A new challenge for Turkey: civil war in Syria.

• Author: Guney, Nursin Atesoglu
• Position: COMMENTARY

The Arab Spring and its Aftermath

Although it is a truism that the sudden outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 was unexpected, some IR scholars believe that the signs of an imminent bottom-up revolt had been present in the Middle East at the beginning of the new millennium. (1) The uprisings were rapid and intense, a near simultaneous explosion of popular unrest across an Arab world which was united and galvanized by a shared transnational media and bound by a common identity. The use of new information and communications technologies--including satellite television, the internet and cheap mobile phones--empowered and connected the people of the Middle East to such an extent that the Arab street, with the effect and spread of a third wave of democratization (2), has become a new strategic player in the politics of the region.

The Arab uprising erupted a mere two and a half years ago within the context of a decade-old 'cold war' that polarized the region into an 'axis of resistance' led by Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and (until recently) Hamas, and a 'moderate axis' consisting of Arab states aligned with the US and Israel. (3) This new 'cold war' weighed regional interactions in a classical bipolar fashion that ignored Arab public opinion and thus actually created conditions for the Arab Street could express its rage against its autocratic leaders.

Over the last two and a half years, the reality of the Arab Spring uprisings has led to different outcomes across the entire Middle East, whereby varying typologies of transitions have developed. The hope and belief that the Arab revolts would usher in democracies now seems to have vanished among the international community. (4) Although there was optimism when events unfolded in Tunisia that the Arab awakening would head in the 'right' direction, this year's tragic events in Egypt, Syria, and to a certain extent Tunisia and elsewhere, have proved that there is also a very real possibility of a return to retrenched dictatorships, rejuvenated monarchies or even the collapse of the state and resultant civil wars. The uncertainty in the region coupled with popular unrest and demands for better economic and political governance has accelerated the conditions required for an intensification of regional and global competition in which new alliances and rivalries may develop. The present situation of intense flux has undoubtedly changed the nature of power politics amongst both Arab and non-Arab actors in the region, as well as further afield. The pace of adaptation to the new reality of the power of the Arab street has made the struggle for influence among regional and extra-regional actors more challenging than ever, to the degree that some regional heavyweights--such as Iran, Israel and Al-Qaeda--have for some time been left behind in the face of newly emerging influences in the region. Now that this struggle for influence has increased in complexity, the notion of two diametrically opposed axis pitted against one another in the Middle East seems increasingly redundant. The conditions of alignment in these previously defined axes are no longer determined by rigid ethnic or religious identities but by geopolitical concerns.

In the aftermath of NATO's intervention in Libya and consequent Russian concerns, different types of cooperation and conflict have emerged during the Syrian civil war and the Egyptian coup between two opposing axes: the Iranian-led axis that has received Russian political backing much of the time and the broad US-led coalition. The unpredictable conditions of the Middle East under the impact of the stalled Arab Spring have also generated opportunities for issue-based cooperation not only between rival external powers but also among competing regional powers. (5)

Today, it is counter-revolutionary movements that have benefitted from the power vacuum in certain Middle Eastern states as a result of the stalled Arab Spring. (6) In some places, these marginal, radical groups have stepped in and countered popular desire for good governance in favor of an extremist agenda. (7) This is the current picture, for instance, in the northern part of Syria, (8) as well as for other regions of the Middle East. Some regional states have also benefitted from the continuing struggle to fill the power vacuum and have thus extended regional rivalries with the help of proxies operating on the ground in those countries plagued by conflict. The 'incompleteness' of the revolution in Egypt and the resulting gap between popular desire for better living conditions and the reality (and apparent failure) of the Muslim Brotherhood's governance led to a forceful military takeover. (9)

The emergence of non-traditional security concerns is re-configuring regional alliances and increasing the likelihood of issue-based cooperation. Since these new security threats have found legitimate ground in failing states like Syria, they have rapidly become a great concern for some of the members of opposing axes. In this regard, the portrayal of the recent use of chemical weapons in Syria...