Measuring social perception of the July 15 coup attempt.

• Author: Mis, Nebi

Introduction

Following the advent of democratic politics (in 1946) and in the current Republican era of Turkey, the military intervened in politics five times --roughly once every ten years (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007). Considering the level of political and economic development and the degree of democratization efforts in Turkey, the struggle against the pro-coup mentality and structures have made a late start in Turkey when compared to countries with a similar geo-politic profile.

The showdown with and the fight against the system of military tutelage began immediately after the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power. Although instruments of tutelage were eliminated considerably, the pro-junta affiliated with FETO (the Fetullah Gulen Terror Organization), the disciples of which have been permeating into the military over 40 years, made a bloody coup attempt on July 15, 2016. The coup was orchestrated by a group, the junta structure and the organization ideology of which differ from those of the military coups in the past in that it was planned as an armed revolt. In order to achieve their aims, the perpetrators were willing to use terrorrising methods such as helicopters and tanks with heavy weapons and F-16s dropping bombs to kill civilians. In addition, the pro-junta not only bombed some strategic institutions of the state, such as the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), the Presidential Complex, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) compounds and security buildings, but also tried to assassinate President Recep Tayyip Erdogan using specially trained teams. The plotters behind the coup attempt, executed outside of the military chain of command, are part of a structure based on a sect of Muslims who follow a particular understanding of Islam dictated to them by their leader Fetullah Gulen. In this respect, the motivation, the planning, the implementation, and the aim of the attempted coup differ from those of previous coup d'etats as the culprits had allegencies to an external organization.

During the junta's coup attempt, first President Erdogan and then the chairmen of both the ruling and the opposition parties called on the people to resist. Consequently the coup failed because of the popular resistance and the determination of the political parties, the media and NGOs against the coup plotters. Regrettably, a total of 250 people were martyred and 2,195 were wounded in this insurgence--the bloodiest attempt in Turkey's history of coups. On the night of July 15, the society showed an exemplary resistance to the coup, and in the following days the resistance turned into "democracy watch." Thousands of people poured into the streets and the squares every night to express their rejection of the perpetrators and the democracy watch lasted 27 days, until August 10, 2016.

The civilian initiative that emerged on the night of July 15 stayed on guard for democracy watch in hundreds of squares across Turkey. The revelation of views and perceptions of the civilian initiative on the attempted coup is of importance. Without doubt, the emerging social picture, during and after July 15, deserves careful sociological attention beyond civilian-military relations. In this context, new definitions and conceptualizations are needed. For this research, a total of 176 individuals in 9 cities and 12 squares were interviewed between July 18 and August 10, 2016, for a sound assessment, together with the support of primary data directly collected in the field on the social uprising against the coup. The main theme and focus of the research was to capture the social consciousness that thwarted the coup attempt.

Undoubtedly, the democracy watch became the most concrete reflection of this social consciousness. Based on the interviews with the participants of the democracy watch, the study aims to analyze the social consciousness that rose against the coup attempt and how people perceived the events of that night.

Method, Frame, and Constraints of the Field Research

The research was conducted in the cities of Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Diyarbakir, Trabzon, Adana, Van, Sakarya, and Eskicehir which are considered to be representative of the whole country. The sample cities were chosen both because they experienced the most violence committed by the putschists during the coup attempt on the night of July 15 because their residents took to the streets in larger numbers than other cities and also for the purpose of geographical representation.

The method of qualitative data gathering was used in the research. Therefore, direct and observable data were collected postulating that the relation between the collected data and their social context would be displayed clearly. (2)

Interviews were conducted with a total of 175 individuals from different age groups. However, the age group of over 18 was particularly concentrated on since the content of the research was weighed more by political issues. Yet, the age group of 15-18--although limited in number--was also interviewed in order to include their viewpoints. Personal information of the participants was not requested nor ware the names of the interviewees mentioned in the research. Excerpts from the interviews are included in this paper. The participants and the cities in which the interviews were conducted are coded and abbreviated as shown in Table 1.

As the excerpts from the interviews are included in this study, each is given a number together with the abbreviation of the city. The coding of the interviews is depicted in Scheme 1.

On the whole semi-structured interviews were conducted for the research with a limited number of focus group interviews. Face-to-face interviews with the participants lasted on average 25-30 minutes. Quota sampling was applied to reflect similar distributions of the age groups and genders of the participants, again, for the sake of obtaining sound results. The research paid as much attention as possible to social diversity, identity groups and differing political views of the participants.

A total of 19 basic questions were asked to measure the viewpoints of the participants under the following headings: "motivations to take to the streets on the night of July 15," "experiences in the streets," "duration of stay in the street," "the failure of the coup attempt," "the FETO-external powers relation," "the struggle of the ruling power in the post-coup attempt period," "the attitude of the opposition parties in the face of the coup attempt," "FETO's role in the coup attempt," "the view on FETO prior to the coup attempt," "the view on TAF and security forces," "comparison with the past coup d'etats," "in the period of the post-coup attempt, the fight against FETO and other elements involved," and "what would have happened if the attempt had been successful."

Some of the participants hesitated to be interviewed because of the on-going discussions over the danger of a possible renewed coup attempt and the trauma they were suffering from was quite fresh to them. Women, in particular, seemed to approach the request for an interview with reservations, but men seemed more comfortable. Another constraint was that although a balanced distribution of participant profiles were intended for the sake of social diversification, individuals who would satisfy a well-balanced distribution in terms of political views could not be reached easily. The reason was that generally conservative and nationalist identity groups were attending the democracy watch. To compensate for this imbalance, as many individuals as possible were interviewed at the Taksim rally of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP). Since other opposition leaders also attended the Yenikapi Democracy Meeting in Istanbul, interviews were conducted with more people with the thought that they were the voters of the opposition parties. On the other hand, interviews were made with people at the cafes and streets other than those who joined democracy watch in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Van and Diyarbakir.

Motivation for Resistance to the July 15 Coup Attempt

The failure of the July 15 coup attempt was the result of strong and hard popular resistance to the putschists. Thus, the question "What was the main motivation behind the emergence of such resistance?" is critical. Many people were confused initially with the low altitude flights of F-16 fighter jets over the capital of Ankara being the first sign that something unusual was taking place. People in Istanbul, considered the possibility of a terror attack when the entrances to the Bosporus Bridge [newly renamed as the July 15 Democracy Martyrs Bridge] were closed by the pro-coup soldiers. Many others were concerned that the country was under attack by foreign forces, but only a few people realised that it was a coup d'etat. In fact, the views of the participants confirm this initial confusion and disbelief.

A cab driver in Kizilay, Ankara, who witnessed the coup attempt from the first moment said:

"Flights started at 8.30 pm. Then, I said, there is something wrong here. If it were a day of celebration, these would be airplanes for show or parade, there is something fishy here (...) I thought that our soldiers were going to strike some places again, but it never occurred to me that it would be a coup. I saw the Kenan Evren coup d'etat (of 1980), I have lived through three coups. I am 82-years-old, but have never seen such a coup." (ANK-21)

After the initial period of uncertainty, people started to learn about the coup attempt through the news pouring from the media and social media at which point many of them took to the streets. Seemingly, their states of mind were driven mainly by rage, fear, enthusiasm, self-reliance and anxiety. Later in the night, people were relatively relaxed and as they succeeded in the struggle against the pro-coup soldiers, so they gained more self-confidence.

About three...