Making Sense of Turkey's Foreign Policy from the Perspective of Neorealism.

• Author: Oguzlu, Tarik

Introduction

Making sense of Turkish foreign policy since the foundation of the Republic requires an in-depth analysis of individual, internal and external factors in a comprehensive manner. However, rather than taking into account all such factors, this study singles out the impact of systemic and external factors on the formulation and implementation of Turkey's foreign policy decisions. Such an exercise would accord with a neorealist interpretation of Turkish foreign policy (TFP), as the main emphasis will be on the impact of the anarchical nature of the external environment, and the influence of the distribution of material power capabilities among states at a given time on their foreign policy choices. This in no way suggests that the internal and individual level of factors holds secondary place in comparison to systemic/external factors. For example, it is already known that in recent decades, neo-classical realism has emerged as an academic effort, to combine the insights of external and internal factors in this regard. Unlike neoclassical realism or other theoretical perspectives that highlight the importance of individiual and domestic level factors, neorealism would appear to offer a more generalized and bird's eye perspective on foreign policy trends of countries for a given time period. Rather than dealing with a single case, or a very narrowly specified time period, neorealism seems to be a much better indicator in offering mid-to-long term foreign policy trends, predispositions and orientations.

This study considers Turkey as a middle power actor in international politics. This identity is attributed to both Turkey's material power capacity - in comparison to more powerful great powers and less powerful small powers - and Turkey's decades-old geopolitical vision of striking the right balance among the great powers, so that Turkey could follow a multidimensional and multidirectional foreign policy orientation.

That said, the following section discusses the key assumptions of neorealism as they relate to the foreign policy choices of middle powers. Here, the main goal is to demonstrate how the anarchical nature of the international environment, the distribution of material power capacity among states, and their geopolitical locations, act as constraining and enabling factors in foreign policy. Then the attention shifts to a periodical discussion of TFP. The time periods under consideration are as follows: The interwar years and Second World War, the Cold War era, the post-Cold War era between 1991 and 2008, and finally the years since the global financial crisis of 2008. All these time periods evinced different power configurations and systemic features, and Turkey's ability to respond to external developments and craft its own policies have been very much informed by the dynamics of international politics outside of Turkey's borders. The main reason why such a periodization is offered is that the time periods under consideration neatly reflect the changes in balance of power dynamics in international political environment. They have nothing to do in particular with the pecularities of Turkish foreign policy. Besides, this periodization in no way suggests that this is the most appropriate periodical classification.

Neorealism and Middle Powers

Neorealism is a theorical perspective that puts an overwhelming emphasis on the explanatory value of the anarchical international environment in assessing the foreign policy choices of states. Neorealism attributes a degree of explanatory power to how material power in the international system is distributed among states at a given time. Whether the system is unipolar, bipolar or multipolar would have an immense impact on how countries define their international orientation. (1) The distribution of material power capability among states determines the limits of what they could potentially achieve in their foreign policies. Countries, depending on their power capacities, know (should know) how far they could go in terms of their foreign policy ambitions. Countries with different power capabilities would logically end up defining their foreign policy interests differently.

Neorealism values the anarchical structure of international political environment as the main variable affecting how states formulate and implement their foreign policy choices. Yet, the impact of the anarchical environment on states' foreign policies would vary with states' power capabilities. States with different power capabilities would react to the anarchical structure of international politics differently. Concerns over territorial security/survival, societal cohesion and economic prosperity would increase as states are positioned further down the ladder of power hierarchy. (2)

Ensuring territorial security, and strengthening material power capacity to that end would shape foreign policy priorities of small and middle powers more deeply than it would the great powers, for the destiny of the former would very much depend on the dynamics of the geopolitical competition among the latter. Compared to the great powers, small and middle powers would feel the pressure of 'lack of trust' and 'short shadow of future' problems in anarchical international environments more acutely and deeply. The risk of entrusting their security on the good intentions and security commitments of others would be much higher in the case of small and middle powers than it would be for the great powers. That said, this article finds the key insights of the defensive neorealism of Kenneth Waltz more useful than Mearheimer's offensive realist account. (3)

Geographical location and the psychical attributes of countries constitute a great share of their power capacity, mostly measured in material terms. Of all theoretical accounts, neorealism seem to be most in line with the policy prescriptions of classical geopolitics. Because all states want to survive and grow more powerful than others within the anarchical international environment, their geographical location and psychical attributes caused by their terrain would play decisive roles in this regard. In the case of small and middle powers, their geographical location is a very important force multiplier at their disposal, and they tend to use this as a leverage in their relations with more powerful actors.

Neorealism also suggests that foreign policy is first and foremost very much about how states react to developments taking place outside their borders. Neither the internal characteristics of states nor the individual attributes of their decision makers would have a decisive impact on foreign policy outcomes. Put differently, leaders would view the international environment and the position of their countries within it from the perspective of the state they rule. The 'reason of state' would outweigh the political ideologies of ruling elites, the individual characteristics of decision makers and societal attributes. (4) National interests, defined in terms of material power capabilities, would be the main prism through which leaders would respond to external developments.

Neorealism differs from many other theoretical accounts in terms of the role it assigns to the primacy of the great powers in international politics. Compared to middle powers and small powers, it is the great powers that have the capacity to influence how the international system is structured at a given time and which determine which issues matter in international politics. (5) Unlike lesser powers, the great powers have the luxury of competing with each other so as to decide how to define the underpinning values and issues of international politics. Based on their interactions with each other, analys

Ts would be able to assess whether the international system at a given time would be cooperative or conflictual. That said, foreign policy from the perspective of middle and small powers would consist of attempts at adjusting themselves to fit in with the interactions among the great powers. This suggests that international politics in essence consists of the games that the great powers play with each other in terms of shaping the material and normative foundations of the international order at any given time.

Compared to the great powers, lesser powers are more prone to building their foreign policies on the basis of opportunities and limits as offered by the system. They do not have much agency in shaping their foreign policy interests independent of these structural limits and opportunities. This also suggests that the foreign policies of lesser powers are more mechanical and responsive to external factors. (6) The key foreign policy interests of lesser powers are ensuring the continuation of their territorial integrity, societal cohesion and economic prosperity.

Their ability to achieve such interests would vary as to whether the international system is structured around unipolarity, bipolarity or multipolarity. Middle powers are more powerful than small powers, yet their ability to help shape their regional environments in line with their priorities would be very much constrained by the degree to which the great powers are involved in their regions. The existing great powers and other regional middle powers could potentially act as enablers or constrainers.

A unipolar international environment means that there is only one great power within the system, and all other actors try to adjust themselves to the whims, aspirations and policies of that power. To the extent that they develop cooperative and cordial relations with the sole great power, all lesser powers would be able to survive and prosper. Looking from this perspective, the strategy of bandwagoning would remain the only game in town for many lesser powers. The capacity of middle powers to play leadership and hegemonic roles in their region would be very much informed by the degree to which their policies and...