Making Sense of Risky Haredi Behaviors in Israel During the Covid-19 Pandemic/Covid-19 Pandemisi Doneminde Israil'deki Riskli Haredi Davranislarini Anlamlandirmak.

• Author: Belder, Ferit

Introduction

Since the first infection was reported in the late 2019, the Covid-19 has turned into a pandemic, having worldwide effects on the daily routines of people, the state and societal relations in various forms and on worldwide relations by causing a high level of ambivalence. If one direction of this emerging uncertainty addresses the psychological disorders observed among individuals, the other direction must point out the political and sociological impacts of the anti-virus measures taken by national governments, mainly restrictions and lockdowns, making for exceptional moments within the regularity of daily life through the securitization of public health. There is a growing literature on the country-case government responses to the pandemic, and also on the rise of nationalism and populism. However, the potential consequences of state interventions, such as the closures of educational and religious centers, and the reorganization of public space, especially in countries where the pre-pandemic socio-political status quo had already been securitized by the societal actors, are yet to be studied. In this regard, this paper aims to analyze the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) resistance to the nationwide pandemic measures and weeks-long lockdowns in Israel, by asking why Haredim (1) acted controversially and endangered their lives, when the rest of Israeli society mostly complied with the instructions.

To answer this question, this paper firstly addresses the already bourgeoning literature on ontological security with great respect for the concepts of anxiety and fear on the one hand, and the disruption of anxiety management mechanisms like narratives, and routines on the other. Secondly, it examines the historical evolution of the Haredi identity, its political accommodation in Israel, and current challenges threatening Haredi autonomy. Lastly, it analyzes how the pandemic measures provoked the existing fears of the Haredi community whilst causing new anxieties, and how Hare-dim dealt with them. This article claims that during the pandemic, Haredi societal leaders not only failed to articulate the coronavirus phenomenon, its scope and effects to their members, but also lost control over those routines (or the means of societal reproduction) like non-stop Torah learning, congregating for prayer, funerals and other activities, which the Haredi identity is all about. The less control they had over re-productive routines and narrative building, the more anxious they felt, and eventually the more radicalized and controversial their responses became, even at the expense of the lives of many. To do so, the discursive and practical responses given by the Haredi political and spiritual leaders toward the government's pandemic instructions are examined, to see how the sustainability of societal reproduction was prioritized over the physical security of the members of the society. Regarding political leadership, great emphasis is placed on the then-leader and only cabinet member of Yahadut HaTorah and health minister in the early period of the pandemic, Yaakov Litzman. In terms of the spiritual leadership, the responses of the prominent Yeshiva Heads (Rosh Yeshiva) and Hasidic Admors are examined.

Ontological Security and Some Key Concepts: Anxiety, Fear, Narratives, Routines, and Risky Behaviors

The concept 'ontological security' finds its roots in the works of Scottish psychiatrist Ronald David Laing and English sociologist Anthony Giddens. (2) The primary focus of the term is the continuation of a stable sense of 'integral selfhood' (3) or 'self-identity' (4). For Giddens, ontological security expresses 'an autonomy of bodily control within predictable routines'. (5) From the 1990s onwards, Giddens' works have become a reference point for subsequent works in other disciplines. It was Jef Huysmans who applied the concept to security studies, by distinguishing certain threats to daily security ordered social relations from ontological security, derived from the uncertainty and the demise of determinacy. (6) Bill McSweeney also underscored this certainty dimension by arguing that ontological security is about being in cognitive control of the situation, and dependent on the sense that the social order is consistent with one's expectations and ability to proceed. (7)

