Roaring in Libya, whispering in others: UN Security Council's posture during the 'Arab spring'.

• Author: Aral, Berdal
• Position: Report

Major Problems in the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention

The doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention', which the UNSC expounded in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War era, gave the Council new powers, inter alia, against regimes that violate human rights on a grand scale. According to Sean Murphy, humanitarian intervention can be defined as:

"threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights." (1)

UNSC actions, known as 'humanitarian intervention,' stem from humanitarian considerations such as ethnic cleansing, mass murder, illegal overthrow of democratic governments, civil wars that mostly victimize civilians, and collective human suffering due to starvation. In a remarkable departure from old orthodoxies about the definition of 'threat' to international peace as stemming solely from military aggression, the UNSC, in a presidential statement adopted in 1992, expressed the view that:

"the absence of war and military conflicts among States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security." (2)

This meant that the essential principles of sovereignty and non-intervention would henceforward be cast aside in the pursuit of greater human rights protection, thus reflecting the general progress of international law in the direction of individual human rights and human security at the expense of the firmly established principle of 'state sovereignty.' The weakening of the considerations of sovereignty, at least theoretically, could justify UN sanctioned offensives against mass killings, war crimes or illegal overthrow of elected governments with bloody consequences. Indeed, by virtue of a series of resolutions originating in an expanded definition of Article 39 of the UN Charter (3) concerning threats to international peace and security, the Council has since authorized numerous military interventions in response to humanitarian crisis which have been essentially 'domestic' in nature. (4) These include interventions into Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), Libya (2011), South Sudan (2011) and Cote d'lvoire (2011).

However, the UNSC's performance since the endorsement of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has not been consistent. Although scores of resolutions were passed by the UNSC condemning Serb aggression against the recognized state of Bosnia in April 1992, members of the Council with military muscle refrained, for instance, from protecting 'safe havens' like Sarajevo, Bihac and Tuzla from Serb attacks. Up until the commission of genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995, when 8,000 Bosnians were wiped out by the Serb forces, the UNSC opted for a non-committal posture in the face of a long list of 'war crimes' and 'crimes against humanity' committed in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, representing one of the low points for the UN. (5)

The dismal record of the UNSC in the course of the Rwandan genocide further eroded the prestige and credibility of this world body. Once the orgy of mass killings committed mainly by Hutu militias began in April 1994, permanent members of the UNSC such as the US and Britain spoke of this drama as a 'civil war.' They succeeded in limiting the Council's objective to the attainment of a ceasefire. (6) When the killings ended in July 1994, roughly 800,000 Rwandans, most of whom were Tutsis, had perished.

The human rights disaster in Chechnya further tarnished the image of the UNSC in the post-Cold War era, as the Council took no action while the Russian troops, seeking to quash the armed insurrection for Chechnya's independence, committed massive war crimes against the breakaway region of Chechnya between 1994-1996 and 1999-2009. All in all, while thousands of innocent civilians were killed, nearly 300,000 Chechens out of a population of 1.1 million people were forced to leave their homes. (7) The mass killings of innocent people in Algeria by elements of the military junta after the second round of elections was cancelled in 1991 in order to prevent the Islamic Salvation Front's victory were likewise brushed off by the UNSC.

Failure of the UNSC to act in a principled and consistent manner has served to diminish the credibility and legitimacy, not only of the Council, but the entire system of the United Nations. The very existence of permanent membership generates double standards in the application of humanitarian intervention, since there is almost no possibility of punishing the 'permanent members' of the UNSC (the US, Britain, Russia, China and France) or their allies for crimes of a humanitarian nature (or, crimes of aggression) due to the accompanying 'right of veto.' Hence, a mechanism that bypasses state sovereignty is bound to 'hurt' the states/regimes that lack patronage in the Council. Indeed all the cases of humanitarian intervention have, as far as the states at the receiving end of such operations are concerned, involved small and/or economically impoverished states, as in the case of humanitarian crisis in (northern) Iraq, Somalia, Haiti (8) (1994) and Sudan (Darfur region; 2004 onwards) (9).

In the remaining parts of this essay, we shall see how these factors played themselves out in the course of the Arab Spring. It has been argued that, by virtue of the doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention', the UNSC possesses the necessary powers to put in motion a series of resolutions appropriate to the specifics of a particular Arab country in order to prevent, or at least keep at a minimum, massive human rights abuses committed by most of the Arab regimes bent on maintaining the status quo. The main concerns of this presentation are formulated around the following questions: With regard to which cases did the UNSC adopt resolutions? What was the substance of the resolution(s)? Were there any cases of aborted draft resolutions? If yes, why were they aborted? How have the individual permanent members viewed the Arab revolutions? What lessons can be drawn from the UNSC's attitude in the course of the civil uprisings in the Arab world?

Revolt in Libya

A dramatic episode in modern history unfolded as truly historic events shattered the Arab world in 2010-2013 when the disgruntled Arab masses began toppling regimes one by one in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya (coupled with international armed support) and Yemen. The uprising in Bahrain has been crushed thanks in particular to the Saudi military intervention, although the ruling dynasty promised significant changes. In the case of Syria, after peaceful demonstrations calling for an end to the authoritarian regime were confronted with a violent response by the security forces, the opposition formed armed units to wage war against the regime. Before abrogating power, the unpopular regimes sought to crush the revolts through brute force by, inter alia, ordering security forces to fire on demonstrators. Moreover, hundreds of demonstrators were arbitrarily arrested, some activists were kidnapped and many prisoners were tortured. Increasing civilian deaths and injuries resulted in the ensuing refugee crisis, particularly in Libya and Syria, where the confrontation between insurgents and security forces was more violent than in others. This was a historic opportunity for the UNSC to prove that it could take a principled stance in the face of these momentous events in the Arab world. Of course, this involved hard choices about whether to resort to 'humanitarian intervention' on account of massive human rights violations, which were undoubtedly tantamount to 'crimes against humanity,' committed by the crumbling regimes.

During the course of the Arab revolutions, the UNSC, relying on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, took 'effective action' only in one case: the uprising in Libya.10 In this case, the Council decided to confront Libya after the Gaddafi regime declared war on demonstrators with an ensuing wave of civilian massacres. Indeed, relying on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC passed Resolution 197011 in February 2011, which called for "an immediate end to the violence" and "steps to fulfill the legitimate demands of the population." Resolution 1970 also referred the Libyan authorities, who were involved in human rights crimes, to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Finally, this resolution imposed an arms embargo on the Libyan state, travel ban on selected individuals assuming state authority, and asset freeze of listed individuals. While implicitly suggesting that the situation in Libya was a 'threat to international peace and security,' this resolution did not, however, envision forceful action against Libya. As the Libyan episode became ever bloodier, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973, which set "to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack" in Libya. Furthermore, under the same resolution, the whole of Libya was declared a no-fly zone. Thus, the UNSC authorized the use of "all means necessary" to protect civilians in Libya. (12) This resolution was the final product of the joint initiative by France, the US and Britain, all of which are permanent members of the Council, and was put into effect by NATO member states from March 2011. The NATO operation, in liaison with the Libyan armed opposition, succeeded in bringing down the Gaddafi regime in October 2011.13

From one standpoint, one could speak favorably of a resolution that authorized a no-fly zone in all of Libya against a despotic regime that had become a 'threat' to its people. Resolution 1973 could thus be praised for making civilian protection its major goal and its support of the freedom struggle of the Libyan people. From another point of view, however, the Libyan campaign may be...