Migration as a Leverage Tool in International Relations: Turkey as a Case Study/Uluslararasi Iliskilerde Bir Kaldirac Unsuru Olarak Goc: Turkiye Ornegi.

• Author: Kaya, Ayhan

Introduction

This article depicts the ways in which various domestic and international political drivers have so far impacted Turkey's migration policy and relationship with the EU. In doing so, the article will position migration-related political debates in the heart of the analysis, revolving around the changing position of Turkey in international relations, which seems to be shaped by various regional, global and local drivers. The drivers that will be discussed in this article are the Arab Spring, populism and Islamophobism in the EU, as well as neo-Ottomanism and Islamism in Turkey. Situated at the centre of these drivers, migration has become a tool leveraged by the Turkish government to attain both domestic and international objectives. Sometimes, this leverage has had a cohesive character as far as the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi)'s overtures towards the Middle Eastern countries are concerned, and sometimes coercive features as far as the AKP's drives towards EU member states are concerned over the last decade.

Immigration, foreign policy and international relations have become embedded fields of study over the last few decades. Referring to various cases in the contemporary world, both Michael S. Teitelbaum and Christopher Mitchell stressed how foreign policy impacts international migration, and how past migration flows impacted foreign policy. (1) On the one hand, military interventions clearly trigger both domestic and international migration. This is what many Latin American countries experienced in the 1970s (e.g. Chile). Turkey also experienced a similar set of mass emigration flows in the aftermath of the 1960 and 1980 military coups. (2) On the other hand, we also know very well how diasporic populations play an important role in the complex foreign policy decision-making processes of the sending countries. The Jewish diaspora, Chinese diaspora, Indian diaspora, Palestinian diaspora, Puerto Rican diaspora and Turkish diaspora are some examples demonstrating the intricate relationship between diasporic communities and their homeland states. (3)

Several other experts have also become interested in revealing the complex relationship between migration and international relations. Kelly M. Greenhill, Fiona B. Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas are some of these experts. (4) Juliette Tolay has also elaborated on the relationship between Syrian mass migration and the images of state power in the Turkish case. (5) Kelly M. Greenhill focused on the use of migration by state actors to attain foreign policy objectives. Referring to different case studies such as the 1994 Cuban crisis, the 1999 Kosovo crisis and the EU-Turkey Refugee Statement (2016), she studied the ways in which migration flows are purposefully engineered to pursue certain political goals domestically and internationally. (6) She calls this phenomenon "strategic engineered migration". According to her, there are four different forms of engineered migration: "dispossessive engineered migration" in which the principal objective is the appropriation of the territory, or property of another group; "exportive engineered migration" in which the main objective is to reinforce a domestic political position, or to destabilize foreign government(s); "militarized engineered migration" the objective of which is to gain military advantage against an adversary, or to enhance one's own force structure, via the acquisition of additional resources; and "coercive engineered migration," which is created intentionally in order to coerce another state into providing specific political, military or economic advantages. (7) Kelly M. Greenhill, Fiona B. Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas have also demonstrated that states that lack capability in other areas may at times attempt to leverage the issue of migration to enhance their bargaining position vis-â-vis more powerful states. (8) It seems that Turkey falls into this category of states under the AKP rule, a party that tends to use migration as leverage to achieve goals in both international relations vis-â-vis the EU member states and the Arab world, as well as in domestic politics following the mass migration towards the Middle East before 2015 and towards Europe in 2015. However, the features of this tool for leverage under the AKP rule are not always the same. This article will demonstrate that the AKP's use of migration as leverage has some cohesive elements as far as Turkish foreign policy objectives in the Middle East are concerned, and some coercive elements as far as the foreign policy objectives in the EU countries are concerned. The main point of this article is that the AKP's failure to become a soft and smart power in international relations has provoked her to use migration as a coercive leverage tool in its foreign policy actions and objectives, both towards EU or in general.

The research for this article was previously conducted within the framework of three Horizon 2020 projects titled "FUTURE: The Future of EU-Turkey Relations", "RESPOND: Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond", and "ISLAM-OPHOB-ISM: Youth Radicalisation in Europe". The qualitative data gathered in this work, including speeches of leading political figures, legal texts, and relevant websites, were analysed through the discourse analysis method with specific emphasis on the concepts of migration, refugees, diplomacy, international relations, domestic policy and foreign policy. (9) In this regard, this article will try to establish the relationship between the debates on migration and international relations in the Turkish context.

This article will first analyse the relevance of changing migration policies in Turkey with the quest to become a soft and smart power in international relations before and after the Arab Spring. Subsequently, the article will scrutinize the relationship between the revival of the Ottoman heritage and the growing emphasis of the Turkish state actors in the Muslim Middle East including Syria. The article will then discuss the growing visibility of an Islamic tone in the process of accommodating Syrian refugees since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, with a particular focus on the political discourses of 'guesthood,' benevolence and the Ansar spirit. The discussion on the political discourses employed in accommodating Syrians under temporary protection will be followed by the ways in which the AKP government responded to the augmentation of right-wing populist and anti-Muslim sentiments in European countries. This section will analyse the process of co-radicalisation between right-wing populist political discourses both in Turkey and the EU, which is likely to lead to the culturalisation of what is social, political and economic in international relations and in the Turkish diaspora. The article will conclude with an assessment of migration diplomacy enacted by the Turkish state actors on the basis of the EU-Turkey Statement on the refugees (put into force on 18 March 2016) and the Readmission Agreement between the EU and Turkey (signed on 16 December 2013). This last section will focus on the elaboration of the ways in which migration has been used by the AKP rule to accomplish foreign policy objectives in international relations as well as domestic policy objectives.

Arab Spring and Turkey's Quest for being a Soft Power

The way the Turkish government has so far perceived migration and asylum matters indicates that foreign-and asylum-policy are intertwined, while at the same time generating differences in coping with refugees and migrants in general. It is evident that the Turkish foreign policy makers had not expected the Arab Spring at the end of 2010. Then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu identified this process as a political "earthquake" in the Middle East. (10) In accordance with this change, Ankara had to reconsider its "zero problems with neighbours" strategy, which entailed a combined approach to cooperative security relations and economic interdependence in international relations. (11)

The Arab Revolutions forced Turkish foreign policy to take on a new role in the 'new' Middle East, which had serious implications on the region. Turkey did not have sufficient capabilities to be active beyond its role as a model of democracy in a Muslim society. (12) The Arab Spring also created a political vacuum in the Middle East, which was leveraged by the AKP, particularly after the Syrian civil war in 2011. An assertive foreign policy of Turkey and its willingness to be the 'play maker actor to establish the order in the Middle East' led to the 'open-door' and humanitarian asylum policy at the early stages of the Syrian mass migration. However, the failure of Turkish foreign policy in the region, along with the growing number of refugees has brought about the revision of the adopted policy towards 'temporary protection', 'voluntary return' and 'burden sharing'. Turkey's 'open door' policy towards the Syrian refugees could be interpreted in different ways. A multiplicity of drivers such as humanitarian, religious, political and ethno-cultural factors can be considered to explain the major assumptions of the policymakers in Turkey. In this regard, another important factor, which is often neglected, is Turkey's quest to become a soft and smart power (i.e., the use of both hard and soft power to attain foreign policy objectives) in the region. This has radically changed Turkey's official discourse on becoming a country of immigration. (13)

Joseph Nye defines power as the "ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants". (14) He further underlines that there are several ways to influence the behaviour of others. Moreover, Nye defined soft power as "the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by the cooperative means of framing the agenda, persuasion and positive attraction". (15) In...