Mr. Trump, post nuclear ban treaty, NATO's nuclear weapons in Europe are obsolete.

AuthorKibaroglu, Mustafa
PositionCOMMENTARY - Essay

ABSTRACT This commentary makes the case as to why the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that have been stationed in Europe since the 1960s should be removed, and how this could be done in the most effective way under the presidency of Donald Trump. It concludes with a summary of the expected benefits of this move, and a reminder that the costs of continued muddling through are substantial.

Introduction

Many people in Europe, including Turkey, wonder why there are still some 200 U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil, especially after the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty was adopted by a majority of states in the world on July 7, 2017. Nuclear weapons will become obsolete, and among the most obvious are the Cold War leftovers lingering in Europe. These B-61 nuclear gravity bombs were stationed in Europe during the Cold War to deter the Soviet bear. While this extended nuclear deterrent may have made sense (arguably) in the "good old days" of the Cold War, most pundits nowadays agree that at least from a military point of view these weapons are irrelevant. (1) Or should we say "agreed"?

The Ukraine crisis does not help our case, at least at first sight. "The prospects for nuclear reductions in Europe are bleak," as Lukasz Kulesa argued. (2) Some argue that Russia's invasion of Crimea and its provocations in the Eastern part of Ukraine prove that the threat remains, and that Russia should be contained and deterred as it was during the Cold War. Those who fear the Russian threat point out that such deterrence should include a nuclear component, preferably as close as possible to the Russian border. (3)

To put everything into perspective, it should be acknowledged that even before the crisis in Ukraine, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons was opposed by the Eastern European NATO member states, especially the Baltic States. This issue was at the heart of the internal deliberations of the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review in 2011-2012. At that time, Germany asked for withdrawal, while the Baltic States, supported by France, preferred the status quo. Others held in-between positions. Because NATO had agreed to decide with consensus, kicking the can was the result. For those who had already been skeptical of the idea of withdrawal before the crisis, the issue is now dead. We argue that they may be wrong; and, President Trump may prove them wrong.

The cost-benefit calculus of keeping the Cold War weapons in Europe did not change fundamentally, even after the crisis in Ukraine. Just as the cavalry became grotesque in an age of armored vehicles, the remaining U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are an anachronism dating back to the high days of the Cold War. It is as if the U.S. forgot to take them away. These weapons of mass destruction in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey (4) are becoming a liability on a variety of fronts.

Despite substantial efforts by different host nations to send them back, the NATO decision-making machinery has proved itself incapable of overcoming niches of resistance, mostly from outside the host nations. There is no consensus on withdrawing them, but at the same time there is no consensus on keeping them. This inertia is a recipe for escalating internal political frictions within the Alliance, (5) and it is all the more problematic in an age where nuclear weapons are being banned. The current stalemate may be seen as an example of what Donald Trump had in mind when he repeatedly--both as a presidential candidate and as president--called NATO "obsolete."

Russia has a point in asking the United States to withdraw its remaining tactical nuclear weapons back to its own territory before starting up bilateral negotiations, as Moscow had already removed its nuclear weapons from the Central European states two decades ago. Waiting for a NATO consensus provides an ideal pretext for the nuclear czars at NATO headquarters and their colleagues in the defense ministries who prefer a status quo because of grooved thinking and parochial interests. President Trump will not abolish NATO, but he might shake up the organization by limiting U.S. military contribution to the Alliance. The withdrawal of the last U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe would perfectly fit his narrative.

This article makes the case as to why these weapons should be removed, and how this could be done in the most effective way. It concludes with a summary of the expected benefits of this move, and a reminder of the substantial costs of continued muddling through.

Why Should the Remaining U.S. Nuclear Weapons Be Removed from Europe?

First of all, weapons of mass destruction are weapons of the past. Modern warfare takes into account the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, such as proportionality and non-discrimination. The world, including the U.S., only started to take the war in Syria serious once chemical weapons were used. For the same humanitarian reasons, when the United States intervened militarily in Afghanistan and Iraq, it aimed to limit the number of civilian and military casualties on both fronts. Such limitation and discretion are by definition impossible with nuclear weapons, which is also the major reason why atomic weapons have not been used since 1945. (6) Each day the anti-nuclear norm has become stronger.

For the same reason, a majority of states in the world are now banning nuclear weapons. That goal fits the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 and is the cornerstone of today's global nuclear...

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