the ultimate control of defensive matters in the hands of the Turkish administration, while also providing the ability to hedge security options between NATO and other regional actors. The third option is where Turkey attempts to become a "latent" nuclear state by acquiring the skills, technology, and materials to proliferate as a hedge against a regional nuclear arms race in the future. This is less likely, but worthy of consideration in the context of Turkey's nascent civilian nuclear program.

The Security of Turkey, Deterrence, and Shared Interests

The security of Turkey has relied on NATO, and by extension, the U.S. nuclear umbrella for security since 1952. While this has provided advantages in terms of cost, stability, and deterrence over the past sixty years, it has also created a number of deeply embedded paradoxes around the security of Turkey. A primary concern is that Turkey has never possessed full control of its own security under the NATO alliance. Because top-level decision-making around missile and nuclear issues occurs in Washington, Ankara's concerns are often secondary. Indeed, Mustafa Kibaroglu identifies the notion of "dugmeye kim basacak? (who will press the button)" as critical to Turkish policy makers. (1) For example, using the NATO missile shield to prevent an attack on Turkey from either Israel or Iran could clash with U.S. interests. Consequently, this arrangement suits Turkey's wider security agenda only as long as Ankara and Washington's interests closely align.

The U.S.-Turkish relationship has a number of historical examples where interests have clashed, most notably during the Cuban Missile Crisis. For example, in 1961, Jupiter missiles, ostensibly installed with the logic of providing security to Turkey, provided, in practice, none. This is because the missiles and their technology were outdated when installed and therefore had few military benefits for Turkey's immediate security. Their deterrence value was mainly psychological. (2) More importantly, this placed U.S. interests above those of Turkey. If the logic of nuclear deterrence failed, Turkey was to be the first casualty of misperception or misinterpretation, not the U.S. This created a scenario where strategic decision-making was effectively isolated from Ankara. In short, Washington's wish to uphold the vague principles around the Monroe Doctrine--the foreign policy doctrine designed to keep external forces out of America's sphere of influence--trumped Turkish strategic concerns. If anything, Turkey's submission to U.S. security logic allowed their territory to be become a buffer zone, where U.S. strategic planners could distinguish between tactical or full-blown nuclear war.

While the Cuban missile crisis provided evidence of minimal Turkish input into high-level security affairs around deterrence, issues around Cyprus demonstrated how capricious U.S. security objectives could be. Here, in 1964, Turkish elites viewed intervention in Cyprus as critical, firstly, because of rising domestic concerns about the treatment of Turkish Cypriots and, secondly, because of the important geostrategic position of the island in the Mediterranean. This created an environment where Turkey viewed Greek control of the island as a core security threat. However, this contrasted with the U.S. position. Their interests preferred stability regardless of Turkey's regional considerations, with the end goal of avoiding great power competition on the small, but strategically placed island. To this end, the U.S. presented the Turkish Leader, ismet inonu with the so-called "Johnson letter." The blunt diplomatic telegram, from President Lyndon Johnson, privately stated in stark diplomatic language that the U.S. would not provide support in the case of a related Soviet attack if Turkey carried out an intervention in Cyprus. (3)

The first major post-Cold War action--the First Gulf War--again demonstrated the awkward security relationship, and the problem of relying on U.S. deterrence in the emerging unipolar environment. While initiatives such as the Nunn-Luger Act prevented any post-Soviet states from maintaining their nuclear capabilities, advances in technology elsewhere meant that a number of smaller states, including Iraq, had gained ballistic missile capabilities. Turkey's vulnerability in this new environment was apparent during 1991 when NATO was slow in providing protection to Turkey against possible Iraqi ballistic and chemical missile attacks. More pertinently, this occurred during a period when intelligence suggested that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction. Though the nuclear program was later discovered to be in its infancy, Turkey was sufficiently concerned to look beyond the U.S. and NATO for assistance. For instance, in 1997, it signed a defense-cooperation agreement with Israel with the goal of participating in the Arrow ballistic missile defense system, although the project faltered after U.S. objections.

The corollary is that Turkey has accepted this junior position in the U.S.-Turkish relationship over the past sixty years because of a lack of material capabilities consistent with its key security position. During the Cold War, Turkey's GDP per capita was less than half the European average and the lowest of all NATO members. (4) As a result, expensive security moves, such as the development of sophisticated indigenous systems were unrealistic. Pursuing them risked a fragile Turkish economy, which, in turn, risked exacerbating a number of problematic domestic debates. The result was general subservience to the U.S. relationship, which restricted Turkish regional activism to institutional and normative frameworks. These include frameworks such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the EU accession process. Thus, overall, general instability in the Middle East, combined with poor material capabilities, has historically provided incentives to maintain loyalty to U.S. objectives.

Since 2001, though, this climate had changed. Turkey's accession to the EU is on hold, while their economic fortunes have changed. While the EU struggles to manage a debt crisis with Turkey's neighbor, Greece, Turkey's GDP in terms of PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) has tripled since 2001 thanks to strong economic growth over the past decade. (5) Despite this, economic successes have accompanied a more complex security environment. Notably, Russia has signaled a desire to revise its declining security position in the post-Cold War period. Hence, it is increasingly aggressive and wary of U.S. actions within its perceived sphere of influence. The U.S., for its part, has been reluctant to engage Russia, demonstrated by their tepid responses to Russian actions in Ukraine. Furthermore, U.S. responses to ISIL and the Syrian War, occurring on the Turkish border, have lacked dynamism. Obama's failure to back up the threat of intervention after Syrian President Assad used chemical weapons is instructive in this respect. This increasingly apathetic U.S. attitude to the Middle East...