In her political psychology article, Catarina Kinnvall discussed the ontological insecurities of individuals and groups in the age of globalization and the rise of religious nationalism, as a response to this insecurity, and defined ontological security as "a security of being, a sense of confidence and trust that the world is what it appears to be". (8) Jennifer Mitzen applied this approach to the International Relations discipline by defining the concept as "security not of the body but of the self, the subjective sense of who one is, which enables and motivates action and choice", and argued that similar to individuals, states not only seek physical security but also look for ontological security or the security of the self. (9) Brent J. Steele also attributed the role of ontological security seeking to states, by claiming that its fulfilment affirms a state's self-identity by affirming not only its physical existence but also how a state sees itself and how it wants to be seen by others. (10) This affirmation by others is also prominent in Ayse Zarakol's definition, as she argued that ontological security is having a consistent sense of self and that sense affirmed by others. (11)

The use of the approach at the state-level or the society-level enabled the application of several case studies, to discuss the non-physical security orientations of collectivities. Giddens' approach attributed a security provider role to society, as it gives individuals a sense of the past, present and future. (12) Similarly, in order to justify applying this approach to the state level, Mitzen argued that the identity of a society also requires routinization to provide identity security for the individuals belonging to that particular group, and that state distinctiveness is the assurance of this stability. (13) Following the path of Mitzen, one could also claim that communities, even if they are not necessarily associated with state bodies like ethnic and religious minorities, could be the object of analysis in ontological security research. This sort of shift would be like the analytical transformation of the 'society' in security studies from a sector of state security into a security object in itself, during the 1990s. (14) The ontological security needs of societies do not always match with the ontological needs of the states that they formally belong to. According to Uriel Abulof, ethnic ontological security emerges through historical continuity and societal unity, and challenges to these create ontological insecurities. (15) In their studies focusing on the failure of the peace process in Turkey, Bahar Rumelili and Ayse Betul Celik also underscored the role of a societal narrative which is not necessarily represented by a state body. (16) However, the absence of certain and concrete threats to identity theoretically differs ontological security from societal security, because the former underlines an ongoing concern with its stability. (17) By highlighting the difference between epistemic and ontological insecurities, Abulof emphasized the ontologi-cal essence of the question 'do we have a future?', by adding 'as what?' and 'for what?' dimensions. (18) Additionally, for him, not all ethnic communities have similar level of insecurities. 'Small nations' or 'small peoples', terms he used to define ethnic communities like (Israeli) Jews whose members have deep-rooted doubts about the existence of the collective self, are more prone to existential insecu-rity. (19) However, in the case of the Haredim, the organizational spirit of this small nation (Zionism) also became a source of threat, as it envisaged a modern nation for the future of the Jewish people, as opposed to traditional religious leadership and its self-image for the answer to the question 'as what'.

Anxiety and Fear

The difference between anxiety and fear in terms of the former's lacking a clear object whereas the lat-ter's having one, and anxiety's need to be transformed into fear, are two central aspects occupying the ontological security literature. Giddens defined anxiety as a fear that has lost its object, expressing internal dangers rather than externalized danger, and an unconsciously organized state of fear. (20) For Paul Tillich, the only object can be the threat itself rather than the source of the threat, which is in fact nothingness. (21) Rumelili, by giving reference to Kierkegaard's existentialist philosophy, also defined anxiety as a product of the ambiguity of the sustainable future of one's existence. (22) The lack of a well-defined externalized threat is a determinant aspect of the state of anxiety, which also affects given responses. For Kinnvall and Mitzen, while fear is able to prompt a response in either fight or flight, anxiety, as a general psychic condition, may incite multiple responses in a wide range of possibilities. (23) In the same pattern, Felix Berenskoetter puts knowledge as the anti-thesis of anxiety that generates a feeling of comfort which he defines as a sense of epistemological peace. (24) However, despite this distinction making a stimulating contribution to theoretical thinking, emerging anxieties and already defined existing fears often overlap in practice. For example, during the pandemic lockdowns, Haredi leaders' anxieties have also derived from the existing fears of state intervention into societal autonomies.

Narratives and Routines

Giddens underscored the role of basic trust, and the protective cocoons which give individuals a sense of the continuity of daily routines, and an environment where you know what to expect, as a provider of the...