Migration Management in Turkey: Discourse and Practice/Turkiye'de Goc Yonetimi: Soylem ve Pratik.

• Author: Luleci-Sula, Cagla

Introduction (*)

Discourse and the practice approaches to security are widely utilized in the study of migration and border management. While the former defines security as 'a speech act' claimed by the elites, the latter searches for hints of security in bureaucratic practices of multiple security agents. According to the discourse approach, security is an intersubjective act, socially constructed via language. (1) The practice approach argues that routinized practices also have a potential to construct emergency issues and insecurities. (2) Hence, security is not only a speech act but is also constituted by everyday practices.

Empirical analyses of migration and security in Turkey tend to focus either on discourse or practice. (3) While the former analyzes securitization in elite discourse, the latter emphasizes insecurities of immigrants that stem from daily practices. Yet, the literature lacks studies that focus both on the discourse and practices of in/security in Turkey. Aiming to fill in this gap, we ask: " To what extent are the discourse and practice of migration management in Turkey parallel to each other?" We observe that while the political discourse is framed with reference to Turkey's humanitarian and civilizational responsibilities, the field of practice is mostly shaped by a logic of security. Inspired by the practice approach, we argue that it is not possible to capture insecurity by only analyzing the presence of 'security talk' since states tend not to frame migration openly as a security issue in their discourse. Practices in the field are part of the formation of insecurities as well. Therefore, we emphasize the significance of in/security practices while not disregarding the power of discourse. (4)

In the first section, we look at Turkey's political discourse by analyzing the official speeches of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (5) between 2014, when he became the president, and 2020. (6) The official website of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey provides transcripts of 727 speeches of Erdogan. We selected 213 speeches according to three criteria: speeches that are 1) longer than 1500 words, 2) include reference to migration, 3) include one of the following keywords: migration (goc), migrant (gocmen), refugee (multeci), asylum-seeker (siginmaci), guest (misafir) and border (sinir). We analyzed each speech separately and identified four major themes: migration as a 1) 'burden', 2) 'responsibility', 3) justification for transborder operations', and 4) 'fault line in Turkey-EU relations'. We find that between 2014 and 2016, Erdogan most frequently referred to Turkey's burden and responsibilities in hosting migrants, while in the post-2016 era, he introduces new themes to his discourse: migration as a justification for transborder operations and a fault line in Turkey-EU relations. In the second section, we examine Turkey's migration practices in three groups: legal challenges, agents and relations of policing, and surveillance. Our analysis starts with the implementation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), the implementation of Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement, and the issuing of Temporary Protection Regulation in 2014 all of which transformed the field of practices significantly.

Discourse on Migration

Since the first post-conflict refugee flows from the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, the Turkish government has framed its policy mainly around a humanitarian responsibility in the region. On numerous occasions, President Erdogan categorized Turkey's citizens as ensar and the migrants as muhacir. (7) This framing is often followed by a reference to Turkey as a humanitarian actor protecting those who suffer from the conflicts and constant threats in their home countries. To see how this framing has evolved until 2020, we identify the most frequently appearing themes.

Until mid-2016, President Erdogan most frequently referred to two themes: migration as a 1) burden and 2) responsibility (see Table 1). We delve into each theme and identify several subcategories to further examine Erdogan's discourse. The following table summarizes the number of references to each:

President Erdogan frames migration policies as a burden that the country is motivated to carry without discriminating against any of the migrants, but also emphasizes the lack of support from the international community. He frequently talks about Turkey's motivation to carry the burden that comes with the country's proclaimed responsibilities. This 'burden' refers not to an existential threat to the state or society, but rather it aims to remind the international community that immigrants come with certain economic needs that should be met through a principle of responsibility sharing. While talking about Turkey's motivations, Erdogan also stresses that Turkey has a "no discrimination" approach and "humanitarian responsibility" (See Table 1). The following statement exemplifies this emphasis:

"I state and underline this: here is a Turkey that does not interrogate the ethnic origin, faith, sect of those who come from Iraq and Syria, but instead a Turkey that opens its doors, feeds, provides clothes, and shelters all those in need (...) without any discrimination, sees human beings just as humans and as life." (10)

One third of all references towards Turkey's motivation either goes to 'protector of victims' (36%) or to 'civilizational-religious duties' (35%). For instance, in 2015 Erdogan openly said: "this nation will never stand by the oppressors but will continue to stand with the oppressed and the victims." (11)

Most of the references where Erdogan talks about the burden of migration, he continues with how that burden is carried by Turkey (40%) and unshared by others (60%). Depending on the occasion, Erdogan often refers to the burden unshared by the world, the EU and Europe, the West and the Arab League. Most of these references are followed by a message that even if no one shares the burden, Turkey will continue on its own path because of its responsibilities:

"Hey World, hey West; when it comes to talking, you talk about women's rights, yet what have you done about the rights of the two million people that seek refuge in my country? (...) Do you know how many asylum-seekers are there in the whole West, In Europe? 150.000. How many do we have? Here, 2 million. The facts speak for themselves. So where does this [Turkey's share of the burden] come from? [We do] this as a practice due to our civilizational understanding,

culture, belief." (12)

The above-mentioned themes in Turkey's migration discourse continued steadily and without interruption until mid-2016, when President Erdogan added two new themes to his framing of migration. First, referring to the EU-Turkey Statement (March 18th, 2016), Erdogan stresses migration as a 'fault line' in Turkey-EU relations. Second, referring to Turkey's transborder operations in Syria, Erdogan starts to utilize the unshared burden of migration as a 'justification' for transborder operations. (13) The following table summarizes Erdogan's post-2016 discourse on migration:

After the EU-Turkey deal and the start of Turkey's transborder operations, references criticizing the EU on the shape of Turkey-EU relations intensified. Disagreement over migration management policies turned into fault lines in Turkey-EU relations (See Table 2). Turkey, while defining itself as a humanitarian actor, places the EU on the opposite side with severe criticism on its attitude towards migration. President Erdogan criticized the EU for not keeping its promises, although Turkey does its part by reducing irregular migration towards Europe and by hosting millions of refugees. These 'unkept promises' stem from different political and legal channels of Turkey-EU cooperation, such as the Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement of 2013, the Turkey-EU Joint Action Plan of 2015, and he Turkey-EU Statement of 2016. Erdogan emphasizes EU's promises on the opening of new chapters in Turkey's accession negotiations, visa-free travel for Turkish citizens, increasing financial assistance to support Turkey in meeting visa liberalization needs, and EU funding for accommodation of immigrants and refugees that are kept in or returned to Turkey. (14) Erdogan criticizes the EU's limited performance in managing the refugee flows and the EU's role on the state of Turkey-EU:

"In the last one year we have developed a significant cooperation framework with the EU. We gave reciprocal promises to each other accepting that we can overcome this problem by sharing the burden and responsibility. In the last couple of months, with the precautions that we took under this framework we managed to bring down the number from 7000 irregular migrants a day in October 2015, to approximately 50. These figures indicate that Turkey successfully fulfilled its promises as part of its deal with the EU. However, the EU did not keep the promises given to

us in the deal." (15)

Erdogan's framing of the migration issue as a fault line in Turkey-EU relations is often followed by various messages that the EU (and sometimes the West) has overlooked its humanitarian values, that the EU fears migration flow, that if the EU decides to continue with this approach Turkey may reopen its borders, and that the EU needs Turkey as well (See Table 2). By early 2016, President Erdogan warned that the number of migrants had become an issue getting beyond any country's capabilities to deal with alone: "the situation has become a burden that can no longer be carried by Turkey alone with its own capabilities." (16) After a couple of months, in mid-2016, President Erdogan stressed that since the international community continues to not share the burden, Turkey will act alone:

"Here, do we have 3 million refugees in our country? Yes. So, does any support come from the world for this? No. They only talk, they only make promises. (...) We said that...